

Population Transfers in Asia

By

JOSEPH B. SCHECHTMAN

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New York
HALLSBY PRESS
1949

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JV 8490
S 35

Printed in the United States of America

P R E F A C E

UNTIL very recently students of international affairs thought of minority problems as an exclusively European matter. They seldom gave due consideration to the fact that in Asiatic countries, too, there are many complicated minority questions, some of them of so explosive a nature that they threaten world peace no less than the most acute minority problems of Europe.

The author has made an exhaustive study of the transfer and exchange of European minorities during and after World War II. Against that background he attempts in this work to analyze a number of Asiatic minority problems which, he has become fully convinced, can be solved only by transfer and/or exchange of population.

A few particularly characteristic and instructive instances have been selected for study. The first is the Hindu-Moslem conflict which found expression in the huge, epochal, unorganized exchange of population between the newborn Dominions of Pakistan and India. The second concerns Middle East Christians particularly: the repatriation of scattered Armenian minorities to Soviet Armenia and the desperate plight of the remnant of the ancient Assyrians. A special chapter is devoted to the plan of Arab-Jewish exchange of population, which, in the author's opinion, offers great promise for the peaceful development of Palestine and the entire Middle East.

The scope and character of this study have been greatly influenced by the fact that it is a pioneer in its field. Because of the very recent or contemporary character of most of the events dealt with here, the author has had to rely largely on newspaper reports. He has made every effort to use this raw and often contradictory material in the most cautious and critical way, in order to piece together a cogent description of the transfers that have occurred and to present a thorough discussion of the problems involved.

March, 1949

JOSEPH B. SCHECHTMAN


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To My Wife and Collaborator

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MOVEMENTS OF REFUGEES FROM AND TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN



White arrows indicate movement from India to Pakistan; black arrows, movement from Pakistan to India.

THE HINDU-MOSLEM EXCHANGE OF POPULATION

THE 389,000,000 inhabitants of the Indian sub-continent speak 325 recognizable languages, fifteen of them used for official purposes, and many more dialects. In addition to being divided by tribe, nation, caste, and race, they are split into several warring religions and sects, including Hindus, Moslems, Buddhists, Sikhs, Christians, and Jains. They are separated into a number of distinctly hostile groups, for whom not their country but their religious community is the basis of nationality. "For that reason," says James C. De Wilde who has had twenty-five years of experience in the Far East, "one will look in vain for an 'Indian'. That type, as we in the West fancy him, does not exist; one will only find Hindus, Moslems, Sikhs, Buddhists, etc."¹

All these communities are, of course, bound together by long centuries of common existence. Their conflicts are not fought on racial grounds: Bengali Muslims and Hindus have far more in common with each other than the former have with the Pathans or the latter with the Tamils. But there also are deep-rooted differences in ancestral origin, since some Indian communities are descended from the aboriginal inhabitants of the land, and others from the Aryan conquerors who came from various countries. The Moslems can never forget that they once ruled India as alien conquerors. Although many Indian Moslems today are descendants of Hindu converts to Islam,² the great majority identify themselves with the Moslems who entered India in successive waves of invasion from the eighth century of our era onwards. Their thoughts constantly turn back to the great period of their rule, the Mogul Empire of Babur and his successors, the

greatest of whom was Akbar, a contemporary of the English Queen Elizabeth. Conversely, the Hindus have not forgotten that they were forced, over a long period of time, to act as the hewers of wood and drawers of water for the conquerors.

In America and in Europe the terms "Hindu", "Moslem", and "Sikh" are used as merely designating religious groups. Technically that is correct. But in India those terms are understood and used differently. The word "religious" seldom appears in Indian newspaper headlines in connection with group conflicts. Indians refer to these group differences as "communal." Religious sects or groups are called "communities." That is closer to the real truth. It is the things that are held or done in common that identify and distinguish each group. Religion in India is not just a faith. It is a way of life, sufficiently differentiated from other ways of life to provide complete self-identification within each group.³ There is a deep gulf between the Moslem religion and mode of life and that of the Hindus. Their notions of social, political and even economic affairs are deeply divergent. Mohammed Ali Jinnah once defined the essential difference between his people and the Hindus as follows: "They worship cow. I eat cow. I defile a Hindu if my shadow falls across him. A Hindu would not take water from my hand. We are utterly different."⁴ The Sikh way of life, too, with its denial of caste, that very essence of the Hindu way of life, sets barriers between them and the majority community. But between Sikhs and Moslems, also, there are long generations of conflict. For it was under the hammer blows of Moslem pressure in the Punjab that the Sikhs were forced into religious and military cohesiveness.

There is also a basic economic difference between the 22 per cent of the Indian people who are Moslems and the 68 per cent who are Hindus. The bulk of the Moslems in India are poor agriculturists. It was chiefly the poorest Hindus who became converted to Islam. As a result, Moslems have been less advanced than Hindus educationally and politically. They have found it

difficult to compete with Hindus in commerce and, when there was open competition, in obtaining official posts. Thus they have suffered from a dual frustration, caused by the Hindus as well as the British. While the Moslems are for the most part farmers and producers, the Hindus are the middlemen who get the produce to market. The Moslems have become increasingly conscious of their economic inferiority; they cite countless examples in which Moslems have been "driven to the wall" by unfair Hindu business practices. In a study, *Pakistan and Moslem India*, published in Bombay in 1943 with a foreword by M. A. Jinnah, the Moslem author complains that "there are certain occupations (shop-keeping, the grain and cloth markets, money-lending) entirely reserved for Hindus and the Moslems have been completely shut out of them . . . even in the purely Moslem areas . . . The Hindu middle class is prosperous and flourishing, and controls the internal and external trade of the country. . . . The Moslem middle class in cities has no choice left except to work as laborers or to seek petty jobs in Government service. . . . The Moslems cannot look upon this state of affairs as a *fait accompli*. Nor can they accept forever the condition of being a debtor community." (p. 4)⁵

Inter-communal tension increased noticeably with the preparations for British withdrawal from India. When offering dominion status to the whole of India, the British Government on March 29, 1942 made a special proviso that the future Indian Constitutional Convention conclude a treaty with Great Britain "for the protection of racial and religious minorities." However, this British scheme for protection of racial and religious minorities in all of India, to be guaranteed by a treaty with Great Britain, has never materialized. Mohammed Jinnah's campaign for a separate Moslem state of Pakistan achieved its goal, but it also intensified and brought to a climax the mutual distrust and fear among Moslems, Hindus and Sikhs, in particular in those areas where the communities were fairly evenly balanced and one or more

of them dreaded becoming a minority after the partition of India. Each of these potential minorities felt uneasy and depressed at the thought of being left to the mercies of the surrounding majority. Embattled Pakistan was looked upon as a promised land by Moslems who felt themselves hopelessly submerged among the overwhelming Hindu-Sikh population of the Dominion of India. Similarly, a "minority complex" developed among the 19,000,000 Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan who began to realize that in that fiercely nationalistic Moslem dominion they might degenerate into second class citizens. To each of these acutely self-conscious minority groups their respective co-racial dominions on the other side of the border became a kind of sanctuary.

Aversion to minority status seems to have been particularly strong among the Moslem community. They pointed to their experience in the United Provinces in 1937-39, as evidence of the fact that where they have been obliged to live under a Hindu majority their rights have been ignored. Choudharry Rahmat Ali, founder and president of the Pakistan national movement, wrote in connection with this question:⁷

What is the fundamental truth about minorities? It is that there are times when minorities are the heralds of their original nations, and others when they are the symbols of their helplessness. Again, there are times when nations can fully assimilate minorities and others, when minorities can fatally sabotage such nations. Finally, there are times when to leave minorities in foreign lands, or to keep alien minorities in your own lands, is a sound policy, and others, when to do either, is childish folly: also when to do neither is saving statesmanship, but when to do both is sure suicide. It is the last contingency which concerns us in the current phase of our life and calls upon us to remember that, in the past, "minorityism" has ever proved itself a major enemy of our Millat, that at present it is sabotaging us religiously, culturally, and politically even in our national lands . . .

To leave our minorities in Hindu lands is . . . to forget the

tragic fate that overwhelmed our minorities which — in more favorable times and with better guarantees than now possible — we left in Sicily, Italy, France, Portugal, Spain, Austria, and Hungary. Where are they now? To ask that question is to answer it in the most poignant terms.

Leaders in both Dominions have honestly tried to eliminate this tense and dangerous minority complex. On Independence Day (August 15, 1947) they eloquently reiterated their guarantee to minorities. "There is no doubt of the leaders' sincerity," Robert Trumbull cabled the *New York Times* from New Delhi on August 16th, "but the question whether Hindus and Moslems can live amicably side by side remains to be answered by events." The answer was given quickly. One month later Trumbull reported: "The leaders of both new nations urged these minorities to stay where they were and guaranteed protection. These leaders were simply not in a position to make such guarantees on behalf of the ignorant fanatical masses. Events proved that these assurances were worthless."⁸

2.

TRUBLE STARTED in the strategic province of Punjab. Moslems were a majority — 57 per cent of its total population of 28,418,000 — and the Moslem League was determined to win the whole of this rich, food-producing province for Pakistan. This plan was violently opposed by the over four million Sikhs (the total number of Sikhs in India is 5,691,000) and by the Hindus. While forming less than 30 per cent of the Punjab population, the Hindus dominated industry, commerce, banking, and the professions in the province and feared that if it went to Pakistan, discriminatory legislation would very soon drive them out of business.

The Hindu Congress demanded the division of the Punjab on ethnic lines as a pre-condition to the cession of Pakistan. This stand was finally accepted by the Moslems and the British. For the

Hindu position was logically unassailable. If a Moslem minority could not with any confidence accept its position in a Hindu-majority federative state, a Hindu or Sikh minority could not with any confidence accept a position in a Moslem-majority unit. It was thus reluctantly agreed that the Hindu and Sikh majority districts in the Punjab and Bengal provinces would be attached to the Hindu, and not to the Moslem, dominion.

But having agreed on the principle, boundary commissions representing each side found it impossible to draw satisfactory or even tolerable frontier lines between the two dominions. In point of fact, no doubt seemed to exist on the basis for the division: it was simply a matter of consulting the census of 1941. But the communal representatives seemed unable to reach any compromise. The Hindu Congress and the Sikhs demanded a demarcation line which would have left some 9,500,000 Moslems (41.8 per cent of the entire Moslem population) in Indian East Punjab; the Moslem line would have left 6,725,000 non-Moslems (or 55 per cent of the total non-Moslem population of the Punjab) in West Punjab, where they then constituted 31.6 per cent of the province's population. At the end, the decision was left to Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the British chairman of the mixed commission, who drew his own line. This line reduced the minorities on either side to what is probably the minimum possible: some 27 per cent of the former Moslem population of the Punjab was left to the east, and 32.5 per cent of the non-Moslems to the west, in each case about 4,000,000 people.⁹

This demarcation line provoked violent criticism. Hindus, Sikhs, and Moslems alike objected strenuously to Sir Cyril's refusal to be guided solely by communal groupings in certain instances where other practical considerations were also highly important. As a result, numerous local communal majorities were converted into minorities overnight. Sir Cyril's own report maintained that considerations of administrative efficiency made these decisions inevitable. He pointed out that "legitimate criticism" would follow, whichever way he ruled.¹⁰

In this he was undoubtedly right. For in India, as well as in Europe, no matter where boundaries were drawn, there would be large population islands left in a community and under a government they regarded as alien and hostile. No sharp geographical line corresponds to a rigid communal line. In fact, there was not one district in Pakistan, not even in the North-West Frontier Province or Sind, without a Hindu minority, while in some districts that minority represented a considerable proportion of the total population. Similarly, a good many areas with a large Moslem population were left on the Hindu side of the frontier. The Sikhs fared worst of all: they were split in two. Hopelessly overshadowed by the two larger communities, the Sikhs were not overjoyed at the thought of being ruled by New Delhi, and they would have protested vociferously if they had been placed *en bloc* within the borders of Pakistan. But to be split into two helpless fragments, partitioned between two alien regimes, was both the most catastrophic and the most humiliating thing that could have happened to them.¹¹

Claims and counter-claims to Punjab areas were pressed so hotly that the fires of communal conflict were ignited several months before partition was effected. Spurred by religious fanaticism, reckless political propaganda, fright and often economic frustration, Moslems, Sikhs, and Hindus fell upon each other with knives, swords, clubs, and the torch.

The first wave of communal riots in the Punjab came when the Moslem League tried to seize power early in 1947. With the support of the British governor, a provincial Cabinet had been scraped together from all the minorities; the League attempted to overturn it and to shake the strong police rule which had been imposed. Gigantic demonstrations by League followers reached strata of the Moslem population which had never before participated in politics, and the Sikh leadership decided to stop the movement by a show of force.¹² In February 1947, Master Tara Singh, political leader of the Sikh community, proclaimed a civil war designed to

keep Moslem rule out of the eastern Punjab and significantly added: "But why should we stop there? We would try to drive them (the Moslems) out of the Punjab entirely."¹³ The Moslems on their part took the offensive. In Lahore, commercial center of Punjab with a population of 671,000, Moslem *goondas* (thugs) began to set fire to the business houses and residences of the 300,000 strong Sikh and Hindu minority, justifying this as a way of establishing the claims of the majority. "Destroy their houses," they said, "and with them their claims to Lahore on the basis of property." Retaliation on the Hindu side came from a nationalistic organization called the *Rashtriya Sevak Singh*, whose whispered reasoning was, "Bomb the Moslems to death and wipe out their majority in Lahore."¹⁴ The Sikhs retaliated in nearby Amritsar, their holy city, and in hundreds of smaller settlements in predominantly Sikh area. Between March 3 and June 23 (when the Punjab Assembly voted on partition), 3,200 persons were killed in the province of Punjab and at least 100,000 Hindus and Sikhs evacuated the city of Lahore which "was completely at a standstill." Refugees streamed along the roads, and in spite of strongly worded appeals from Moslem League, Congress Party and Sikh leaders, rioting, bombing and arson continued unabated. The Hindus were the bomb throwers, while Moslems specialized in arson and stabbing.¹⁵

The partition of the province into West (Pakistan) and East (India) Punjab did not stop the bitter communal strife. Violence on one side begot revenge on the other. Old bloody accounts were revived and lavishly settled. "Talk to a Sikh," the correspondent of the London *Times* cabled on August 24 from Lahore, "and he will declare that this is retaliation for what the Moslems did to the Sikhs in Rawalpindi in March — which was retaliation for the Hindu massacres of Moslems in Bihar, which was retaliation for Noakali, which was retaliation for Calcutta. So it goes back, violence begetting violence." Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Chief Indian Delegate to the United Nations, aptly said that "when elemental passions infest vast masses of men, the cycle of attack and

revenge is apt to spread with lightning rapidity."¹⁶

The communal fighting was attended by a fury never witnessed in all preceding conflicts and left cities and villages looking like battlefields. Neither side spared women and children from ghastly knifing, burning alive and crimes of lust.

3.

For millions of human beings within this vicious cycle of attack and revenge there was only one salvation: flight. The exodus began in the spring of 1947, and by July some 250,000 Hindus had fled to India from predominantly Moslem West Punjab.¹⁷ Simultaneously, it was "semi-officially" confirmed in Lahore that there had been a substantial flight of Hindu capital from that city since the beginning of the disturbances in the spring. Similar movements took place out of the Pakistan North West Frontier Province. The Delhi controller of rationing announced on June 24 that approximately 75,000 refugees from all the disturbed areas had by that time reached the capital of the Delhi province.¹⁸

These first waves of refugees played a sinister and often fatal role in inflaming and spreading hatred and bloodshed between communities. "I think we can safely say that 75 per cent of what has happened in Delhi is the direct result of stories of refugees," declared Indian Premier Pandit Nehru at a news conference.¹⁹ This does not seem to have been an overstatement. Robert Trumbull reported from New Delhi on September 7th: "These refugees, whose memories of recent horrors are still aflame, constitute the greatest menace to peace in Delhi. They consist of both Moslems and non-Moslems and their temper is kept constantly excited by stories of new outrages being brought to Delhi daily by evacuees from the Punjab. Thousands of them are armed and are eager to avenge themselves and their co-religionists. These newcomers nurse murder in their hearts against all Moslems as the result of atrocities against the Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan. The

Moslems are equally vengeful for what has happened on India's side of the Punjab border, particularly in the Sikh country."²⁰ The Delhi correspondent of the London *Times* described the refugees as "carriers of infectious hysteria or mental derangement" which has beset India's communities. The incubation period, he said, is the time it takes a large number of refugees to move from one part of the country to another.²¹

If bloodshed and consequent mass flight only partly affected areas other than Punjab and a few other provinces, that is largely due to what Sardar Vallabhai Patel, the "strong man" of the Indian Government, ominously hinted at as the role minorities might possibly play as hostages. On October 16, a dispatch to the *New York Times* stated: "It seems generally accepted that if there is trouble in Calcutta where the Hindus predominate, the reaction will be swift and severe in East Bengal, where millions of Hindus are 'hostages to fortune' amidst an overwhelming Moslem majority". Referring to attacks on non-Moslem refugees in Pakistan, H. S. Suhrawardy, Moslem League leader and former Premier of Bengal, significantly said on October 28, 1947: "For the sake of the life and liberty and honor of the unfortunate Moslem minority in the Indian Union, I beg the Moslems of West Punjab to see that such incidents are put a stop to at once."²²

Members of minority groups who had escaped slaughter or attack but feared that their turn would soon come, took to the road. Early in October, Hindus started leaving the city of Dacca in East Bengal in which the Moslem majority was 70.8 per cent of the population and which has been described as Pakistan's "eastern capital." Dacca with a population of 213,000 witnessed serious communal disturbances in the autumn of 1946, but was relatively calm in 1947. Nevertheless, despite assurances by the East Bengal Government, the exodus spread to almost the entire province, and by the middle of October Hindus were reported coming by train, boat and on foot to Hindu West Bengal.²³ Similar developments took place in Karachi, capital of the Dominion of Pakistan, with a popu-

lation of 359,000—55 to 60 per cent of whom were Hindus, controlling the lion's share of the city's commercial life. Karachi had long been relatively free from communal disturbances. None the less, in October about 3,000 Hindus were reported leaving the city every day, two-thirds of them on crowded little steamers bound for Okha and Bombay.²⁴ V. Viswanathan, Indian Deputy High Commissioner to Karachi, said on October 11 that he could sell 60,000 tickets to India if he had space. By the beginning of 1948, when bloody disorders broke out between the Moslem and Hindu populations, about 100,000 Hindus had already left Karachi.²⁵

In other parts of India, minority groups had to leave under pressure of threats or were "advised" to go. Sikh bands in East Punjab, after having attacked Moslem villages and killed many villagers, drove other villagers away with the warning: "Go to your Pakistan! If you dare come back here, we'll kill you to the last child."²⁶ And in Qadian, holy town of the Moslem Ahmediya sect in the Indian East Punjab, the Sikhs offered not to molest the 6,000 Moslems there resident, if only they left for Pakistan—indeed, the Sikhs would even escort them safely to the Pakistan border.²⁷

Successive waves of survivors and of "voluntary" and compulsory refugees flooded every highway, road and cowpath linking Pakistan with India. Every means of conveyance—from airplanes to ox-carts—was used to escape annihilation and reach safety.

Trains were jammed with passengers riding on the roof and hanging from the sides. Special trains moving 1,000 a day in each direction between Lahore and Amritsar were reported on August 21 by the Associated Press. But train travel proved to be both inadequate and extremely hazardous. A military spokesman of the Indian Government revealed on September 24 in New Delhi that at least seven trains had been attacked in both East and West Punjab, with considerable casualties among the refugees. Two thousand Moslems were killed on September 22 when a Moslem refugee train from Delhi, carrying several thousand persons, was

attacked near Amritsar, Sikh stronghold in East Punjab; only one hundred persons escaped uninjured. Two trains carrying Hindus and Sikhs to India were also assailed according to a Pakistan army communique.²⁸ There were also numerous cases in both India and Pakistan in which fleeing minority groups were hurled from moving trains. The railroads, like the other roads, were lined with dead.

Andrew Roth witnessed the arrival of a train at the Casur station with a "grisly freight of dead and wounded Hindus and Sikhs who had been attacked by Moslems while fleeing to safety . . . the train reeked with the sickly-sweet smell of death, and flies buzzed around the bodies of men, women and children cut to pieces because they belonged to the wrong community. On the same day the crack Punjab mail arrived in Lahore from Delhi with some four hundred dead passengers."²⁹ On August 25, the authorities officially declared that rail travel was unsafe in the Punjab. So many trains were halted by politico-religious fanatics that several rail services operating out of Delhi were suspended.³⁰

The Indian Government made a determined effort to mobilize 1,500 trucks to carry refugees and their possessions in special motor convoys guarded by soldiers. But no more than 640 trucks were secured, of which 170 were disabled by lack of tires.³¹

A very spectacular but necessarily limited form of evacuation was air transport. As early as August 27, the London *Daily Express* reported that the Government of India had gathered a fleet of planes and trucks to rush Hindus, Sikhs and other minorities out of the Pakistan area of Western Punjab. On the other hand, the Pakistan Government, because of the danger to trains from mobs between Lahore and Delhi, had ordered twenty planes from the British Overseas Airways to fly 7,000 marooned Government officials and their families from New Delhi to Karachi. But air evacuation, naturally, proved to be inadequate, even for those who could afford it. A racket developed in which individuals chartered planes and charged terrific prices for seats.³²

By and large, however, the tragic exodus was conducted in the simplest and oldest way—on foot. Like the Children of Israel, but in ten to twenty times their number, millions of Hindus, Moslems and Sikhs began their self-evacuation over footpaths and bullock cart roads. Sometimes the caravans were relatively small, considering the danger they faced; sometimes they were unwieldy columns of hundreds of thousands of people. Forming what may be called the greatest single refugee trek in the world's history, 800,000 Hindus and Sikhs, coming on foot from Pakistan, were reported by the middle of October as being within twenty-five miles of the Indian border. The procession was forty-five miles long, with 400,000 in a single column and the rest in smaller groups. New Delhi newspaper correspondents reported on October 16th that the immense convoy had been attacked twice and suffered about 1,000 casualties. The exact whereabouts of the marchers was kept as a "military secret" to avoid further attacks.³³

A month later, ten Moslem foot convoys, totalling 570,000, were reported moving across the Punjab toward Pakistan.³⁴ In December, foot convoys, 30,000 to 40,000 strong, marched 150 miles from the rich agricultural lands of the Lyallpur and Montgomery districts of Pakistan West Punjab with thousands of head of cattle and hundreds of bullock carts carrying the migrants' meager possessions.³⁵

Large or small, Moslem or Hindu-Sikh, all these convoys shared common emotions—misery and fear. For those individuals among them who had not been driven out by violence and had had ample time to make preparations before they left their homes, the food problem presented no great difficulty; people who joined the convoys with their bullock carts were generally able to carry sufficient supplies with them to last them for, say, a month. But in many cases the refugees carried only their clothing and a few pounds of food. Moving at the slow pace of the bullocks, ten to twelve miles a day, they had to forage or starve. Often the old and the very young dropped from hunger and exhaustion. Some were fortunate

enough to have relatives who could aid them when they fell, but others were simply left behind by the roadside, alone and helpless in a hostile land.

The hardships of the trek, common to most migrations, were compounded by disease and mass murder. From the beginning, cholera flourished in the filthy camps and accompanied the travelers on the road. Armed bands of Moslem, Sikh and Hindu zealots preyed upon each other's convoys, and sometimes caravans were massacred in miniature wars between groups of refugees bound in the opposite direction.

A great impediment to quick movement of the refugees, according to Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola, High Commissioner for Pakistan in London, was the practice of both sides searching the persons and property of the refugees to prevent the removal from each province of prohibited commodities. These searches held up convoys for days and it was soon realized by both sides that they would have to be stopped. Orders were passed allowing refugees to take with them all their movable property, except merchandise in bulk. "Unfortunately," confesses Sir Ibrahim, "it has in practice been found very difficult to enforce these orders."³⁶

The scope of the Indian migration, as well as its hardships, is almost beyond imagination. Organization and protection of this two-way mass movement became the principal concern of the Indian Army. On September 15, the Army began using tanks to escort long columns of Moslem evacuees moving toward Pakistan through the Hindu and Sikh country of East Punjab. At the same time the Indian Government, under an agreement with Pakistan, sent its own troops across the Pakistan border to protect caravans of Hindus and Sikhs leaving the West Punjab. By September 25, the Army had evacuated 400,000 Moslems to Pakistan and had 850,000 still to move, while in Pakistan 600,000 non-Moslems were marching toward the border of the Dominion of India. Thousands more were evacuated in both directions by train and motor transport.³⁷

The goal was to move this vast populace before famines and epidemics began and in time to harvest millions of acres of crops. The success or failure of this undertaking meant the difference between famine and adequate food for the entire country.³⁸

Control of the situation in both parts of the Punjab was considerably hampered by the lack of liaison between the Indian and Pakistani provincial governments in Punjab. A great deal of this was caused by the refusal of Moslem under-officials to cooperate with their Hindu and Sikh opposite numbers and *vice versa*. The civil police "have not distinguished themselves," reported the special correspondent of the *London Times* (August 28, 1947). "There is ample evidence to show that on both sides the police of one community not only failed to give protection to members of another community under attack, but actively assisted the attackers. Moslems have been murdering Hindus and Sikhs. Hindus and Sikhs have been murdering Moslems. Each side blames the other with passionate vehemence and refuses to admit that its own people are ever at fault."

The joint Punjab Boundary Force under Maj. Gen. T. W. Rees was, while it existed, the only liaison between the two Dominions. It brought some order into the disorganized and panic-stricken trek of refugees. But on August 29, the Punjab Boundary Force was dissolved and law enforcement was placed under the British-commanded armies of the two Dominions. Moslem, Sikh and Hindu units were segregated and allocated to their appropriate command. The work of the dissolved Punjab Boundary Force was continued effectively under Indian command in the Military Evacuation Organization which was created on September 5.³⁹

4.

The numerical scope of the chaotic population exchange between the two Dominions grew steadily and surpassed all estimates by Indian and Pakistani authoritative sources.

On September 16, a military spokesman in New Delhi stated that from September 5, when the Military Evacuation Organization began to function, up to September 13, 400,000 non-Moslems had been escorted from Pakistan into the Indian section of the Punjab on foot, 115,092 by rail and 51,940 by motor transport. Moslems moved in the opposite direction for the same period were 200,000 by route march, 148,909 by rail and 45,400 by motor. Some hundreds also traveled in both directions by air.

Making these evacuation figures public, the Indian Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation—a new Cabinet department—emphasized that many thousands had crossed the border uncounted before the military organization began to function, while other groups, of whom the military had no count, were constantly moving. At a press conference held on September 13, Pandit Jawarharlal Nehru, India's Prime Minister, estimated that the exchange of minority populations between India and Pakistan would total four million, or about two million from each side.⁴⁰

This huge figure of four million proved to be an underestimate. By October 9, 2,388,120 Moslems and 2,644,687 non-Moslems had already crossed the Indo-Pakistan border on foot. There were 837,498 Moslems and 1,372,329 non-Moslems still en route or waiting to cross. The total count of 7,272,634 included 95,000 Moslems in the Delhi encampments and 128,000 Hindus and Sikhs in New Delhi, some of whom found shelter with friends or relatives. It did not take into account the number who might decide later to migrate from one Dominion to the other.⁴¹ By the end of October, military reports stated that 1,800,000 non-Moslems were yet to be evacuated from the West Punjab and the North West Frontier Provinces (Pakistan) and 2,300,000 Moslems were still in the East Punjab (India) waiting to go to Pakistan.

Organized and coordinated evacuation started on October 21, 1947. The position then was that about 2,800,000 Moslems were in India awaiting evacuation and about 1,500,000 non-Moslems had to be brought over to India from West Punjab and the Frontier

Province. The period following October 21 was divided into ten-day sections, and in each section arrangements were made both for evacuation by rail and for evacuation by foot and motor transport. The actual working of this system can be seen from the following table:

<i>Period</i>	<i>Approximate Number of Moslems Transferred to Pakistan</i>	<i>Approximate Number of Non-Moslems Transferred to India</i>
Oct. 21 - 31	600,000	550,000
Nov. 1 - 10	650,000	130,000
Nov. 11 - 21	380,000	180,000
Nov. 21 - 25	770,000	140,000

About November 25 the balance that remained to be moved was close to 400,000 Moslems and 300,000 non-Moslems.⁴²

At a meeting of the East India Association in London, held on November 4, 1947, Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola, Pakistan's representative in Britain, revealed that "by agreement between the two Governments it was decided to send to East Punjab approximately 3½ million Sikhs and Hindus, who were anxious to leave the country . . . In return we agreed to take about 5 million Moslems . . . At one time we hoped to confine the migration of the Moslems to those in East Punjab less the Ambala Division and the States. This would have given the reasonable figure of 3,124,000 and would have met a fairly equal exchange. But our hands were forced by the Sikhs making life impossible for the Moslems in the States and in the Ambala Division, and we have to find room now for the very large figure of nearly 5,400,000."⁴³

Authoritative quarters in New Delhi estimated that the exchange of minority populations in the Punjab, augmented by relatively small numbers of evacuees from other provinces, would involve close to ten million persons: five to six million Moslems were involved in the westward migration to Pakistan while over four mil-

lion Hindus and Sikhs had moved or were moving eastward into India.⁴⁴

An Indian Government press note partly corrected these estimates, placing at 4,131,000 the number of non-Moslem refugees who had crossed into India up to November 21 from the West Punjab, North West Frontier, Sind and Baluchistan; the number of Moslems evacuated in the same period to Pakistan from the East Punjab and Delhi was estimated at four to five million. "Every nerve is being strained," the press note said, "to complete the evacuation of the remaining 500,000 or 600,000 non-Moslems from the West Punjab and North West Frontier by the middle of December. On an average more than 60,000 non-Moslems were brought to safety every day by using available means of transports—trains, motor lorries, aircraft, ships and on foot. Foot columns provided the quickest means of evacuating the largest number of refugees."⁴⁵

The population transfer was, however, far from completion by the eve of 1948. New danger spots constantly arose, demanding further evacuation of minority groups. According to Pakistan's High Commissioner in London, "a malicious attempt is being made by some Hindus and Sikhs" to increase the already huge number of Moslem refugees from East Punjab by many more from Delhi and the Western districts of the United Provinces.⁴⁶ On the other hand, on December 26, a Government spokesman in New Delhi announced that India was negotiating with the Pakistan Government for early transfer of some 70,000 Hindus and 3,000 Sikhs in Bahawalpur State which had acceded to Pakistan, because of alarming reports of murders and forced conversions of the non-Moslem minority.⁴⁷ About 25,000 non-Moslems were still waiting for evacuation in the North West Frontier Province.⁴⁸ In the spring of 1948, the total number of transferees exceeded eleven million: a spokesman for the West Punjab Government put the number of Moslems brought to Pakistan to "about 6,000,000,"⁴⁹ and K. C. Neogy, Indian Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation, said that "roughly the total number of refugees (including Hindus and Sikhs yet to be evacu-

ated from Western Pakistan) who needed to be rehabilitated in India would be about 5,500,000."⁵⁰ In addition, during the late spring and summer nearly 1,150,000 non-Moslems migrated from East Bengal (Eastern Pakistan) to West Bengal (India).⁵¹

It is, it goes without saying, difficult to ascertain the precise number of casualties that have accompanied the communal strife and the ensuing displacement of millions of persons. On September 7, Miter Sri Prakash, the Indian High Commissioner of Pakistan, told a Rotary Club meeting at Benares that almost 150,000 persons had been killed thus far in the two Punjabs (India and Pakistan).⁵² By the end of October, authoritative circles in New Delhi estimated that deaths directly or indirectly traceable to the Punjab communal disturbances and consequent migration⁵³ would approach one million, the casualties in the different communities being approximately 10 per cent of the number of refugees.⁵⁴

The huge number of casualties and refugees in the short period of approximately four months seems almost unbelievable if measured by a European population yardstick. But India's population growth and population losses are both of unprecedented dimensions. Between 1921 and 1941 the population of India increased by about 83 million; the increase in the single decade between 1931 and 1941 amounted to almost 50 million. On the other hand, during the famine of 1943, deaths from starvation in the province of Bengal alone were estimated by the end of October at 100,000 weekly. An expert on India's population problems aptly wrote in 1946: "A vast population breeds and dies lavishly."⁵⁵

5.

The fact that disturbances and ensuing mass flights seemed to have followed the same pattern in widely separated areas, naturally suggested the existence of some organized plan conceived and effected at someone's instigation. Major General T. W. Rees who

commanded the Punjab Boundary Force told the Associated Press correspondent of his belief that "this program (of communal riots) was ably directed by underground leaders, using ancient and modern methods of war, who were deliberately keeping the rioting alive for their own purposes, despite the orders of the chiefs of the Indian and Pakistan Governments."⁶⁶

The Pakistan Government insisted that the organizers of the alleged plot were deliberately aiming at the destruction of Pakistan's statehood. Mohammed Ali Jinnah called on the India Government "to deal ruthlessly with this diabolical conspiracy and extirpate the roots of the plot and the powerful men who are behind the organization."⁶⁷ Other highly placed persons in the Pakistan Government categorically asserted that the fierce communal bloodshed and staggering migrations that have beset the Indian sub-continent since it was freed from British rule on August 15, 1947 were the results of a highly organized plot with the Sikhs at the core. They insisted that the Government of India had as early as July, 1947 known of the alleged Sikh conspiracy, but had not taken effective steps against it—through fear of offending the powerful Sikhs and the radical Hindu organizations exploiting the Sikhs' grievances.⁶⁸

The Sikhs have thus been deliberately presented as the villains of the entire sad and bloody affair. This is hardly justified. It would be a futile endeavor to allocate blame for the state of affairs created in India after partition. The Indian controversy is too deeply rooted in the tangle of causes and effects, of ends and means, over a period of many decades. No deliberate diabolical conspiracy on the part of any persons or clans in so vast a country could within a period of a few weeks or even months give rise to the massacre of hundreds of thousands and the migration of millions. A far deeper and more complicated background, which the author tried to outline in the introductory remarks to this chapter, lies behind those dramatic events of August-December 1947 that have so drastically revealed the tremendous significance of India's perennial minority problem.

Foreign observers were quick to recognize the implications of the population movement engendered by partition. As early as August 22, the Lahore correspondent of the London *Times* reported "the beginning of a vast transfer of populations." "In a few weeks' time," he cabled, "at the present rate of transfer there will not be a Moslem left on the Indian side of the frontier or a Hindu left on the Pakistan side, except perhaps for some Hindu merchants in Lahore . . ." ⁵⁹ Simultaneously, the Associated Press correspondent cabled from Jullundur in Punjab that despite the peace efforts of the authorities, the opinion was expressed on all sides that there could be no respite until minority populations were transferred. Robert Trumbull of the *New York Times* also related that "more and more, sober observers here, both British and Indian, are coming around to the view that direct transfer of population is the only solution to the communal problem in India's minority districts." ⁶⁰

Both Pakistani and Indian leaders, however, stubbornly refused to accept the exchange of population as a bitter but inevitable necessity and to conduct it in a constructive way. Mohammed Ali Jinnah was the only one to foresee the unavoidable developments. In an interview with Sidney Jacobson of the London *Picture Post* in January 1947, he expressed his conviction that only a wholesale exchange of minority populations between the future states of India and Pakistan could offer a solution to the ever growing conflict between the communities. ⁶¹ But Mohandas K. Gandhi, the most outstanding spiritual personality of India, was categorically opposed to that idea: he told his prayer meeting in New Delhi that even at the risk of standing alone, he would oppose the large-scale transfer of populations between India and Pakistan. "The transfer of millions of Hindus, Sikhs and Moslems is unthinkable and wrong," he declared. ⁶² A few days later, the Government of India and the Acting High Commissioner for Pakistan in New Delhi joined in efforts to halt the flow of Moslems from India's capital into refugee camps whence they would be evacuated to Pakistan. Both announced that steps were being taken to provide "adequate protection" for the

Moslem minority in the twin cities of Delhi and New Delhi. A military spokesman told a news conference at Government House, residence of Governor General Viscount Mountbatten, that the Government wanted to keep the Moslems in their homes.⁶³

At a press conference held on October 12 in New Delhi, Mr. Nehru frankly admitted that the Government of India "had no policy with regard to exchange of population and that there was no talk of it before August 15, although since March about half a million people must have come through the frontiers of the Punjab to the United Provinces and other places. We only accepted them because they came and there was no question of a general migration. None of us (Indian leaders)," said Mr. Nehru, "envisaged a major transfer of population at any time," and he humbly confessed: "perhaps this was due to lack of judgement on our part." The transfer undertaking, he added, "was thrust upon us and we had to admit that facilities had to be given and to face the problem squarely." But even then, a clear distinction was made between Punjab and the Northwestern Frontier Province on the one hand, and the rest of India on the other. "We took," said Mr. Nehru, "the Punjab as a whole and decided that it should be treated as one problem and the major transfer of population as between east and west Punjab; to that we added the Frontier Province. For the rest the problem is one of individuals wanting to go and to be given facilities to go or to come." Motivating this position, Mr. Nehru stressed that "if this business of transfer of populations was extended to the rest of India, it would become not only a terrific problem but almost a problem impossible to deal with; we have no desire to spread this out all over India."⁶⁴

Following these statements, a very enlightening exchange of questions and answers developed between press representatives and Mr. Nehru. The first question was:

"So far as this migration is concerned you have faced the inevitable. But instead of that why not take up the offer that Mr. Jinnah has made in his latest statement that exchange of popula-

tions may be considered at Governmental level? After all it is not merely the exchange of human heads that is involved but very largely the exchange of property, means of production and means of earning income. Hindus and Sikhs may leave valuable assets on that side and Moslems on this side which may be all wasted. A regulated exchange of population might bring about such exchange as would preserve and maintain the assets on this side and on that side."

To this Mr. Nehru replied:

"It is perfectly true that if the thing is to be done it should be done properly on a Governmental level without the loss of any property to any one. But to think in terms of this being done on an all-India scale is a problem which, I think, inevitably reduces itself almost to an impossibility—apart from its undesirability. You take the census figures and the distribution of the population; it can take us half a generation. But what is likely to happen is that it will be done improperly, because once this happens it will involve volcanic changes, it will upset the whole economy of India, a great deal of the production will cease, there will be starvation, there will be mass movements, there will be no railway system or any system whatever. Tens of millions of people will move and we will sink as a nation without any resources—a starving and a dying population."

"My question is," persisted the press representative,

"whether you would consider it on a Governmental level in a way which would make an appeal to the people and make it feasible. I think if the two Governments did it on a basis of friendliness and goodwill it may end up with an exchange of the urban population, though the rural population may not be affected at all."

Mr. Nehru's answer was that "so far as the Punjab is concerned, both Governments have tried and are trying to talk on that level." He did not, however, suggest extending that policy to the rest of India. For his part, Liagat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, insisted that there was to be no deliberate transfer of minority populations in the Punjab, but only an organized evacuation "of those who wish to go." Replying to a previous statement by Sardar

Vellabhbhai Patel, Deputy Prime Minister of India, the Pakistani Prime Minister denied that the two Dominion Governments would ever agree that all Moslems and non-Moslems in East Punjab should be transferred "as a matter of policy." According to Liagat Ali Khan, the respective Governments agreed merely to facilitate the movement already taking place. He raised the strongest objection to any enforced evacuation of individual Moslems, reminding the Indian Government of its obligation to protect minorities.⁶⁶

The only group in India which has unconditionally endorsed and favored the exchange of minorities is the Sikh. As early as May, 1947, the foremost political leader of the Sikh community, Master Tara Singh, insisting on partition of the Punjab, emphatically stated his belief that Jinnah's demand for exchange of populations in India as a whole was impossible of execution because of climatic, linguistic and cultural difficulties, but that such exchange was altogether practicable within a province and particularly in the Punjab.⁶⁶ Several months later, he openly condemned what he said was the policy of both Mohandas K. Gandhi and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's Government in inducing Moslems to remain in the East Punjab and in Delhi.⁶⁷ The Sikhs, he said in December, 1947, would bring pressure upon the Indian Government to continue the exchange of minority populations with Pakistan because "in case of war, minorities in both Dominions would be loyal to the other side"—Hindus and Sikhs to India and Moslems to Pakistan.⁶⁸

Instead of anticipating developments and preparing a constructive scheme for channelizing the imminent mass movements, Hindu and Moslem leaders in both Dominions persisted in urging the minority populations not to move, promising fullest protection of life and property. These promises proved to be worthless, and Robert Trumbull cabled on September 14 to the *New York Times*: "The same leaders who so recently counseled minorities to stay put, now concede reluctantly that a tremendous exchange of populations must take place. It has taken place."⁶⁹ But being

unplanned, unwanted and merely tolerated, this unprecedented population movement took on a ghastly and ominous aspect. The *Times* correspondent rightly stated: "It may be argued that an exchange of populations is the best solution to this question. But for it to happen in this manner, accompanied by blood and violence, is not only to cause incredible misery among hundreds of thousands of simple people, but to sow the seeds of lasting bitterness between India and Pakistan. This cancerous growth may poison their whole relationship permanently, unless excised soon."⁷⁰

It was because of their reliance on the assurances of their respective Governments that the millions of victims had decided to stay where their families had lived for centuries. Mr. Nehru himself recalled at a press conference in New Delhi that he once came across a few hundred people trekking along the road, among whom he recognized old friends and colleagues of his. "They came up and charged me with having deluded them. They were referring to a broadcast I had made ten days previously from All-India Radio in which I had appealed to the people not to migrate but to stay on. They told me that they had followed my advice and this was the consequence; their families were all dead and they were the sole representatives left. After that it became impossible for us to talk in terms of asking them to stay on, in spite of those consequences, and face greater dangers."⁷²

On another occasion, when the Indian Prime Minister visited the refugee camp of Montgomery Gurdwara, southeast of Lahore, to comfort 1,500 Sikhs who had moved there in panic, one of the refugees angrily charged Nehru's Government with responsibility for the tragic developments. "Why didn't you tell us this was going to happen?" he asked. "Why didn't the Government arrange for a peaceful migration of Sikhs and Moslems many weeks ago instead of letting it happen through violence and terror?" The Prime Minister gave the only possible answer—the inability of anyone to foresee the events which have convulsed the Punjab.⁷³

6.

Bloodshed and massacre have, it is true, largely been limited to the Punjab with its population of 28,400,000; only a few serious outbreaks have occurred elsewhere, mostly in Indian Delhi (with its 918,000 inhabitants) and the Pakistan North West Frontier Province (with its 3,038,000 inhabitants). Using the 1941 census as a basis, one concludes that about 357,000,000 citizens of India, Pakistan and the Princely States have been living their normal lives in peace. Nevertheless, the partition and disruption of the Punjab—long famous as the “granary of India”—has had a serious economic effect upon virtually the entire population of both Dominions, with Pakistan as the greater sufferer.

Aside from these disastrous communal disturbances and the dislocation of millions of lives, the partition of India into two countries within four months' time, completely destroyed efficient organization in Government services. At a joint meeting of the East Asia Association and the Overseas League on January 21, 1948, Sir Archibald Rowlands, speaking of the economic effects of partition, said: “Consider what happened to the railways. The East India Railway was manned to a considerable extent by Moslems, and they had left under the idea that it was unpatriotic to work for the Indian railways. Then, again, the commercial community in the Punjab was largely in the hands of Hindus. The only banks which could be said to be working at all were two British banks and one Moslem bank; the others had practically thrown their hands in; a large part of the financing and the growing of the cotton crop was in the hands of the Hindus, and it was difficult to get it into the factories.”⁷⁴

The gigantic movement of over eleven million people has undoubtedly been one of the most staggering problems ever to confront any government. As a technical problem, it involved placing troops, patrolling roads, requisitioning trucks and railroads cars

and setting up emergency camps. Once the technical phase was over, even more complex questions faced both Governments—questions involving the entire economic and political structure of India and Pakistan.

K. C. Neogi, Indian Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation, did not exaggerate when he said on November 29, 1947 that "the magnitude of the refugee problem has been such that there has been no historical parallel to it. Nowhere in history has a transfer of population of such dimensions taken place in such a short time and under such circumstances." The problem itself was "not really one problem, but literally scores of problems, each one having an importance and urgency of its own."⁷⁵ Neither of the two Dominions was prepared for competent handling of the situation, for partition had thrown their administrative machinery out of joint. To quote Mr. Neogi once more, the "Government had no experience in this matter and our method has, in many instances, been one of trial and error . . . we have learnt by experience, by mistakes that we have made."⁷⁶ When making this statement before the Indian Constituent Assembly on March 12, 1948, Mr. Neogi had in mind his own Government, but his remark applied fully to the Government of Pakistan, as well.

Some of the problems resulting from the exchange of populations can be solved adequately only on the basis of mutual agreement between the Dominions. The most complicated of these problems is the question of property, both movable and immovable, left behind by refugees. Besides millions of acres of land abandoned in India and Pakistan, a considerable number of industrial and commercial concerns have remained ownerless. In Lahore alone, the non-Moslem minority owned 167 factories (out of a total of 215) with a registered capital of over 60 million rupees (\$18,000,000). Ninety-two per cent of the exporters of raw cotton, 88 per cent of the raw wool exporters, and 89 per cent of the exporters of miscellaneous items were non-Moslems; non-Moslems also owned 63 per cent of the shops.⁷⁷

In the early stages of the unorganized two-way flight, when the abandonment of property was considered a temporary phenomenon, the joint Hindu-Moslem Partition Council came to the conclusion (on August 6, 1947) that because "no arrangements have so far been made for the management of refugees' property, and because, so long as the local population and the majority community in villages and towns maintain a hostile attitude, the refugees will be unable to return and look after their property—the two Governments have decided to appoint managers, at a suitable level, for the administration of refugees' property in the various areas; the expenses of these managers will be paid out of the proceeds of the properties which they are appointed to look after." It was also decided that, where this had not already been done, Provincial Governments should be asked to set up machinery for the assessment of damages to both the movable and immovable property of the minority groups involved.⁷⁸

Later on, when the exchange of minorities proved both unprecedented in scope and final in nature, the Pakistan and India Governments agreed on the principle that the ownership of refugees' property, movable as well as immovable, should remain vested in the refugees. Custodians were appointed to look after and manage such property on behalf of the owners.⁷⁹ Similarly, Registrars of Claims were appointed and instructed to make records of the property left behind by the evacuees.⁸⁰ Where the Custodian assumed possession or control of any undertaking or business, he had to report to the Ministry of Industries and Supplies regarding the feasibility of reopening and continuing the undertaking or business, which could only be reopened or continued in accordance with directions received from that Ministry. The Custodian was entitled also to sell livestock, standing crops or any evacuee property which was subject to speedy and natural decay or the sale of which would be for the benefit of the evacuee-owner.⁸¹ It was agreed that the Custodian's control and management, whether exercised by himself or through a lessee or any other person, would operate

only during the absence of the evacuee-owner. It would be open to the owner of such property or his legal heirs to claim its restoration on payment of the excess, if any, of expenditure over receipts during the period the property had been under the Custodian's management.⁸²

All these *de jure* guarantees of the inviolability of abandoned property do not seem to have reassured the refugees themselves. They repeatedly expressed their anxiety about their property and demanded final settlement of their accounts on the governmental level. It was suggested that in each case "the Government receiving the refugees should claim compensation on their behalf for the losses they have sustained from the Government from the territory of which the refugees have to come away" and that the same principle should be applied to expenditures incurred during rehabilitation. As an instructive pattern for such procedure, it was recalled that after the disturbances in the province of Bihar, the then Government of Bengal claimed that the cost of maintaining and rehabilitating Bihar refugees in Bengal should be borne by the Government of Bihar. When this matter was referred to the Government of India, which was at that time headed by Pandit Nehru and Liagat Ali Khan, the Government accepted the validity of the claim and introduced it on an all-India basis. "Now if that formula had been agreed to, there is no reason why it should not be revived again in the context of Indo-Pakistan population transfer," insisted Bimal Chandra Sinha.⁸³ Thus far, no agreement on this or any similar basis seems to have been reached between the two Dominions. In August, 1948 the Governments of India and Pakistan signed an agreement for the removal and disposal of evacuees' movable property, envisaging the establishment of a joint government agency on which the two Dominions would enjoy equal representation. The agency would supervise the execution of agreements and would set up an organization to facilitate the movement of movable property by rail and road.⁸⁴

A particularly painful and still unsolved problem for both India

and Pakistan is that of the recovery and repatriation of abducted women. During the troubled months of violence, tens of thousands of women, Hindu, Moslem and Sikh alike, were kidnapped. According to a broadcast of Mrs. Shrimati Rameshwari Nehru, the wife of India's Prime Minister, "their honor was outraged almost publicly while they were sold out to markets as chattels. The trader was not dealt with by law, the buyer was not penalized, and even the neighbor did not take exception in this trade. The Government could do nothing, while the Police never rounded up the criminals. This happened in a free India and in a free Pakistan."⁸⁵

On December 6, 1947 the Governments of Pakistan and India entered into an agreement binding them to make every attempt to return abducted women to their homes. The lists supplied by India contained the names of 33,000 non-Moslem women to be repatriated from Pakistan, while the lists supplied by Pakistan contained 21,000 names of women to be repatriated from India. However, up to August 20, 1948, not more than 9,659 women had been rescued in India, and only 5,556 in Pakistan.⁸⁶ According to authoritative sources, "the desired results could not be achieved because interested parties carried on propaganda that the abducted women, after rescue, would not be accepted in their families again."⁸⁷ This propaganda, unfortunately, was not completely unjustified. In an appeal to his fellow citizens, Pandit Nehru indignantly branded "the foolish and callous attitude" of some families who were "reluctant to welcome back these unlucky sisters to their original place of honor" and regarded "these victims of fate and fury of man as degraded."⁸⁸ An energetic campaign of enlightenment was launched by the most outstanding Indian leaders to combat this "most objectionable and wrong attitude."

There are many grave problems involved in the rehabilitation of those millions of refugees who have flocked to each of the Dominions. Mr. Neogi put the total number of Hindus and Sikhs to be rehabilitated in the Union of India at about five and a half

million—three million rural and two and a half million urban. Oversimplifying the problem of their resettlement, some members of the Indian Constituent Assembly have suggested that it would be easy to absorb them by spreading them out in all the 700,000 odd villages of India. Replying to this suggestion, Pandit Nehru flatly told the Assembly on November 29, 1947, that "this mechanical calculation does not take us any distance" and invited the House to "examine the problem on its merits, apart from vague statements and heroics." He admitted that "the rest of India ought to do everything in its power to help the refugees" and that "land should be given in the United Provinces or in the C. P. or Bengal or wherever it may be, if land is available." He stressed, however, that Hindu and Sikh refugees coming from West Punjab were mostly well-to-do peasants with average holdings of 20 to 25 acres of very good land, while the average holdings in the United Provinces were 2-1/2 acres. "In order to provide two persons with a room," said Mr. Nehru, "you put them in a room where there are ten persons; you are putting two more in it. This would be simply unfair . . . We cannot be vicariously generous, we cannot impose a greater burden on the poverty-stricken people of any place merely because you want to be generous. Let us be generous, but not, obviously, because, apart from everything else, this is going to give rise, as it is giving rise, to grave discontent in various ways and an unfortunate tendency to dislike these refugees coming there. We do not want that to happen . . . this business of taking land where there is none and giving to somebody something is not a proper way of giving relief."

The Indian Government has, therefore, decided that the main resettlement and rehabilitation effort must be concentrated in East Punjab which includes the Punjab States and is considered capable of absorbing almost all agricultural refugees. "People seem to think," insisted Mr. Nehru, "that somehow East Punjab is a tiny little place where people have not got room to stay and, therefore, they should spread out all over the place. The East Punjab from

any Indian standard is not only enough, but bigger from the population of India point of view, to absorb those who come."⁸⁹

As far as the agricultural refugees are concerned, it was decided that all agriculturists from West Punjab and those from the North West Frontier Province, Bahawalpur and Sind who have their roots in East Punjab must be settled within the pooled unit of East Punjab and Indian States in that area. Other agriculturists from N. W. F. P., Baluchistan, Bahawalpur and Sind may be settled on soil elsewhere in India; Alwar, Bharatpur and Gwalior in particular, have possibilities in this direction.⁹⁰

It has been decided that lands vacated by Moslem evacuees in East Punjab should be allotted to non-Moslem refugees. Since the number of rural evacuees on both sides is almost equal, it was believed that the problem of the rehabilitation of agriculturists would be solved almost automatically. It turned out, however, that Hindu and Sikh refugees had abandoned 5.7 million acres of land in West Punjab, while the total area abandoned by Moslems in East Punjab did not exceed 4.5 million acres, of which 1.15 million are to be found in the insecure districts of Hissar and Gurgaon. Of the cultivable area previously owned by Moslems in East Punjab some 3.3 million acres are available for settlement. Since the non-Moslem families from West Punjab who are entitled to receive land in East Punjab number between 350,000 and 375,000, it quickly became evident that—even allowing for Punjab States—some 50,000 to 60,000 families cannot be provided for in East Punjab.⁹¹ Furthermore, the land abandoned by Hindu and Sikh refugees on the other side of the border is superior to that abandoned by Moslems, while the size of the average abandoned agricultural holding in Western Pakistan is larger than that of the average holding vacated by Moslem evacuees from India.

Generally, all land allotments to refugees are made on a group basis: i.e. to a group of families coming from the same area in West Punjab for joint possession and management. Within this group framework each family is to receive ten acres of land for

cultivation, with an addition of three acres for married adult workers, and of two acres for unmarried adult workers.

By the spring of 1948, 1.25 million acres of land in East Punjab had been allotted to over 177,000 refugee families, constituting about 50 per cent of the total number of rural families entitled to receive land in that province.⁹²

Difficult as the rehabilitation of rural refugees is, the problems of urban refugees have proved even more complex. The number of houses in West Punjab towns previously inhabited by non-Moslems are 175,203, against the corresponding figure of 170,480 for Moslem-owned houses in East Punjab. Allowing for new construction to provide for the increase in population since 1941, for the differing standards of accommodation among Moslems and non-Moslems, and for new additions to the urban population in East Punjab, the net housing shortage in the towns of East Punjab approximates some 75,000 to 100,000 dwellings. In sum, the economy of East Punjab is not capable of absorbing 700,000 urban refugees (120,00 to 140,000 families), though steps have been taken to repair damaged houses and bungalows, and schemes for the development of large cities and the building of a new capital for East Punjab are being examined. It has therefore been decided to assign dwellings in East Punjab only to those who have come from urban areas in West Punjab. Even so, 550,000 urban refugees had to remain under canvas and in refugee camps till April 1948, when they were supposed to be assigned to homes.⁹³ The Government of India is intending to solve the problem "by not only building cities in East Punjab, but by taking the urban people to cities in the rest of India, having colonies, suburban areas, etc."⁹⁴ In response to a request by the Government of India, all Provincial Governments have generally agreed to waive their housing restrictions in the case of Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan.⁹⁵

Schemes of rehabilitation in India may broadly be classified in two main categories: those undertaken at the initiative of Provincial Governments, and those undertaken directly by the Central

Government. Basically, the East Punjab Government, with some financial help from the Central Government, is responsible for the rehabilitation of refugees from West Punjab, scheduled for resettlement in East Punjab and the East Punjab States taken together as a pooled unit. Rehabilitation of refugees from North West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Bahawalpur and Sind—other than those who have old roots in East Punjab and can be resettled there—is the direct responsibility of the Government of India. For practical purposes this category of refugees comprises those dependent on urban occupations. In order to coordinate rehabilitation schemes as far as possible with the country's development plans, the Government of India has set up a three-man Rehabilitation and Development Board to work in close cooperation with the Provincial Governments concerned.⁹⁶

The Indian Government rejected the suggestion to make the refugees and all the problems connected with them the exclusive concern of the central authorities. N. Gopalswami Ayyangar, Minister without portfolio, explained the reason for this as follows: "We have got to remember that whatever policy we may decide on at the Center with regard to these problems, a great portion, the bulk of it, will have to be implemented by machinery for which we shall have to depend on the Provincial Governments in order to make the scheme work. Now in a problem like settling people on land, it involves an amount of investigation and inquiry and exploiting of the information which is in the hands of the Provincial Governments, and the Center is not equipped for the task of doing that work with as much efficiency as a Provincial Government can, if only it went about its business in the proper way."⁹⁷ The Central Government has advised Provincial and State Governments to grant loans on a liberal scale to agriculturists and expressed its willingness to assist them, if necessary, in this matter.⁹⁸ The Indian budget for the year 1948 contains an allocation of Rs 100.4 million (about \$31.33 million) for refugee relief and rehabilitation, with an additional advance by the Government of Rs 100 million for setting

up a Rehabilitation-Finance Administration.⁹⁹ This Administration has been authorized to sanction loans from Rs 5,000 to Rs 100,000, and also to extend guarantees to banks and other lending institutions against losses to the extent of 50 per cent in any individual case of loans and advances granted to refugees. The Administration is not permitted to charge more than a six per cent rate of interest; the loans must be repaid within the period of ten years.

The Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation has likewise sanctioned advances up to a maximum of Rs 5,000, to be granted to traders, shopkeepers and those persons wishing to start their own workshops or cottage industries. In the case of doctors, dentists, radiologists, and homeopaths, the maximum has been fixed at Rs 3,000. Displaced persons wishing to buy a *tonga* and a horse to ply on hire in Delhi may be granted loans up to Rs 1,000. Other displaced persons are covered by the general loan scheme under which the maximum is Rs 500.

These loans are available all over India and in the Indian States. It has been decided that grants should be confined to displaced persons who decide to settle finally in a particular town or place and who can be fitted into the economy of the area. The advances will be paid by the authorities of the district where the displaced person decides to settle finally. Those who require loans will be asked to produce proof of their having been registered as refugees and an affidavit to the effect that they have not previously received a similar advance from any other source.

The advance will be free of interest for the first year, but interest will be charged at three per cent for subsequent years. No recovery will be made in the first year. Instalments for repayment in the subsequent years will be fixed by the sanctioning authority, on the condition that the advance be completely repaid within four years from the date it is given. In case of default on any instalment, the whole advance will be recoverable as arrears of land revenue.¹⁰⁰

In spite of careful planning and considerable administrative effort, the resettlement and rehabilitation of the over five million

refugees is still far from completed. As late as June 2, 1948, the Government of India Information Services admitted that "a large majority (of the non-Moslem refugees) are still in refugee camps . . . Some of the refugees are doing odd jobs. Some prosperous merchants of yesterday are today plying tongas and cabs in Delhi and other big towns . . . The problem is to put these men on their feet again." In the middle of August 1948, over 2,800,000 refugees were reported resettled; of these 2,148,000 were in East Punjab.¹⁰¹ On August 8, Robert Trumbull reported in the *New York Times* that two million refugees were still stranded in the cities, many without employment and shelter.

These agglomerations of uprooted and unemployed Hindus and Sikhs constitute a highly disturbing and menacing element in the Indian situation. "The majority of the refugees," wrote Margaret Parton in December, 1947, "are psychologically disturbed when they arrive in India and frequently, as individuals, work against the welfare of the whole." In refugee camps most of them have refused to work, saying that they have suffered enough and should now be cared for; in the East Punjab many have appropriated more land than they have been allowed by the Government; in towns and cities they claw and fight for houses and shops, frequently refusing to obey Government regulations.¹⁰² Eight months later, Robert Trumbull fully confirmed this analysis in a cable from New Delhi: "The refugees are becoming increasingly menacing in their dissatisfaction with the Government's efforts for their rehabilitation. In addition there has developed a natural conflict between the settled urban residents and the destitute refugees who are desperately trying to wrest a living from the already overcrowded cities."¹⁰³

The Indian Government can hardly be blamed for this situation. Mr. Neogi, Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation, correctly stated in the Constituent Assembly on March 12, 1948, that permanent rehabilitation can be achieved satisfactorily only as an organic aspect of the general development of the country, and that it presents tremendous difficulties "at a time when production is admittedly at a

dangerously low ebb, and when the volume of trade and commerce in the country is shrinking." Yet, Mr. Neogi, turning to the available literature on similar developments in other countries, stressed the fact that "in the case of Greece and Turkey—which were the first in modern times to have a similar experience of mass movements of population—the time taken for rehabilitation of a fraction of the population with which we are concerned today was five years¹⁰⁴, and they seem to take pride that it was accomplished in that period... Greece took five years: we have not had as many months in India."¹⁰⁵

The problem facing the Pakistan Government proved to be quite as complex. The first effects of the Hindu exodus were disastrous. The Lahore correspondent of the London *Times* cabled on August 22 that all but 10,000 of the city's 300,000 Hindu population had fled to India and that "the immediate effect of this Hindu exodus is that the economic life of the city is almost at a standstill. Several banks are closed, as nearly all the clerks were Hindus."¹⁰⁶ Many shops are shut. Railway, postal, and other services are only just managing to keep going, as the Hindu employees have gone and there are not enough trained Moslems to take their place."

This description applies quite as well to Karachi, Pakistan's capital. High officials of the Pakistani Government were so deeply disturbed by the exodus of some 1,000,000 Hindus and Sikhs who largely controlled the city's economic life, that they believed the emigration movement was being encouraged by "extremist Hindu elements in India wishing to cripple the Moslem State's finances at the outset." Ghulam Mohammad, Pakistani Finance Minister, declared flatly that the exodus was organized by certain sections of the Hindu minority who had made plans for this even before the two states came into being. And Fazlur Rahman, Minister of the Interior, bitterly complained that those leaving Karachi for India were taking with them merchandise, machine parts and other things badly needed in Pakistan. "It must be part of a plan to paralyze our economy," he said in an interview.¹⁰⁷

In order to prevent the disruption of steady business activities, the Sind Provincial Government completely disregarded the agreement between the Governments of India and Pakistan to the effect that evacuees from either Dominion should not be searched. Instead, special export regulations were enforced against Hindus leaving Karachi; they were not allowed to take with them "essential commodities"—machine parts, unsewn cloth, sewing machines, typewriters, and so on. Commodities prohibited for export might be disposed of by the owners.¹⁰⁸ Restrictions were also placed on the panicky flight of capital from Pakistan—a flight which had grave repercussions on the money market, particularly in Western Pakistan. Even in Eastern Pakistan, in spite of comparatively peaceful conditions, there was considerable flight of capital to West Bengal. "Those banks which had their assets locked up in the Eastern Pakistan had a most difficult time and some of them have virtually collapsed," states an Indian economist.¹⁰⁹

Restrictive governmental measures have, however, only slightly improved the general situation. Nearly all of Pakistan's financial and professional men were among the millions of Hindus who fled to India. In return, Pakistan got four to five million impoverished Moslem peasants from India, most of whom left their agricultural implements behind. Pakistan found itself with camps full of landless farmers and an almost complete lack of skilled technicians or businessmen. The majority of workers in Pakistan's Industrial Department were non-Moslem and opted for India. Necessary equipment and machines were not obtainable and the Department lost some of its best institutions in East Punjab. When Moslem workers in the East Punjab cottage, hosiery, handloom, carpet, blankets, foundry and engineering industries started to arrive in West Punjab, their resettlement presented tremendous difficulties because factories abandoned by Hindu industrialists were closed down and some of them needed heavy capital investments before they could be in working order again. There was also a shortage of building material, spare parts, pig iron, mild steel, tool steel, coke, coal,

chemicals, etc., which had always been imported into West Punjab.¹¹⁰

Despite all these obstacles, the West Punjab Government claims considerable progress in the "even and methodical rehabilitation" of the Moslem transferees. Official figures released in February 1948 indicated that more than 5,100,000 had already been rehabilitated in the sixteen districts of the West Punjab, in place of the Hindus and Sikhs who emigrated to the Dominion of India; while not more than 773,500 Moslem refugees were at that time still kept in camps awaiting settlement.¹¹¹ Of 9,843 towns and villages vacated by Hindus and Sikhs, 8,925 were occupied by Moslem resettlers; 3,600,000 Moslems were settled in rural areas replacing 2,200,000 evacuated non-Moslems. The West Punjab Government assigned Rs 21.5 million (approximately \$6,670,000) from August 15, 1947 to March 31, 1948 for loans to refugee agriculturists. Each refugee peasant was entitled to a loan up to Rs 400 for the purchase of cattle, agricultural implements, seeds and manure and for the construction of wells. The Government decided, as an experimental measure, to cultivate some blocks of crown land through direct tenants under governmental management; the produce will be shared on the threshing floor, except for cotton, all of which will be sold and the cash proceeds divided between the Government and the tenants. Consideration is also being given to a scheme of cooperative farming in the canal colonies of the West Punjab.

About 1,600,000 Moslems have found employment in urban areas in place of 1,400,000 non-Moslems who left for India. Factories abandoned by Hindus were leased out to Moslem refugee industrialists and experts; simultaneously, the services of industrialists and public volunteers were enlisted to save the factories from further damage. Dumps were created to conserve the material available, and syndicates were entrusted with their management. Despite all these efforts, of 934 factories abandoned by non-Moslems only 56 had resumed work by February 1948.¹¹²

7.

As far as East Punjab, on the one hand, and West Punjab, on the other, are concerned, the two-way Moslem and non-Moslem migration has actually effected a clear-cut sorting out of the rival communities. "The scarcest thing in Lahore is a Sikh or Hindu, while in Amritsar there was not a single Moslem fez to be seen," reported the *New York Times* correspondent as early as August 21, 1947. Not more than 150 to 200 thousand Moslems have remained in the whole of East Punjab, where 5.3 million Moslems lived in 1941. The last insignificant remnants of the 3.6 million strong Hindu-Sikh minority in West Punjab were evacuated in the spring of 1948. Of 238,000 non-Moslems in the North Western Frontier Province only 48,500 remained by November 1, 1947; these were almost completely transferred to India during subsequent months. The total population of Hindus and Sikhs in the province of Sind was estimated at 1,400,000 at the time of partition. Of this number 1,177,000 had left Sind by June 30, 1948.¹¹³

This unprecedented exchange of minorities seems to bear the mark of finality. There have been, it is true, some authoritative statements to the contrary. In an article published in the *Hindustan Times* of September 29, 1947, Syed Ali Zaheer, United Provinces nationalist leader and former member of the Interim Government, insisted that "the transfer of populations must not only stop but must be undone if real peace is to be established." On the other side of the barricade, it was the late Mahatma Gandhi who told the Hindu refugees in the Kurukshetra camp that he believed that they, as well as the Moslem refugees, must "all be reinstated and return with honor and safety from where they have been driven out."¹¹⁴ But there is little probability that this policy of "undoing the transfer" will ever be implemented. The overwhelming majority of those who left their blood-drenched and fire-gutted cities and villages on both sides of the Hindu-Pakistan frontier can hardly return.

Nor will those who would attempt to do so be permitted by their former Governments to return. A convincing proof to this effect was offered by the Government of India in the spring of 1948 when, with relatively peaceful conditions restored, certain groups of Moslems who had fled to Pakistan in 1947 began to return to India. Nearly 52,000 Moslems had returned to India during April, May and June of 1948.¹¹⁵ This return movement created a complex problem. Property hastily and informally vacated by the fleeing Moslems during the fall and winter of 1947 had been taken over by "evacuee-property custodians" for allocation to Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan; settlement with the former owners was to be made later. The return of these owners threatened to upset these plans. The Government of India, therefore, promulgated an ordinance called "Influx From West Pakistan (Control) Ordinance 1948" which prohibits the entry of any person into India from any place in West Pakistan, whether directly or indirectly, unless he has in his possession a special permit. The Pakistan Government, in turn, tightened its border controls and declared that permits would be required of all persons wishing to enter Pakistan from India.¹¹⁶

The exchange of eleven million persons between India and Pakistan was anything but an organized and constructive movement conceived by the interested Governments and carried out in an "orderly and human manner," to use the formula of the Potsdam Protocol. It was voluntary only in that the Governments of Pakistan and India had not officially ordered it. It was compulsory in that it was forced by mass slaughter and stark terror. The people involved were driven by fear, not by hope. The respective Governments originally tried to suppress the causes of this mass migration—communal strife, killings and arson—and, what is more, bitterly opposed the very idea of it. Later, confronted with irrepressible realities, they reluctantly accepted the new situation and endeavored to meet the most urgent needs of the migrants. The results of their endeavors may seem considerable when the newness of the Dominions is remembered, but as far as statesmanship and foresight is

concerned, their policy was that of "too late and too little." They never even tried to make a virtue out of necessity and to convert the obviously unavoidable tragedy of mass flight into a state-directed device for at least partial solution of the minority problem in the most explosive sector of the Indian sub-continent.

The transfers which went on have merely been tolerated, but never directed. No serious attempt has been made to legalize and channelize this two-way migration through inter-state agreements. Not only the immediate causes of the migration, but the migration as such was considered and treated as extra-legal. Both Governments persisted in futile efforts to induce the menaced populations to stay put, promising them security and protection, though they were manifestly unable to keep these promises. Had the fear-stricken masses heeded these appeals and renounced or postponed their flight, the number of victims would have been considerably higher. But, as B.R. Sen, charge d'affaires of the Indian Embassy in Washington, reluctantly admitted, although "both Governments believe the migrations are unnecessary and unwise ... the decision is being made by the people themselves."¹¹⁷

Huge as it was, the exchange of populations that took place in 1947 and partly in 1948 did not solve the perennial minority problems of India. Over eleven million people have been transferred, but there are still about thirty-five million Moslems in the Dominion of India and some thirteen million Hindus and Sikhs in the Dominion of Pakistan (almost exclusively in East Pakistan). Their eventual organized transfer is not even envisaged by the respective Governments. As late as March 24, 1948, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan published a joint statement expressing "hope and trust that minority communities will remain in their homes ... this is in the best interests of all concerned." Nevertheless, "this does not mean," the statement reluctantly conceded, "that the Governments intend to put any obstacles in the way of those who, of their own will, decide to migrate from one Dominion to the other."¹¹⁸ A few weeks later, an agreement designed to reassure

the Hindu and Moslem minorities in East and West Bengal and to discourage mass migration between Pakistan and India was signed in Calcutta by the Governments of the two Dominions.¹¹⁹

The presence of these tens of millions belonging to minorities causes tension and increasingly poisons the relationship between the sister Dominions. The Moslems minority in India is subjected to strong pressure on the part of the Hindu leaders who demand that the Moslems abandon their separatist attitude and become loyal citizens of the Indian Union. United Provinces Premier, G. B. Pant, insistently urged Moslems of India to "leave off thinking in terms of Hindus and Moslems" and to liquidate the Moslem League. "If a secular democratic state is to be established," he said, "communal organizations cannot be tolerated." Emphasizing that the good will of the majority community is the ultimate safeguard for minorities, Mr. Pant said: "No Government can save minorities without the good-will of the majority community and that good-will cannot be created merely by paying lip homage to the work of Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru."¹²⁰

Moslem leaders have repeatedly stressed their willingness to adapt themselves to a status of loyal minority. Mian Abdul Aziz, acting High Commissioner for Pakistan in India, declared on September 18, 1947: "So far as the Moslems in the Indian Union are concerned, they seriously and honestly intend to remain loyal citizens of the Union"¹²¹ One month later, the Indian Government Education Minister, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, endorsed the demand for dissolution of the Moslem League and advised the Moslems "to co-operate with the Government wholeheartedly."¹²² The Conference of West Bengal Moslems, which met in Calcutta on November 9, also urged Indian Moslems to dissociate themselves from the "Moslem League, to abjure the two nation theory, and unequivocally to affirm their faithful allegiance to India."¹²³ The Moslem Calcutta daily, *Morning News*, wrote on January 11, 1948: "Indian Moslems have accepted the fact of India's partition, and their leaders have time and again said so, that they are citizens of India and owe true

allegiance to India and to none else. Those that cannot give the India Government such unconditional allegiance have migrated to Pakistan."

In spite of these and similar conciliatory declarations, the relationship between Hindus and Moslems remains strained. On the international arena, India and Pakistan accuse each other of oppressing their respective minorities and preaching or tolerating their extermination.

In January, 1948, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, officially charged the Government of India with "carrying out a program of genocide against Moslems" in more than twelve provinces of the Indian Union and asserted that "the freedom and religion of the Moslems of India was in serious danger." India's representative in the United Nations, M. C. Setalvad, categorically denied these charges and stated that "large masses of the thirty-five million Moslems in the country were living in peace, undisturbed and unmolested;" he saw the root of Hindu-Moslem conflict in the "continual preaching of hatred of one community by Moslem leaders for a number of years." Mr. Setalvad quoted several instances of "lawlessness, murder and massacre rampant even today in Western Punjab and Sind."¹²⁴ In April Pakistan's delegation in the United Nations repeated charges of genocide against India and insisted that a "deliberate scheme of the suppression of the Moslems not only in a cultural and religious sense but even in a physical sense has gone on in various forms in different parts of India... Unless speedy steps are taken the world is going to witness a tragedy of vast magnitude involving the lives of a whole community numbering thirty million."¹²⁵

Sir Percival Griffiths, who revisited India during the first winter of partition, told a joint meeting of the East India Association and the Overseas League on February 3, 1948, that "the presence of these large populations, each of which will be nervous about its position and will suspect tyranny even where there is none, will be a complication which will make relations between the two Dominions

extremely delicate."¹²⁶ Indeed, the mood of the minorities is increasingly bitter and frustrated. If the individual feels relatively secure, it is because he belongs to a community of his own, not because he is a citizen of India or Pakistan. Partition and the tragic events of August-December 1947 have left a deadly legacy of poisoned memories. The minority communities are apprehensive, and the majorities distrustful.

Should further large-scale population transfers be considered impracticable, each Dominion will have to create among its population a still non-existing feeling of common statehood. The prevalent feeling that safety for the minority lies exclusively within its own group's horizon, must be overcome.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I.

1. James C. De Wilde, *The Shadow of the Sword*, New York 1946, p. 142. In a presidential address delivered at the Allahabad session of the All-India Moslem League in December 1930, Dr. Sir Muhammed Iqbal said: "The units of Indian society are not territories as in European countries. India is a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages and professing different religions. Their behavior is not at all determined by a common race consciousness." Quoted in K. L. Guaba, *The Consequences of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1946, p. 35.
2. S. K. Shastri, Deputy Director of the Indian Government's Information Services in Washington, claims that "90 per cent of the Moslems of India are converts from Hinduism" (letter to this author, dated March 6, 1948).
3. Robert Aura Smith, "Why India Fights India", in *Saturday Evening Post*, December 6, 1947.
4. Quoted in William B. Ziff, *The Gentlemen Talk of Peace*, New York, 1944, p. 224.
5. See also: K. B. Krishna, *The Problem of Minorities or Communal Representation in India*, London 1939, Part I, Chapter 15: *The Growth of the Moslem Professional Class* (pp. 94-97).
7. Choudharry Rahmat Ali, *The Millat and Its Mission*, quoted in De Wilde, *The Shadow of the Sword*, p. 156.
8. *New York Times*, September 14, 1947.

9. O. H. K. Spate, "The Partition of India and the Prospects of Pakistan" in *The Geographical Review*, January 1948, p. 10; O. H. K. Spate, "The Boundary Award in the Punjab" in *The Asiatic Review*, January 1948, p. 6.
10. For the full text of Sir Cyril Radcliffe's Report see *Indian Information*, Sept. 15, 1947.
11. Edmund Taylor, "India's Black Morning", *The New Republic*, October 13, 1947.
12. Andrew Roth, "On the Sikh-Moslem Frontier", *The Nation*, September 20, 1947.
13. *New York Times*, February 28, 1947.
14. Andrew Roth, *op. cit.*
15. *New York Times*, June 23, 24, 26, 1947.
16. *Ibid.*, September 19, 1947.
17. *Ibid.*, September 24, 1947.
18. *Ibid.*, September 25, 1947.
19. *Ibid.*, September 14, 1947.
20. *Ibid.*, September 7, 1947.
21. *Times*, London, September 18, 1947.
22. Government of India Information Services, October 31, 1947. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, Indian Minister of Health, however, stressed in a broadcast talk on October 18, 1947 that "even in all this horrid turmoil and time of tribulation that we have passed through and are still passing, there have been many instances where Hindus and Sikhs have sheltered Moslems and Moslems have saved Hindu and Sikh lives," (*Indian Information*, November 15, 1947).
23. *New York Times*, October 10, 1947.
24. *Ibid.*, October 12, 1947.
25. *New York Herald Tribune*, January 9, 1948.
26. Andrew Roth, *op. cit.*
27. *New York Times*, October 15, 1947.
28. *Ibid.*, September 25, 30, 1947
29. Andrew Roth, *op.cit.*
30. *New York Times*, August 26, 1947
31. *Ibid.*, September 4; October 8, 1947
32. *Ibid.*, September 2, October 4, 1947
33. *Ibid.*, October 17, 1947
34. *Ibid.*, November 16, 1947
35. *Ibid.*, December 7, 1947

36. Habib Ibrahim Rahmitoola, "The Ideals and Prospects of Pakistan" in *The Asiatic Review*, January 1948, p.31
37. *New York Herald Tribune*, European edition, September 7, 1947
38. *New York Times*, October 26, 1947
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*, September 17, 1947
41. *Ibid.*, October 15, 1947
42. Statement of N. Gopalswami Ayyangar, Minister without Portfolio, in the Indian Constituent Assembly, November 29, 1947. *Indian Information*, January 1, 1948
43. *The Asiatic Review*, January 1948, pp.28-30
44. *New York Times*, October 26, 1947
45. *Ibid.*, December 4 and 7, 1947
46. *The Asiatic Review*, January 1948, pp. 28-30
47. *New York Times*, December 27, 1947
48. Government of India Information Services, February 5, 1948
49. *Dawn* (Karachi), March 1, 1948
50. Government of India Information Services, March 1, 1948
51. *Ibid.*, August 18, 1948
52. *New York Times*, September 9, 1947
53. Some European observers took a very dark view of the health prospects of the migrating millions and predicted that many would not survive the winter. These predictions fortunately did not materialize. "It is my proud claim today," Mr. Neogi, Indian Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation, stated on March 12, 1948, "that the mortality that has prevailed among the refugee population is not in some cases even as high as the normal mortality in cities and towns and rural areas having comparable population." *Indian Information*, April 15, 1948
54. *Ibid.*, October 21, 1947—Earl Mountbatten, Governor General of the Dominion of India, took, it is true, a considerably more optimistic stand as regards the number of people killed in the course of the communal strife. According to his estimates, deaths resulting from massacre in India and Pakistan will be shown to amount to only a "fraction" of the figures thus far quoted. He did not, however, give any precise data to substantiate this statement. *New York Times*, November 15, 1947
55. D. Ghosh, *Pressure of Population and Economic Efficiency in India*. p. 65. See also Gyan Chand, *India's Teeming Millions*. London, 1938
56. *New York Times*, August 21, 1947
57. *Ibid.*, September 9, 1947
58. *Ibid.*

59. *New York Herald Tribune*, European edition, August 24, 1947
60. *New York Times*, August 27, 1947
61. The author owes this information to Sidney Jacobson who authorized him to publish it.
62. *New York Times*, September 16, 1947
63. *Ibid.*, September 19, 1947
64. *Indian Information*, November 1, 1947
65. *New York Times*, October 16, 1947.
66. *India Today*, May 19, 1947.
67. *New York Times*, October 6, 1947.
68. *Ibid.*, December 4, 1947.
69. *Ibid.*, September 14, 1947.
70. *Times*, London, August 28, 1947.
72. *Indian Information*, November 1, 1947.
73. *New York Herald Tribune*, European edition, September 4, 1947.
74. *The Asiatic Review*, April 1948, p. 124.
75. *Indian Information*, January 1, 1948 .
76. *Ibid.*, April 15, 1948.
77. Government of India Information Services, June 2, 1948.
78. *Indian Information*, September 1, 1947.
79. *Ibid.*, January 1, 1948.
80. *Millions on the Move*, published by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi, 1948, p. 46.
81. *Indian Information*, October 15, 1947.
82. *Ibid.*, December 1, 1947.
83. Bismal Chandra Sinha, "Economic Relationship between India and Pakistan", in *The Modern Review*, February 1948, p. 108.
84. *Indian Information*, February 1, 1948.
85. *Ibid.*, March 15, 1948.
86. Government of India Information Services, August 31, 1948.
87. *Indian Information*, January 1, 1948.
88. *Ibid.*, February 1, 1948.
89. *Ibid.*, January 1, 1948.
90. *Ibid.*, April 15, 1948.
91. *Millions on the Move*, p. 25.
92. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27
93. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-28

94. Mr. Neogi's statement in the Indian Constituent Assembly on Nov. 29, 1947. *Indian Information*, January 1, 1948
95. *Ibid.*, January 15, 1948.
96. *Ibid.*, April 15, 1948
97. *Ibid.*, January 1, 1948.
98. Government of India Information Services, March 1, 1948
99. *India Today*, April 1948
100. *Millions on the Move*, pp. 73-74
101. Government of India Information Services, August 18, 1948
102. Margaret Parton, "India's Great Migration" in *New York Herald Tribune*, December 13, 1947
103. *New York Times*, August 8, 1948
104. This, of course, is incorrect. The Refugee Settlement Commission set up by the League of Nations functioned from November 1923 to January 1931. See Joseph B. Schechtman, *European Population Transfers 1939-1945*, New York, 1946, pp. 19-20
105. *Indian Information*, April 15, 1948.
106. The following advertisement, placed by a well-known Punjab bank, appeared in a Lahore paper: "The management of the... bank regrets the inconvenience caused to their patrons on account of the non-functioning of the branches in West Punjab for reasons beyond their control. The bank is making every endeavor to resume functioning as soon as possible. The Hindu and Sikh staff of the bank being afraid to serve in Pakistan, resumption of service can only begin after Moslem staff has been recruited and properly trained. For this purpose a few of our Hindu officers are staying on in Pakistan during the training period of the new staff. Such officers should receive the full and sympathetic cooperation of the public to enable them to train Moslem personnel. In case of any hardship or rough handling of such Hindu officers of the bank, it may become difficult for the bank to re-start functioning in Pakistan."—Quoted in *The Modern Review*, January, 1948
107. *New York Times*, October 13, 1948
108. *Ibid.*
109. Bismal Chandra Sinha, "Economic Relationship between India and Pakistan," in *The Modern Review*, February, 1948, p. 108
110. *Dawn*, March 1, 1948
111. In striking contradiction to this encouraging statement, the Pakistan Government announced six months later that about 2,500,000 refugees were still not settled. *New York Times*, August 28, 1948

112. *New York Times*, February 27, 1948; *Dawn*, March 1948
113. *Millions on the Move*, pp. 68-70; *Indian Information*, December 15, 1947. Government of India Information Services, August 18, 1948
114. *Indian Information*, December 1, 1947
115. Government of India Information Services, August 23, 1948
116. *India Today*, September 1948; *New York Times*, September 24, 1948
117. *New York Times*, September 24, 1947
118. *Pakistan News* (published by the Information Department, Government of Pakistan), No.13 (period 24-30 March, 1948)
119. *New York Times*, April 20, 1948
120. Government of India Information Services, November 17, 1947
121. *Ibid.*, September 24, 1947
122. *Ibid.*, October 28, 1947
123. *Ibid.*, November 17, 1947
124. *New York Times*, January 17 and 24, 1948; *Indian Information*, February 15, 1948
125. *New York Times*, April 15, 1948
126. Sir Percival Griffiths, "India Revisited: The First Winter of Partition," in *The Asiatic Review*, April, 1948, p. 142

II

TRANSFER OF MIDDLE EAST CHRISTIAN MINORITIES

Repatriation of Armenians to Soviet Armenia

NEXT to the Jews, the Armenians are the most "classic" minority people in the modern world. Not more than 1,201,591 Armenians live in a state of their own,¹ the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,—these are about two-fifths of the Armenian nation. Even within the Soviet Union the Armenians of Soviet Armenia represent only 61 per cent of the 2,151,884 Armenians registered by the all-Union census of 1939, the largest groups being concentrated in the Georgian and Azerbaijan SSR, as well as in North Caucasus and Crimea. About one million Armenians are scattered over Europe (where there are approximately fifteen groups totalling 170,000); throughout the Middle East and Asia (where there are sixteen groups totalling about 425,000); and in North and South America (where there are seven groups totalling 235,000).

Both the present numerical smallness and the utter dispersion of the Armenian people are the direct result of a Turkish policy of extermination and deportation. In 1890 there were two and one half million Armenians in Turkish Armenia and Turkey proper; by 1919 fewer than 100,000 remained. More than a million and a half had been massacred or had perished as a result of deportation, and about a million had survived by escaping to other lands.

A considerable part of the survivors found refuge in the Russian Caucasus. In 1915 some 220,000 Armenians from Turkey and Persia arrived there; in 1916, 160,800 Armenian refugees were reported assisted by the Empress Marie Committee—this number does not

include unassisted refugees and those within 15 kilometers of the front. In 1918, the number of Armenian refugees reached 408,000;³ in 1921-1925, some 13,300 Armenian refugees from Turkey arrived in Soviet Armenia⁴ by way of Greece, Persia and Iraq.

Migration, famine and epidemics, particularly of typhus, accounted for the drastic reduction of this refugee mass. A total of only 120,068 Armenians born outside the USSR was registered by the 1926 census in all of Transcaucasia (Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbeidzhan).⁵ V. Quisling puts the total number of refugees settled on land in Armenia at about 102,500.⁶ In 1926-1936 new groups totaling 15,500 immigrated to Soviet Armenia, largely from Greece, followed in 1937 by 6,000 immigrants transferred on the basis of a Greco-Soviet agreement.⁷

The pre-World War II distribution of Armenian war refugees outside Soviet Armenia, the Americas, Iran, Iraq and Turkey is shown in the following table:⁸

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number</i> (in thousands)
Syria and Lebanon	100,0
France	63,0
Greece	25,0
Bulgaria	14,5
Rumania	6,0
Cyprus	2,7
Other European Countries	3,8

The number of Armenians in Iran was approximately 100,000, in Turkey 57,599 (1935 census), and in Iraq 6,900.

A plan for resettling Armenian refugees upon reclaimed and irrigated land in Soviet Armenia had been drawn up in 1924-25 by Fridtjof Nansen. The Government of the Armenian SSR was ready to receive a considerable number of Armenian settlers from countries of the Near East, to give the land necessary for their settlement free of charge, and to exempt them from taxation for the first three years. Nansen estimated that in addition to cost of transport,

a settlement loan of nine million gold roubles would be required, which would provide for land reclamation, irrigation work, and the cost of settlement of 25,000 refugees.⁹ The plan was abandoned in 1929 due to failure to raise the necessary funds.¹⁰

2.

It was revived on a much larger scale and along predominantly political lines, after the end of World War II. This time the initiators of the plan were the Armenians themselves and their aim was not piecemeal transfer of small groups of refugees but wholesale repatriation to Soviet Armenia of the million Armenian refugees scattered over the world.

The term "repatriation" can, of course, be used only figuratively in this connection. The overwhelming majority of the Armenians living in the Middle East, in European countries or in the United States never lived in what is now Soviet Armenia, and they can no more "return" to this territory than the Baltic Germans could be "repatriated" to the Reich. They are either natives of the countries in which they now live, or refugees from Turkish Armenia who escaped the wholesale extermination of 1915-1919. Their transfer to Soviet Armenia is repatriation in the spiritual sense only. It is in that limited sense that the term will be used in the following pages.

"The inducements to leave do not all come from the Russian side," wrote the London *Economist* on January 11, 1947. "The growth of xenophobia and of Moslem nationalism in the Arabic-speaking states—particularly in Egypt and Syria—is closing more and more doors to outsiders. It is impelling many to go." The mood prevailing among the Armenian communities in the Middle East was described in 1946 by A. H. Hourani as follows:¹¹ "The great majority of Armenians...practically all of them, except the small minority who have property or large interests in Syria and Lebanon...desire ultimately to return to the Caucasus and rebuild their

national life there." Differences exist only "on the manner of their return": some have accepted the inclusion of Armenia in the Soviet Union and are therefore willing to return immediately and unconditionally, while others object to Sovietization and desire to return only when Armenia becomes an independent State.

This description applies fully not only to the 250,000 Armenians in the Arab lands, but to the entire Armenian diaspora. The urge to put an end to their insecure minority existence and to "live in the shadow of Mount Ararat"¹² is felt passionately not only by those Armenian refugees who have not succeeded in adequately supporting themselves and their families but also by more settled and prosperous elements. "Their reason for leaving is not necessarily economic, or that they are unhappy in the countries where the families of some have lived for hundreds of years, but their desire to live as a national group in their own country after centuries of persecution and massacres," stated a spokesman of the Armenian Repatriation Committee in Jerusalem.¹³

This longing for statehood and national normalcy has apparently overcome doubts concerning the desirability and advisability of a "return" to a Soviet-dominated country and has established a certain community of interests between the imperial tendencies of the Soviet Union and the repatriation action of the strongly nationalistic, generally non-Communist, Armenian organizations abroad.

In fact, the movement for the mass transfer of scattered Armenian minority groups to the Armenian SSR was closely linked in its early stage with the demand for the expansion of Soviet Armenia's present territory through the incorporation of the Armenian provinces of Kars, Ardahan, Erzeroum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis held by Turkey. These provinces were part of the Armenian Republic as established by the abortive Treaty of Sevres (August 20, 1920): the Armenian population they had before 1915 was massacred, deported or forced to flee, so that they are now both "Armenian-free" and underpopulated.¹⁴ Armenian national organizations argued that, apart from the historic and moral claim for

the unification of these provinces with Soviet Armenia, their 40,000 square miles are essential to the resettlement of the million prospective Armenian repatriates. Soviet Armenia, they pointed out, is a small country with an area of 11,580 square miles and a population of about 1.5 million—almost 130 persons per square mile. More than two-thirds of the area is mountainous country unsuitable for agriculture, whereas more than two-thirds of the Armenian population (915,183) are agriculturists and only 366,416 are town dwellers.¹⁵ Most land flat enough for cultivation is covered a good part of the year by dust that is driven by strong winds; rainfall is scarce and rivers and brooks run in deep ravines. Hence, an acute land crisis exists which accounts for the fact that many Armenians are compelled to seek work outside Soviet Armenia in other parts of the Soviet Union.

Construction of extensive irrigation canals has increased the cultivable area fivefold in the past twenty-five years, and industrialization of the country has provided a livelihood for large sectors of the population. But resettlement of almost a million repatriates within the narrow boundaries of already heavily populated Soviet Armenia with its unusually large natural increase (the Armenians have the highest birthrate among all the peoples of the USSR) would present insuperable difficulties. The repatriation movement initiated by the Armenian national organizations in 1945 was therefore organically linked with demands for the territorial expansion of Soviet Armenia.

In April, 1945 the Armenian National Committee (an offspring of the otherwise traditionally anti-Soviet Revolutionary Federation *Tashnags*) presented to the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNICIO) in San Francisco a memorandum demanding the incorporation into Soviet Armenia of some of the eastern provinces of Turkey promised the Armenians in the Treaty of Sevres, and the transfer to Armenia of the remnants of the Armenian minority in those regions.¹⁶ A month later, a delegation of the Armenian National Council of America, representing fifty Ar-

menian organizations in the United States, presented a similar demand: that "opportunities be granted Armenians abroad to return to their own homes and pastures, their cities and villages and live there their own lives." The memorandum also demanded the incorporation into Soviet Armenia of the Armenian provinces now forming part of Turkey. "We want no less," stated the delegation, "than the joining of our historic land of Armenia to the existing state of free and independent Armenia, and the repatriation there of all Armenians abroad who wish to go there."¹⁷

Inasmuch as the San Francisco Conference was "not delegated to settle questions relating to repatriation and settlement of boundaries," the Armenian National Council in July, 1945 presented a similar request to the Potsdam Conference of the Big Three. Recalling Turkish persecution of the Armenian population in the last century and pointing out that during recent years the Turkish Government "had worked out new means of expropriating and subjugating the small Armenian population in Turkey," the Armenian memorandum went on as follows: "Fortunately, in one part of Armenia—that which formed a part of Russia before the First World War—an independent Armenian Republic has been created, forming an integral part of the Soviet Union. In the course of its years of existence Soviet Armenia has made giant strides in its development and has provided Armenians with the security which was absent in their past. . . . At present 1,500,000 Armenians live outside Soviet Armenia and in other parts of the Soviet Union. The overwhelming majority of them desire to return to the lands of their forefathers and to take part in their reconstruction. The Americans of Armenian descent urgently ask the Potsdam Conference to put the question of the Armenian Nation on its agenda so as to guarantee a just settlement of the Armenians desiring once again to live in their historic land, Soviet Armenia."¹⁸

The Potsdam Conference disregarded this Armenian appeal. Undeterred by the setback, the Armenian National Council approached the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (December

16-26, 1945), calling their attention "to the cause of the one-and-a-half million Armenians scattered over the earth, victims of Turkish terror and persecution. The overwhelming majority of these refugee Armenians desire to return to their birthplace, which is still under Turkish control. They can only be repatriated when their homeland becomes a part of Soviet Armenia."¹⁹ A similar appeal to the Moscow parley was sent by the Armenian Catholicos, George VI, asking for the "return of the Armenian vilayets to Soviet Armenia to enable the refugee Armenians to live peacefully in their fatherland."²⁰

These Armenian actions, intended to mobilize international sympathy and support for the wholesale repatriation of the Armenian diaspora to Soviet Armenia and for the enlargement of that country's territory, did not produce the expected results. The Governments of Great Britain and the United States were particularly reluctant to favor any expansion of Soviet territory at the expense of Turkey and were inclined to consider the entire Armenian campaign a Soviet-instigated device. Foreign Secretary Bevin stated that Soviet Armenia has no right to claim the provinces of Kars and Ardahan on ethnical grounds since, as the result of "movements of population", there are no Armenians there now. This statement was bitterly criticized by the Armenian press.²¹ The Armenian National Committee in the United States sent Mr. Bevin a cable, pointing out that the absence of Armenians in Kars and Ardahan was caused by the massacre and forced flight of the 230,000 Armenians in those provinces when the Turks occupied them in September 1920.²² This and other arguments have, however, failed to change the negative attitude of the Western Powers towards the Armenian demand for territorial changes in favor of Soviet Armenia.

The repatriation action was accordingly initiated as a purely Armenian enterprise, enjoying the blessing and support of the Soviet Government only.

3.

The delegates of the Armenian communities in France, the Balkans, and the Middle East to the Armenian Ecclesiastical Congress in Emchiadzin (June 15 to 25, 1945) were instructed by their constituencies "not to return without securing the definite promise of the Armenian Government to take practical steps for the repatriation of the refugee Armenians in the world."²³ The newly elected Catholicos, George VI, fully endorsed this wish of the Armenian Diaspora and expressed great concern over the state of the Armenians dispersed in the countries of the old and new world. The Government of Soviet Armenia resolved, on November 12, 1945, to allow the repatriation of Armenians from abroad.²⁴ This decision was approved by the USSR Government in Moscow. On December 2, a special communique was published, stating that preparations were under way for receiving and accommodating Armenians living abroad who wished to settle in Soviet Armenia.²⁵

A governmental Committee to Receive and Resettle Armenians was appointed in Erevan, the capital of Soviet Armenia, and instructed to establish ties with appropriate Armenian organizations in other countries. The repatriates were to be encouraged to bring with them, free from custom duties, their tools, furniture and personal property. The Soviet Government earmarked a fund for the payment of 50 per cent of the cost of building individual houses for the settlers.

According to the Erevan Committee, repatriation was to start in June, 1946 with the immigration of 50,000 Armenians in the course of several months—these were to come from Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania. At the request of the repatriation committees of certain countries, their quotas were raised, so that a total of about 65,000 people were supposed to enter Armenia by the end of the repatriation season in the fall of 1946—approximately 20,000 from Syria and Lebanon, 30,000 from Iran,

and the rest from the other countries. Actually, however, only some 51,000 were repatriated.²⁶

The Armenian diaspora responded enthusiastically to the call for repatriation. "When the news of the action of the Armenian Government reached Alexandria, Egypt," says Rev. Vertanes, "the people flocked to the Church with a deep sense of gratitude for the 'beginning of the end' of their tribulations as a dispersed people. Similar expressions of joy were in evidence in other countries."

In accordance with the appeal of the repatriation committee in Erevan, Armenians abroad formed special committees, enlisted the cooperation of existing organizations, and opened offices to register the repatriates and raise funds for them. Official representatives from Armenia to the countries from which the repatriation would start in 1946, cooperated in the preparation of the lists of repatriates, and generally supervised and facilitated the emigration. Soviet Consulates helped where they could. Persons of all ranks registered for repatriation—laborers, farmers, artists, businessmen, students, professionals and intellectuals. Within one month, 20,000 Armenians had registered in Iran, 35,000 in Syria and Lebanon, and thousands in Greece, Egypt and Palestine. By August 1946 the number of those applying for repatriation reached 200,000.²⁷ The figure of 800,000 applications given in March 1947 by an Armenian author²⁸ seems to be highly exaggerated.

The repatriation movement went on partly by land, mostly by sea. The only group which entered Armenia by land were the Armenians from neighboring Iran, whose situation has in recent years become steadily worse. They used to occupy rather important posts in the Iranian administration, but are now being increasingly replaced by Persians.²⁹ Their positions in agriculture and gardening as well as in trade and business have also been undermined to a great extent. By the end of 1946, some 60,000 Armenians registered for repatriation,³⁰ and 30,000 actually left. In one day 12,737 persons crossed the Iranian-Soviet border.³¹

Repatriation from all other countries proceeded by ship. Repa-

triatres who embarked in the Mediterranean ports went through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus to Batum, and thence to Armenia. The Soviet Government provided two of its best vessels. One of these, the former Italian *Saturnia*, rechristened *Rossia*, was the largest vessel ever to pass through the Bosphorus; the other was the *Transylvania*.

The Armenian Government decided that the first group to be repatriated and rehabilitated would be Armenians from Greece (100,000 found refuge there after their expulsion from Turkish Asia Minor in 1922), who had suffered more from the war than Armenians in other countries.³² About 5,000 were repatriated to Soviet Armenia in 1946;³³ the first group, numbering 2,000, left in late July.³⁴ In the same month 3,500 Armenians began their journey from Bulgaria.³⁵

The most numerous and most impatient group among the 1946 repatriates were Armenians from Lebanon and Syria. The 70,000-75,000 Lebanese Armenians and the 120,000 Armenians in Syria are recent settlers in those countries. Most of them entered in successive waves during and after the war of 1914-18, fleeing from persecution or from anticipation of it. A number arrived in 1939 after the cession of Alexandretta to Turkey. The overwhelming majority arrived penniless. But in the last two decades, thanks to their own efforts and to those of the Nansen Office, their economic situation improved considerably. Almost all of them live in towns where they are craftsmen, small traders and office workers, and constitute a half-isolated community centered around their churches, clinging to their national language and maintaining their own schools. Even in the predominantly Christian Lebanon, "they have not always been popular with the Arabs," states A. H. Hourani. "Arab nationalists complain that their presence has given rise to an additional minority problem, and one particularly difficult to solve. Lebanese Moslems regard them as one of the factors making for Christian predominance; had it not been for their immigration, the Moslems would now have a majority in Lebanon." The Arme-

nians are also "not popular" with the Christians who dislike them "for having come into the country destitute and being now prosperous . . . Being concentrated in a relatively small number of urban dwellings, they are peculiarly open to attack," Hourani remarks ominously.³⁶ It is only natural that the urge for repatriation has always been particularly strong among them. As early as July, 1945, several months before the call for repatriation was issued, members of the middle and lower classes in Syria and Lebanon began to register for transfer to Soviet Armenia.

The first group of 1,600 repatriates from the regions of Damascus, Rayak and Beirut left Beirut on June 23; on July 8, a second ship sailed from Beirut with 1,834 repatriates aboard, and on July 13, a third ship with 2,300 passengers departed from the same city.³⁷ Entire Armenian settlements have emigrated. A Soviet correspondent reports that in the settlement of Ainchar on the Beirut-Damascus highway, established in 1938 by 5,000 Armenian refugees from Alexandretta, 3,000 left in 1946 and 1,200 more in 1947.³⁸

The remnants of the Armenian minority in Turkey were the first slated for repatriation (see the above quoted memorandum of the Armenian National Committee). Their number was given as 57,599, of whom 39,821 reside in Istanbul.³⁹ Although statistics are vague with reference to Armenians in Anatolia, a reliable source estimates as many as 15,000 living there, whereas figures for the ten provinces for which statistics are available total 11,701. No statistics are given for such eastern provinces as Kars, Van, Erzurum, Mush, Siirt, and Agri, where large numbers of Armenians lived before World War I. It is not known whether all the Armenians in these regions have been exterminated or removed. Armenian sources estimate that there are 170,000 Armenians in Turkey, but over 100,000 of them have been Turkified by force or so isolated that they are regarded as lost to the Armenian nation.⁴⁰

The move of the Armenian National Committee in the United States aroused a great deal of fear among the Armenians in Turkey. They anticipated that the Turks would be utterly displeased with

the transfer demand—particularly in view of strained Soviet-Turkish relations—and might retaliate by applying administrative and economic pressure on the Armenian community. The Turks particularly resented the fact that the Soviet Consulate in Istanbul started enlisting Armenians for repatriation without consultation with the Turkish Government.⁴¹ Well-informed observers of the Turkish scene expressed doubts as to the willingness of the Istanbul Armenians, who form over two-thirds of the remaining Armenian community in Turkey, to leave for Soviet Armenia; it was argued that they belong to the *petit bourgeois* class and do not form a politically conscious and nationally well organized group. In fact, some 30,000 Turkish Armenians registered for repatriation.⁴² Their departure was made impossible by increasing political tension between Turkey and the Soviet Union.

During the summer of 1946, 50,761 repatriates arrived in Soviet Armenia. Inclement weather interrupted the repatriation movement during the winter months; the work was resumed in the spring of 1947. The original schedule for 1947 provided for the reception of 100,000 people.⁴³ Later the number was reduced to 60,000.⁴⁴ In addition to continuing the repatriation from Greece, Syria, Bulgaria and Iran, it was decided to start receiving repatriates from Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, France and the United States.

In June, 1947 a Soviet Armenian delegation arrived in Salonica to supervise the repatriation of about 17,000 more Armenian refugees.⁴⁵ Early in July, the Soviet ship *Pobeda* left Beirut carrying 2,230 Armenians from Syria and Lebanon, and on September 7, 2,550 more repatriates embarked on the same ship.⁴⁶

The first party of 1,600 Armenians from Egypt sailed early in September from Alexandria.⁴⁷ The Armenian community in Egypt numbers between 30,000 and 35,000. About one-half of this number came as refugees from Turkey during and after the first World War. At least one-third of the total are Egyptian citizens. The community is, on the whole, prosperous, preserves its language and cultural traditions and is one of the most important centers of Ar-

menian national culture. Notwithstanding this rather satisfactory status and despite the fact that "there is no prejudice against them",⁴⁸ the urge for repatriation seems to be very strong.

It appears to be even stronger among the 11,000 Armenians in Palestine who are a predominantly urban community of craftsmen and traders. Some of them are prosperous, although they are less important economically than in Egypt. Many families have been settled in Palestine for two hundred years; the rest came as refugees after the first World War.⁴⁹ Some registered with the Soviet Repatriation Committee for transfer to Soviet Armenia.⁵⁰ The first group of 1,200, including mostly tradesmen and skilled workers, left late in October, 1947 on the *Pobeda*. Of these, 640 were from Jerusalem, 250 from Jaffa and 310 from Haifa.⁵¹

Their departure was delayed by the late arrival of a group of seven hundred Armenian repatriates from Iraq who were scheduled to leave on the same ship.⁵² The Armenian colony of Iraq which numbered 6,900 members in 1935, is predominantly an urban trading community. While carefully preserving their language and traditions, they are too few to be able to avoid some measure of assimilation,⁵³ and many of them responded readily to the call for repatriation. Before leaving Baghdad, the seven hundred repatriates issued a statement thanking the Iraqi people for their hospitality and friendship.⁵⁴

The London *Economist* (January 11, 1947) aptly points out that the departure of the Armenians from the Arabic-speaking lands "is depriving countries which stand in great need of skilled labor of an industrious and hardworking element that they can ill afford to lose. To wave goodbye to a minority of the type of the Armenians may feel like good politics, but it is bad economics."

The deep and widespread Armenian longing for national normalcy brought repatriates even from France and the United States to Soviet Armenia. The first group of 3,500 to be repatriated from France embarked on September 5 in the harbor of Marseilles on the

Soviet steamer *Rossia*, transporting with them their furniture and tools.⁵⁵

On April 21, 1947, the Soviet Embassy in Washington approached the State Department with the request that the American Government "render assistance to those Armenians who desire to return to their motherland by permitting them to leave, export property which belongs to them, relinquish their foreign citizenship, etc." Replying to this note, the State Department stated on May 28 that "the Government of the United States will interpose no objections to the departure of persons of Armenian origin from the United States to the Soviet Union... No exit visas are required, and such emigrants are at liberty to take their personal property with them. American citizens may voluntarily relinquish their American citizenship by making a formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign country in accordance with the laws thereof."⁵⁶

Of the approximately 180,000 Armenians in the United States, about one thousand (250 from Boston which has an Armenian-American population of 15,000) registered for repatriation to Soviet Armenia. Among them were native Americans and hundreds who had held United States citizenship for periods of from ten to forty years; some were wealthy and had occupied high positions.⁵⁷ The first group of 153, mostly from New England states, sailed on November 1, 1947, on the *Rossia*. According to Szot I. Chepurnykh, Soviet Vice-Consul in New York, all American citizens in the group accepted Soviet citizenship when they agreed to be repatriated. Several of the passengers, however, stated that they retained their American status and would return to the United States if they did not wish to remain in Armenia. There was also a controversy as regards the costs of the passage. The Vice-Consul stated that all expenses of the trip were borne by the Armenian Government, but this was contradicted by Mr. Mgrditch Pragouni, executive secretary of the New York Committee to Aid the Repatriation of Armenians, who insisted that all the repatriates were paying for their own passage.⁵⁸

The Moscow radio asserted on November 1 that these American Armenians were disillusioned with life in America; some of them were quoted as having complained of unemployment and discrimination. The repatriates themselves, before their departure, issued a statement saying: "America gave us refuge when the Armenian people were on the brink of total extermination following the brutal massacres by the Turks during and following World War I. The democratic institutions of America afforded us an opportunity to build life anew. We did our utmost to serve America well." The return to Armenia, the statement added, "was impelled by one of the deepest emotions of the human heart—the desire to live and work in the land where for countless generations before us our ancestors have lived, struggled, and brought forth a matchless civilization."⁵⁹

4.

At the Black Sea port of Batum, the gateway to their Promised Land, the repatriates received a heartwarming reception from the population. From Batum they proceeded by train to Erevan. On the way, as the train crossed the Armenian boundary line, they were welcomed again with a great pomp and ceremony by officials, farmers, workers and friends. The same warm reception was given them at Erevan. Speeches of welcome were exchanged by representatives of the Government and of the repatriates.⁶⁰

On their arrival the newcomers were given medical examinations. Nearly 60 per cent were found to be suffering from malaria, trachoma or dysentery. In a short time, dysentery was wiped out, the number of trachoma patients was reduced considerably, and malaria was well under control.

Plans for the permanent housing of the repatriates had been under way long before their arrival. The Government had planned to construct 1,115 new homes within three months in Erevan alone. By January, 1947, 135,000 square meters of living space was to be

ready for occupancy. The Five Year Plan of the city of Erevan made provision for the establishment of suburban settlements. Industrial enterprises set about to provide housing facilities for the new workers they expected. Erevan and Arabkir were joined by a wide avenue, to be named after General Bagramian; and nearly all the lots flanking it, as well as those in adjacent districts, were to be available for private homes. The repatriates were granted loans totalling 19,000,000 rubles. Families received credits for home construction from 25,000 rubles, in the case of farmers, to 30,000 rubles, in the case of city dwellers, payable within fifteen years. Transportation facilities, construction materials, and the necessary workers were made available.

Plans had also been made to provide work for the repatriates. All leading industrial enterprises submitted lists of personnel they needed to the Government's Reception Committee. In Erevan the repatriates were classified according to occupation, interest and background, before being assigned to their new homes and jobs. If not satisfied with the initial assignment, they were free to settle where they pleased.

During the summer of 1946, of the 50,761 repatriates who had arrived in Armenia, 20,000 adults were given jobs in their chosen profession or occupation—for example, tailors, textile loom operators, goldsmiths, metal workers, collective farmers, engineers, teachers, technicians, physicians, artists, etc. Scientists and writers were given work in institutes and foundations. Some were offered responsible positions as managers and executives. There were instances where new jobs were created to meet existing needs and to utilize the talents of workers and specialists.⁶¹

The educational facilities of the Republic were put at the disposal of the repatriates. More than six thousand young people entered the schools, many of them to receive instruction in their mother tongue for the first time. About six hundred enrolled in the technical schools. About twelve hundred were accepted in the University of Erevan and the medical, agricultural and teacher's in-

stitutes. The repatriates enjoyed the opportunity given them to study the mother tongue, while being fully relieved from financial cares.

The enrollment of the children gave rise to educational problems, since the teaching methods and curriculum in the Soviet Union differ from those in other countries. To meet these problems, the Armenian Ministry of Education tested the aptitudes of the children concerned. As a result, special classes were instituted for grades 1 through 4. For grades 5 to 7, courses in the Russian language, history, geography, chemistry and the Soviet Constitution were introduced. For grades 8 to 10, there were special evening classes, to enable pupils to complete their secondary education. For students on college level, similar one-year adjustment programs were set up.

The repatriation movement was financed by Armenian communities all over the world, by the Armenian Church and national organizations in Soviet Armenia and other Soviet Republics, and by the Armenian Government. In America, the Armenian General Benevolent Union launched a million dollar campaign, which exceeded its goal, thanks to the support of the League of Armenian Compatriotic Societies, and other constituent organizations and local chapters of the Armenian National Council of America. In Salonica the local repatriation committee resolved that repatriates who were more or less well off financially should participate in the transportation expenses of their less fortunate brethren. It carried through the plan by grading the repatriates according to ability to pay the fare, as follows: those in Category A, 300 Drachmas per person; in Category B, 100 Drachmas per person; in Category C, 50 Drachmas per person; in Category D, free. In Salonica, special effort was devoted to soliciting contributions toward a \$50,000 repatriation fund, of which \$30,000 had been collected throughout Greece by the fall of 1946.

The small Armenian community of Lyons, France, raised one million francs for the cause the first night of the campaign. Other communities in France raised larger sums.

In Aleppo, Syria, the local chauffeurs offered to help transport repatriates. Those who planned to drive their taxis to Armenia expressed willingness to take along with them as many others as they could accommodate. Those who had no taxis were willing to drive privately owned automobiles free of charge.

Yet as early as August, 1946, the *Armenian Bulletin* issued by the Armenian National Committee in the United States, stressed that while "until now all the money necessary for the transportation of the refugees has been supplied by the Armenian communities in foreign lands . . . it is now obvious that the money which will be required for the task ahead is beyond the financial means of Armenians abroad. Greater sums and greater facilities for transportation are essential for the success of the enterprise. This can be accomplished by either of two means. The first is by appropriation of a sizeable sum of money for this purpose by the Government of the Armenian Republic. The other method is by means of an international organization which might expedite the transfer of Armenian refugees in the same manner as is now being used for the millions of victims of the war."

The Government of Soviet Armenia assigned considerable sums for the accommodation of the Armenian resettlers. A credit of 40,000,000 rubles was appropriated for the construction of homes in 1946. Later, the Ministry of Municipal Economy of the Republic earmarked 6,500,000 rubles for the construction of homes in 1947.

Particularly generous was the response of the Armenian national institutions and of the Armenian population. The Catholicos, George VI, diverted the use of the building fund of the Cathedral of Echmiadzin to aid the return of his "beloved children." The people in the rural districts and in the cities inaugurated drives of their own. The collective farmers of the Artashat District were the first to respond. They asked each worker to subscribe from four to five days wages, and each collective farmer to contribute a definite sum from his savings. In forty-four villages of this District and the District Center, over a million rubles were collected in a

very short time; 569 rooms were found that could be put at the disposal of the arriving repatriates; and the construction of new homes was begun. The Artachat peasants then extended a call to their fellow-citizens in the Republic at large to do their share in the common cause and received the unstinted support of the people all over Armenia. On the collective farms and the machine and tractor stations in the Amassia District, 211,000 rubles were collected on the opening day of the campaign. In the village of Kishlagh, the collective farmers raised 140,000 rubles in one hour's time. In the Nor Bayazet District, they raised 500,000 rubles in one day. In the cities, workers turned in weekly salaries to the Repatriation Fund. In Erevan, in the Stalin District, they contributed 1,255,000 rubles; in the Mototov District, 1,200,400 rubles; in the Kirov District, 1,028,812 rubles; and in the Spandarian District, 500,000 rubles. Each worker of the Erevan Flour Mills donated the equivalent of five to fifteen days wages.

There is little non-Soviet information regarding the installation of the repatriates in Soviet Armenia. According to the usually well-informed London *Economist*, it appears "that the conditions they (the repatriates) are encountering are not at all what some of them expected. After the easy-going life of Cairo or Damascus it is a shock to encounter the shortages and difficulties that are the lot of the Russians today." But, the *Economist* admits, "the newcomers see around them the promise of educational and medical facilities far beyond anything the Middle East had to offer. What matters if, for the moment, the grant for a house is valueless because there are no building materials for the money to buy?"⁶²

In the course of 1946-47, some 110,000 Armenians were transferred from ten countries (Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, Greece, Bulgaria, France, the United States of America) to Soviet Armenia. This is in itself a very appreciable achievement, particularly in view of the complexity of the political, psychological and practical problems involved. But the number of repatriated Armenians represents only some 11 per cent of the Armenian diaspora,

and the results so far attained must be considered merely the promising commencement of a larger project.

It is too early to pronounce definite judgement on the prospects of the whole scheme. Much depends on the progress of the resettlement of the first groups of repatriates. It is not quite clear as yet whether Soviet Armenia in its present boundaries is in a position to absorb many hundreds of thousands of new settlers, and whether the Soviet Government is ready to continue its present repatriation policy without hopes of territorial expansion. If, however, the repatriation action is carried out successfully, it will solve one of the world's most intricate and pathetic minority problems.



The Abortive Assyrian Transfer

ON June 17, 1948, in the British House of Commons, Mr. Skeffington-Lodge raised the matter of the Christian communities in the Moslem Middle East. These age-old Christian minorities, said the outspoken Member of Parliament, "live dangerously; they live almost as the Christians of the pre-Christian Roman Empire lived." In Iraq, "Moslems are denouncing and speaking of Christians, who are their neighbors, in terms which the German Nazis reserved only for the Jews." But, added Mr. Skeffington-Lodge, no section among the Christian communities in the Middle East "is in greater risk and danger at the present time than that body known as the Assyrian Christians . . . they are facing virtual annihilation."⁸³

The British M.P. did not exaggerate.

The Assyrians are Christians. Their Church is one of the oldest and most aristocratic in Christendom. Centuries ago they were a great and advanced people of about forty million whose contribution to science and culture was numerous and valuable. Assyrian

historians stress that at the dawn of the Middle Ages the services rendered by the Assyrian (Nestorian) Church to the propagation of Christianity, education and enlightenment throughout the continent of Asia were unsurpassed.

Of this ancient glory little has remained. Centuries of dispersion and persecution reduced the Assyrian people to insignificance. The Assyrians were truly described by the Information Section of the League of Nations as a "Nation-Church" bearing "the shadowy heritage of the ancient name of Assyrians."⁶⁴ At the outbreak of World War I their number was estimated at 155,000, comprising three main groups: 80,000 inhabited the Tigris valley in what is now Iraq, 35,000 lived in Persian Azerbaijan; and 40,000 in the Hakkari mountains in the vicinity of the frontiers between Turkey, Russia and Persia.⁶⁵ When Turkey entered the war in November 1914, both the Turks and the Russians bid for the support of the Hakkari Assyrians. In the spring of 1915 the Assyrians decided to join the Allies. In spite of their courage and fighting spirit, they were driven by the Turkish forces from their mountain homes. Some forty thousand took refuge in Persia at the end of 1915. Together with the Persian Assyrians they fought on the side of the Russians until the Russian front collapsed. In the summer of 1918 the seventy thousand Persian and Hakkari Assyrians had no alternative but to retreat toward the British forces in Mesopotamia. Moving three hundred miles southeastward with their families, livestock, and possessions, they suffered from perpetual attacks by the Turks, Kurds, and Persians. Fewer than fifty thousand ultimately reached the British garrison in Hamadan.

Later, some of the Persian refugees returned to their villages. But the Hakkari mountain tribes numbering some 15,000 persons remained in Iraq. The Hakkari district was assigned to Turkey by the League of Nations in 1925, and the Kemalist Government barred the repatriation of the tribes.⁶⁶

It became necessary to face the prospect of establishing a "permanent home" for more than twenty thousand Assyrians scattered

over the Iraqi province of Mosul. However, no place for their resettlement was found within the boundaries of Iraq. The failure of all the resettlement schemes considered can certainly not be ascribed to the scarcity of Iraq's land resources. Iraq is one of the most underpopulated countries in the world. Its area is 140,000 square miles and its population in 1920 did not exceed 2,850,000. The real cause of the failure of all attempts to settle the Assyrians in Iraq in a single homogeneous community was cautiously and *en passant* described by the League of Nations Information Section as "ill-feeling between certain sections of the Arab population and this [Assyrian] small Christian minority, the greater part of which was not indigenous to the country."⁶⁷ The idea of a closed Assyrian settlement in Iraq was abandoned.

The alternative solution—individual absorption of the Assyrians into the Iraqi population, their religious freedom being maintained—was frustrated by the Anglo-Iraq treaty of June 30, 1930, which provided for the surrender by Great Britain of the Iraq Mandate and for independence of Iraq. This new development created much anxiety among the Assyrians, who were well aware of the dangers awaiting ethnic and religious minorities in an independent Arab state. In October, 1931 Assyrian petitions, presented to the League of Nations, stated that "it will be impossible for them [the Assyrians] to live in Iraq after the withdrawal of the [British] Mandate." They therefore asked that arrangements be made for the transfer of the Assyrians in Iraq to a country under the rule of the Western nations, or, if this were not possible, to Syria.⁶⁸ The Iraqi declaration in May 1932, including guarantees for the protection of minorities, had by no means dissipated their apprehensions. In 1932, when Iraq became a member of the League of Nations, the League's Council had before it petitions from the Assyrians asking that they be either transferred or settled in Iraq in a compact community possessing local autonomy. The Council adopted the view that the demand for administrative autonomy with-

in Iraq could not be accepted; no territory for a compact community of Assyrians in Iraq was made available.⁶⁹

Disappointed at the results of their representations, some eight hundred men, leaving their families behind, crossed the Syrian border on July 22, 1933, in the belief that the French authorities would provide them with land. They were, however, ordered by the French to return to Iraq. After they recrossed the frontier, a clash with local detachments of the Iraqi Army occurred. Many of the Assyrians were killed and wounded. Some 550 took refuge in Syria, where they were interned by the French authorities. As a result of this incident, passions were inflamed on both sides. A violent agitation convulsed Iraq. It culminated in the wholesale massacre of Assyrian men in Simmel on August 11, 1933, while in sixty neighboring villages robbing and looting continued during the following days. Lieutenant Colonel A.S. Stafford, British Administrative Inspector in Iraq, gives a blood-curdling eye-witness account of the Simmel massacre: "Machine gunners set up their guns outside the windows of the houses in which the Assyrians had taken refuge, and . . . fired among them until not a man was left standing in the shambles."⁷⁰ Women were ripped open with knives and then made sport of while they were in a state of agony. Little girls of nine were raped and burned alive. The survivors, some 1,500, mostly women and children, were sent by the Iraqi Government to a camp at Mosul.⁷¹

2.

These tragic events convinced all the parties involved that the Assyrian problem in Iraq was beyond local remedy. The Iraqi Government impressed upon the Council of the League of Nations that it was essential to provide a new home for those Assyrians "who wished to leave or were unable peaceably to be incorporated into the Iraqi State."⁷² The Council was unanimously of the same opinion. On September 15, 1933 it set up a Committee of Six to

prepare a scheme for transfer and permanent settlement of the Iraqi Assyrian community.

"From October 1933 to the middle of 1935," reports an information publication of the League of Nations, "the Committee searched the world for a suitable place in which to settle the Assyrian people, and there is not a continent in which it did not consider possibilities."⁷³ Investigation commissions were sent to the state of Parana in Brazil and to British Guiana. The Parana report was favorable, but the project had to be abandoned owing to the adoption by the Brazilian Parliament of a law restricting immigration. The investigation in British Guiana led to the conclusion that it is "more than doubtful whether the Assyrians could be settled there on a sufficiently large scale."⁷⁴

The Committee, therefore, concentrated its attention on the possibilities of transfer and settlement of the Assyrians in Syria, where a precedent had already been established in 1934 when the 550 Assyrians, who had taken refuge there in August 1933, were settled provisionally in the valley of Upper Khabur. There was a further influx, and by September 1935 some six thousand Assyrians were living in the Khabur area; they were rapidly becoming self-supporting as regards the more important foodstuffs.⁷⁵

Both Turkey and Iraq were, however, averse to the mass settlement of Assyrians in Khabur which was in proximity to their frontiers. The French authorities finally agreed to allow the permanent establishment of the Assyrians (not only of those who had been provisionally settled in Khabur, but also of those who had remained in Iraq and wished to settle elsewhere) in the sparsely populated and marshy Ghab plain in the Alaouite territory. This area had the advantage of being remote from the Turkish and Iraqi frontiers, while the immediate neighbors of the prospective Assyrian settlers were Christian groups. It was also stressed that the administrative authority to which they would be ultimately subject was the separate state of Latakia, administered by a French Governor and inhabited almost exclusively by non-Moslem groups. Some 24,000

Assyrians then in the Mosul area—even those who had property and did not complain of conditions—expressed the unconditional wish to leave for the Ghab “without asking for any details of their future settlement.” Similar results were registered at Kirkuk and Baghdad. The Assyrians were ready to go. The Iraqi Government was ready to let them go and even offered a contribution of £125,000 (\$500,000), calculated on a basis of £10 for every Assyrian leaving Iraq up to 12,500 persons.⁷⁶ Later it doubled this offer.⁷⁷ The cost of the whole Ghab settlement scheme was calculated at £1,075,000 (\$4,300,000), of which some £937,000 were secured by contributions promised by the French, British and Iraqi Governments, as well as by the League of Nations.⁷⁸

The Information Section of the League of Nations hopefully stated early in 1935 that the League “has now initiated and helped to finance a scheme for their (Assyrian) transfer from Iraq and settlement in the Levant states—a work of humanity and appeasement.”⁷⁹ The Khabur settlement was considered a temporary expedient, pending the completion of the Ghab scheme.

The situation, however, completely and abruptly changed in the spring of 1935, when the French announced their decision to apply for the termination of the French Mandate in Syria.⁸⁰ In view of the growing nationalist feeling among the Syrian Arabs, who bitterly opposed the establishment of another Christian minority in the country, the prospects for successful settlement of the Assyrians in the Ghab area were practically eliminated.

The League's Committee for the settlement of Assyrians was thus forced to recommend to the Council the definite abandonment of the Ghab scheme. On July 4, 1936, the Council approved this recommendation. It instructed the Committee to study the possibilities of “settlement elsewhere than in Iraq of the Assyrians of Iraq who still wished to leave that country.” But all these studies and investigations proved fruitless. The Committee, therefore, reached the definite conclusion that the settlement outside of Iraq of those Assyrians who still remained there did not at that time

seem to be practicable. It stated further that it was impossible to arrange for the transfer of the 8,800 Assyrians settled in the Khabur valley or in Syria.⁸¹

Thus, the transfer of Assyrians reached a blind alley. The League of Nations Council failed in its efforts to secure the settlement of some 25,000 to 30,000 Assyrians who had since 1919 been the object of international interest and attention. Admitting its failure, the Resettlement Committee decided that the Assyrians who remained in Iraq would "have to continue to reside in Iraq," and the Committee would "not be called to deal with them; these Assyrians should, as far as possible, become incorporated in the Iraqi population as ordinary citizens of the Iraqi State."⁸² The League's Council took note of the vague declaration of the Iraqi Foreign Minister that the Assyrian community in Iraq will "enjoy the benefits of the declaration on the protection of minorities signed by the Iraqi Government . . . on May 19, 1932."⁸³

3.

It was very easy for the League of Nations' Resettlement Committee to decree that the Assyrians should "become incorporated in the Iraqi population." The implementation of this pious recommendation proved to be much more complicated. All students of Middle Eastern affairs are unanimous in stating that there is deep hatred and distrust between the Assyrian people and the Iraqi Moslem Arabs. This bad feeling increased in intensity after the outbreak of World War II. The Iraqi Arabs, like the Arabs in Syria, Egypt, Palestine and elsewhere, did not expect the Allies' victory and were completely pro-Axis. Brigadier Glubb, the Commander of the Transjordan Arab Legion, openly admits that in the whole Middle East, from Libya to the Indian border, "every Arab was convinced that we were done for . . . Every Arab force previously organized by us mutinied and refused to fight for us, or faded away in desertion."⁸⁴

The Assyrians, like the Jews, took a diametrically different attitude. They staked their all on an Allied victory, and they acted accordingly. In Iran they placed at the disposal of the Allied Powers a large number of efficient and reliable transport workers for transportation of American lend-lease goods to Soviet Russia. When the German armies stood at the gates of the Caucasus, thousands of Assyrians volunteered to join the Red Army and to play their part in stemming the German advance. And in Iraq they enthusiastically responded to the appeal of the British authorities and voluntarily joined the Royal Air Force ground forces at the meager pay of three pounds a month. They guarded airdromes, ammunition dumps and other important war materials, as well as lines of communication in the Middle and Near Eastern countries, among a deeply hostile Arab population. They also took an active part in the Mediterranean and Southern European theaters of war.

This attitude earned the Assyrians the violent hatred of the Iraqi Arab nationalists. This hatred came to a climax during the notorious pro-Axis coup organized in May, 1941 by the government of Rashid Ali al Gailani in Baghdad. It is generally conceded that Assyrian Levies, numbering about eight hundred, bore the brunt of the attack by an 18,000 strong Iraqi Army against the British-held Habbaniya airfield, and, together with small Jewish units from Palestine, saved that highly strategic point of British resistance. Thereby they averted a major catastrophe to the Allied position in the entire Middle East at a time when the Reich's fortunes were at their highest point. The defeat of the anti-British rebellion was enthusiastically greeted by the Jews and the Assyrians. An anti-Jewish pogrom followed instantly, and some five hundred Jews were killed. Heavy losses inflicted by the Assyrian Levies on the Iraqi Army when the latter attacked Habbaniya were also not forgotten. The families of the dead Iraqi soldiers developed a violent personal grudge against the Assyrians and did not conceal their grim determination to pay off as soon as an opportunity presented itself.

The situation became increasingly unbearable. After the announcement of the withdrawal of British troops from Iraq, the Assyrians lived in permanent fear of physical extermination. Some of them are still in the employment, and on the payroll, of the British Air Force. But this does not in the least alleviate their apprehensions. They are unanimous in their desire to be transferred to some Christian country where they will be able to live in safety. In the early autumn of 1944, they began an underground action for a unified representation to set their case before the world. Fearing Arab or British interference, they kept their plans secret and placed all their faith in the United States of America. They sincerely believe that the services they rendered the Allies during the first and second World Wars and their sacrifices for the Allied cause entitle them to appropriate representation among the United Nations. They demand that the Assyrian question be placed on the agenda of all United Nations' conferences and they are confident that the victorious democracies "will find them a place to settle somewhere in the world." An Assyrian delegation headed by Patriarch Mar Eshai Shimun XXIII came to the United Nations Conference at San Francisco and petitioned for "living space for the surviving Assyrians." But they failed in their efforts to enlist the support of the Conference. Nor were they successful in making the headlines in the press, despite a case the merits of which no one can gainsay. At San Francisco the representatives of a small, poor and homeless people were scarcely noticed.

Later attempts by the Patriarch Eshai Shimun to draw attention to the fate of his people, proved no more successful.

On May 17, 1946, he presented to the U.N. Secretary General a memorandum on a "well-planned systematic persecution in the form of massacre, conducted by certain units of the Iranian military forces against the Assyrian Christians in the district of Rezaieh, Iran." Five months later, on October 17th, he was informed that his communication "will be referred to the Commission of Human Rights for the information of its members when the Commission

next convenes."⁸⁵ The Patriarch's appeal was buried in the archives of the Commission.

A year later, the Patriarch once again asked the United Nations for an investigation of the plight of Assyrians in Iran and Iraq, where, he said in his petition, the "Assyrian and other peoples were sacrificed on the altar of oil," massacred and subjected to systematic persecution. Twenty-four Assyrian villages, the petition charged, were wholly or partially looted and burned in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan during the month of December, 1946, and some hundreds of Assyrians were brutally slaughtered by Iranian forces under Colonel Sarhang Zanghanai. Assyrian priests were cut to pieces, women and little girls were raped or paraded nude on the streets, numerous men tortured to death. "If a repetition of these tragic events is to be prevented," insisted Patriarch Shimun, "the Assyrian question as a whole must be taken under the immediate consideration of the United Nations with a view to finding a lasting solution to the problem as a whole."⁸⁶

This appeal, too, remained unanswered. The United Nations has done as little for the Assyrian people as the defunct League of Nations in its time.

Even more strikingly, perhaps, the British Empire, which is so much indebted to the Assyrians, has manifested no willingness at all to help them. Replying to the interpellation by Mr. Skeffington-Lodge, Mr. McNeil openly told the House of Commons on behalf of the British Labor Government that "there can be no question" of resettling the Assyrians under the groundnuts scheme in the British-controlled territory of Tanganyika. While acknowledging the failure of the Assyrian attempt "to become good Iraqis," Mr. McNeil declared: "When we have upon our hands so many desperate problems of resettlement of victims whose state is even more precarious and desperate, it is obvious to everyone in the House that it would be rash, and even dishonest, to say that I see any obvious opportunity of resettlement . . ."

The valiant Assyrians, heirs to a great civilization, fighting allies

of the western democracies, are thus, in the words of Patriarch Shimun, "being repaid for their loyalty by a series of broken promises and eleven massacres since 1914 . . . They are the innocent victims of power politics and their case constitutes the most glaring example of broken pledges and shameful betrayal." Their case constitutes, as well, one of the most pathetic examples of the acute need for a solution based on population transfer.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II.

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4. Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, London, 1939, pp.36-37
5. *USSR Census*, 1926, Vol.48, pp. 62-63.
6. V. Quisling, "Notes on recent arrivals of Armenian refugees in Armenia (1925)", *Scheme for the Settlement of Armenian Refugees* (League of Nations C.699, M.264, 1926, IV) p. 62
7. Simpson, l.c., Some of the groups who have settled in Soviet Armenia have built towns and villages of their own through the financial assistance of their compatriots in the United States, and gave them the names of cities in Turkish Asia Minor from which they originally came—for instance, New Sebastia, New Arapkir, etc. G.H. Pallian, *Landmarks in Armenian History*, New York, 1942, p.86.
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9. *Scheme for the Settlement of Armenian Refugees*, League of Nations, Doc. C.669, M.264, 1926, IV (1927). Also: Simpson, *op.cit.*, p. 56
10. L. L. Lorwin, "International Economic Development: Public Works and Other Problems," *NRPB Technical Paper*, No. 7 (1942), p. 59
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13. *Jewish Agency Digest of Press and Events*, Jerusalem, October 26, 1947
14. According to the 1933 census, they have an average population of 10.5 per sq.km.
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18. *Soviet Home Service*, July 22, 1945
19. *Baġkar* (Boston Armenian daily), January 4, 1946.—(The figure of 1½ million is obviously an exaggeration.)
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21. *Hairenik* (Boston Armenian daily), March 14, 1946; *Baġkar*, March 9, 1946, *Lraper*, March 7, 1946
22. Published in *Hairenik*, March 1, 1946
23. Letter to Mr. Trygve Lee, Secretary General of the United Nations, by the Conference of Armenian Compatriotic Societies (May 3, 1946)
24. Rev. Charles Vertanes, "Lo, A Dispersed People Returns to Its Homeland" in *Land and Life*, March, 1947
25. *Prauda*, December 2, 1945
26. Vertanes, *op.cit.*
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29. William S. Haas, *Iran*, New York, 1946, p. 172
30. *The Economist*, London, January 11, 1947
31. Vertanes, *loc.cit.*
32. Letter to Mr. Trygve Lee
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39. *Istatistik Yilligi*, vol. XVI, 1942-43, pp. 47-48
40. Vertanes, *op.cit.*
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42. *The Jewish Agency Digest*, *loc.cit.*
43. Vertanes, *op.cit.*
44. *The Jewish Agency Digest*, *l.c.*
45. *New York Times*, June 11, 1946
46. *Soviet News*, July 9, September 10, 1947
47. *Ibid.*, September 10, 1947
48. Hourani, *op.cit.*, p.49

49. *Jewish Agency Digest*, October 26, 1947
50. *New York Times*, October 20, 1947
51. *Jewish Agency Digest*, op.cit.
52. *Ibid.*
53. Hourani, op.cit., p.103
54. *Jewish Agency Digest*, loc.cit.
55. *Le Monde*, September 7/8, 1947
56. *New York Times*, December 5, 1947
57. *Ibid.*, October 31, 1947
58. *New York Herald Tribune*, November 2, 1947
59. *Ibid.*
60. The following description of the resettlement of the repatriates in Soviet Armenia is based on the unqualifiedly enthusiastic but fundamentally reliable report of Rev. Charles Vertanes in *Land and Life* (March 1947)
61. Erevan newspapers have, however, complained that the Armenian repatriates "have not yet realized that during the last thirty years deep changes have taken place in the ideology of the population; that they obviously "cannot yet get used to a long patriotic work effort" and that they will have to be forced to work more. Quoted in *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, New York, January 20, 1948
62. *The Economist*, January 11, 1947
63. *Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons*. June 17, 1948
64. *League of Nations Questions No. 5, "The Settlement of the Assyrians"*. Information Section. Geneva 1935, p. 3
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73. *League of Nations Questions*, No.5, p.22
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75. *League of Nations Documents*, C 352, M 179, 1935, VII
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77. "The Settlement of the Assyrians" in *Information Section*, p.44
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79. *League of Nations Questions*, p.46

80. *League of Nations Documents*, C 387, M 258, 1937, VIII & C 440, 1937, VII
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82. *League of Nations Documents*, C 387, M 258, 1937, VII.
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III

THE CASE FOR ARAB-JEWISH EXCHANGE OF
POPULATION

PRECEDING chapters of this book have dealt with transfers that are completed or still in process of implementation. The purpose of this study is, however, not only descriptive and historical. The author believes that many important conclusions can and must be drawn from past transfers and that the idea underlying any transfer scheme is basically a preventive one. If a country, or two countries, or an international body is faced with a minority problem which manifestly cannot be solved within the existing territorial framework and which, if perpetuated, will obviously lead to international complications and possibly to war, recourse should be taken at once to the preventive device of transfer. A transfer scheme loses its point unless it is applied before matters have come to an explosive climax and unless it has a scope commensurate with the magnitude of the problem. The fallacy of "too late and too little" is particularly perilous in the case of minority transfers.

Palestine seems a classic case for quick, decisive transfer action as the only constructive method of solving the basic problem and preventing extremely dangerous developments. It is a test case calling for clear-sightedness, vision, courage and high statesmanship.

On the eve of the expiration of the Palestine Mandate, British statistics put the total number of Arabs, Moslem and Christian, in the territory of Western Palestine¹ at 1,225,000.² Authoritative Jewish sources estimated the number of Jews at over 700,000. The Jewish population which comprised 83,790 souls in 1922, increased largely through immigration under the terms of the League of

Nations Mandate which gave "recognition to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country." For the Jews immigration was a means toward the establishment of a Jewish majority in Palestine as the prerequisite for the creation of a Jewish State. Leaders of the Zionist movement repeatedly stated that the prospective Arab minority would enjoy full civic, religious and cultural equality in the future Jewish State.

The Arabs—at least the politically articulate among them—consistently opposed Jewish immigration and its political implications. They insisted that Palestine was their country and demanded the establishment of an independent Arab State there. Anti-Jewish riots in 1920, 1921, 1929 and 1936-39 were the most violent manifestations of this Arab opposition. The Arab leaders demanded full stoppage of Jewish immigration.

The Arab-Jewish controversy over Palestine, complicated and intensified by the vacillating policy of the British Mandatory Power, grew worse in the course of the last decade, till at the end of World War II the Holy Land faced an explosion. The Arab and Jewish communities, backed respectively by the neighboring independent Arab States and by world Jewry, were more divided than ever. The Arabs demanded that all of Palestine be converted into an independent state, ruled by its Arab majority. The Jews demanded that a Jewish State be established either in all of Palestine (which implied a speedy transfer of at least half a million Jewish immigrants from other countries to achieve a Jewish majority), or in part of the country. It became evident that the aspirations of the two communities were irreconcilable and that the idea of a bi-national Arab-Jewish State, based on equality of the two components, irrespective of their numerical strength, was not practicable. Palestine clearly had to become either an Arab State with a Jewish minority or a Jewish State with an Arab minority.

In an attempt to arrive at a compromise solution, the United Nations, on November 29, 1947, by a two-thirds majority decided to

partition Palestine into a Jewish State with a population of 538,000 Jews and 397,000 Arabs,³ and an Arab State with a population of 804,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews; the enclave of Jerusalem was to be a neutralized international zone with a population of 105,000 Arabs and 100,000 Jews.

Without going into the merits of the partition scheme as such, the author submits that, even if implemented, it merely limits, but by no means solves, the crucial and explosive problem of Palestine's ethnic minorities. This minority problem, which is a question of life and death for the success of any constructive scheme for Palestine, cannot be solved without resorting to what the late President Eduard Benes of Czechoslovakia called "the grim necessity of transfer."

2.

The first time the idea of a Palestine partition, combined with transfer and exchange of population, was put forward by any responsible body, was in the report of the British Royal Commission on Palestine under the chairmanship of Lord Peel, published in July, 1937.³ The report submitted that the Palestine Mandate, as voted in 1922 by the League of Nations, was unworkable; it presented a carefully elaborated plan for partitioning the country into a sovereign and independent Arab State consisting of Transjordan, united with some 80 per cent of the territory of Western Palestine, and a sovereign and independent Jewish State covering some 20 per cent of Western Palestine, plus an enclave containing the Holy Places of Jerusalem and Bethlehem which would remain under a new Mandate regime.

In the belief of the Royal Commission, this partition scheme offered the only constructive and permanent solution of the Arab-Jewish conflict over Palestine. The Commission was, however, well aware of the fact that the demarcation line between the two States, which had been drawn with the intention of creating—as far as

possible—ethnically uniform territories, had left considerable Arab and Jewish minorities in the proposed states. The Jewish minority in the Arab State was relatively small. According to the figures given by the Royal Commission, there were only some 1,250 Jews. The Arab minority in the proposed Jewish State was, however, incomparably larger. It comprised about 225,000 persons.⁴ The Commission insistently emphasized (p. 390) that "the existence of these minorities clearly constitutes the most serious hindrance to the smooth and successful operation of partition. The 'minority problem' has become only too familiar in recent years, whether in Europe or in Asia. It is one of the most troublesome and intractable products of post-war nationalism; and nationalism in Palestine, as we have seen, is at least as intense a force as it is anywhere in the world. . . If the settlement is to be clean and final, this question of the minorities must be boldly faced and firmly dealt with. It calls for the highest statesmanship on the part of all concerned."

The Royal Commission suggested that "an instructive precedent" for the solution of this thorny problem was afforded by the exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations after the Greco-Turkish war in 1923. It insistently recommended the acceptance of a similar solution with regard to the Jewish and Arab minorities in the prospective Arab and Jewish States. The Commission expressed the hope that in view of the manifest advantage for both nations of "reducing the opportunities of future friction to the utmost," the Arab and Jewish leaders "might show the same high statesmanship as that of the Turks and the Greeks and make the same bold decision for the sake of peace."

As to whether the proposed transfer should be voluntary or compulsory, the Commission took a practical stand. With regard to the hill country of North Galilee with its wholly Arab population, the Commission believed that it might not be necessary to effect a greater exchange of land and population than could be effected on a voluntary basis; but, as regards plains, including Beisan, and Jewish colonies in the prospective Arab State, "it should be part of

the agreement that in the last resort the exchange would be compulsory." (p. 391)

The British Government fully endorsed the scheme recommended by the Royal Commission as "the best and most hopeful solution of the (Palestine) deadlock" (Cmd 5513). The partition plan was discussed at length in both Houses of the British Parliament on July 20 and 21, 1937. Such distinguished representatives of all three parties, as Winston Churchill, Lord Samuel, Lloyd George and Lord Strabolgi, sharply opposed the entire partition scheme. The transfer issue played a very slight role in the debate. The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Ormsby-Gore), did not mention it at all. In the House of Commons, Colonel Wedgwood and Mr. de Rothschild, who presented the Jewish case, mildly opposed the transfer solution. On the contrary, Earl Winterton, who spoke for the Government, and Sir A. Wilson, known for his pro-Arab tendencies, were sympathetic.⁵ In the House of Lords, Viscount Samuel spoke sharply against the idea of transfer, while another Jewish Lord, Lord Melchett, advocated the mass transfer of East European Jews into Palestine.⁶

In the course of the thirty-second (extraordinary) session of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations which opened on July 30, 1937, and dealt extensively with the partition scheme, close attention was given to the suggested transfer plan. The accredited representative of the British Mandatory Government, W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore, warmly advocated the transfer proposal. The members of the Mandates Commission manifested no opposition towards the idea in itself and expressed concern only as regards the compulsory or voluntary character of the transfer. The Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Orts, stressed that he "would be glad to have it confirmed that in the event of the creation of the two new states, the proposed transfer of the rural Arab population would only be effected if those populations freely consented." Mr. Ormsby-Gore replied that "he would hesitate to envisage any obligatory transfer of Arabs from the Jewish State into the Arab

State, save when the Government of the latter State agreed."⁷

In a "Preliminary Opinion" submitted to the Council of the League of Nations the Mandates Commission admitted that transfer of population "might be necessary if there was a partition;" it stressed that the problem was a "delicate" one and that "in order to guarantee that the advantages of such a transfer should outweigh the disadvantages, particular care would have to be given to ensure that it was carried out with the greatest fairness."

The principle of population transfer in application to Palestine was thus basically endorsed by the most authoritative international body.

There were, however, three fundamental weaknesses in the Royal Commission's transfer scheme which finally doomed the scheme in its entirety.

Even though it spoke of an Arab-Jewish exchange of population, the Royal Commission actually proposed a one-way transfer of Arabs. The 1,250 prospective Jewish transferees from the Arab State could not be balanced against the 225,000 Arabs to be transferred from the Jewish State. This ratio of almost 1 : 200 was conducive to the idea that there was not only inequality in numbers (a usual phenomenon in most known cases of population exchange), but inequity in the very approach to, and treatment of, the two ethnic groups involved. In the second place, the Royal Commission's scheme provided for the transfer of Arabs from the prospective Jewish State to the prospective Arab State only, without envisaging their resettlement in other, already existing, large Arab States with insufficient population. Finally, the lack of clarity about the voluntary or compulsory character of the transfer, jeopardized the workability of the entire partition solution.

After having obtained the consent of the League of Nations to further study of the partition plan, the British Government appointed a special Partition Commission (often called the Woodhead Commission, after the name of its chairman), whose terms of reference included the examination of the "possibility of voluntary ex-

changes of land and population, and the prospects of providing by works of land development room for further settlement to meet the needs of persons desiring to move from one area to another."⁸ The report of the Woodhead Commission, submitted in October 1938, rejected the partition scheme as proposed by the Peel (Royal) Commission. The results of investigations made on behalf of the Commission in Beersheba, the Jordan Valley, and Transjordan in the prospective Arab State (where large areas of sparsely populated country were supposed to be available for the resettlement of the Arab transferees, if water could be provided for irrigation) proved to be "most disappointing." Thus, no inducement could be envisaged to influence the Arab minority to move there from the future Jewish State.

The Partition Commission came to the conclusion that there is "little possibility of the voluntary exchange of population between the Jewish State and the Arab State," and continued: "The Royal Commission assumed that provision would be made for the transfer of the greater part of the Arab population in the Jewish State, if necessary by compulsion under a scheme to be agreed between both states. But in his despatch of the 23rd December, 1937, your predecessor made it clear that His Majesty's Government have not accepted the proposal for compulsory transfer; and we have found it impossible to assume that the minority problem will be solved by a voluntary transfer of population. It is largely because of the gravity of the situation that would thus be created that we have felt obliged to reject the Royal Commission's plan, under which at the outset the number of Arabs in the Jewish State would be almost equal to the number of Jews."⁹

The majority of the Woodhead Commission offered a partition plan of their own (the so-called "plan C"), which reduced the territory of the future Jewish State from 20 per cent to 5 per cent of Western Palestine (300,000 acres in all) and its Arab minority to 54,400, while the Jewish minority in the Arab State was increased to 8,900. No transfer or exchange of minorities was envisaged in the

majority report of the Woodhead Commission.

The report was published on November 9, 1938, and on the same day the British Government issued a Statement of Policy announcing that in the light of the evidence contained in it they had reached the conclusion that a solution on partition lines was impracticable.

The transfer plan was, however, not forgotten among British parliamentary circles concerned with Palestine. In both Houses the issue was raised in the course of the debate following the Government's abandonment of the partition plan. Examples of successful population transfers were approvingly quoted in the House of Commons by Sir Walter Smiles in a rather pro-Arab speech, while Captain Cazalet, an ardent champion of the Jewish cause, indicated the possibility of transferring Palestine Arabs to Iraq.¹⁰ In the House of Lords, the transfer idea was strongly advocated by the leader of the Labor opposition, Lord Snell, and vigorously opposed by Viscount Swinton who was for four years Colonial Secretary. Speaking about the Royal Commission plan to transfer some 250,000 Arabs from the proposed Jewish State, Lord Swinton indignantly asked: "Where on earth they were to be transferred, it passes the wit of man to understand."¹¹ Nine months later, in the course of a debate on Palestine in the House of Commons, Mr. Alfred Duff Cooper, formerly First Lord of the British Admiralty, resumed the issue and vigorously advocated a radical solution of the Arab-Jewish conflict on Palestine by way of a transfer of the Palestine Arab population to the other Arab countries.¹²

3.

The United Nations resolution of November 29, 1947, left unanswered the same crucial question which defeated the partition scheme of the Royal Commission ten years earlier. The Jewish State was left with an Arab minority of 350,000 to 397,000, 39 to 42

per cent of its population. This strongly nationalistic Arab community, embittered by decades of Arab-Jewish political friction, permanently subject to irredentist propaganda from outside and confident of spiritual, financial, and possible military support on the part of the neighboring Arab States, could hardly be expected to reconcile itself to a minority status within the new Jewish State. In spite of the far-reaching guarantees by the State of Israel of their economic, political, religious and cultural rights and interests, nationalistic Arab groups were more than likely to continue to consider all of Palestine an Arab country and to persist in attempting to overthrow "Jewish supremacy." The young Jewish State would then from the very beginning be saddled with an acute minority problem which would inevitably become a permanent source of friction and conflict. Any suppression of Arab subversive activities would inevitably provoke anger and intervention on the part of the neighboring Arab States, and retaliation against their own Jewish minorities.¹³ The peace of the entire Middle East would be shaken.

The Arab-Jewish controversy over Palestine has thus emerged in its undiluted political essence, purged of the economic arguments which have for so long obscured its true nature. Previous attempts to motivate, or at least to explain, uncompromising Arab hostility to Jewish mass immigration into Palestine and to the eventual establishment of a Jewish State, on the ground of the economic harm allegedly caused by Jewish colonization to the interests of the local Arab population, have been convincingly refuted by the Royal Commission in 1937, by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946 and the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947. All these authoritative bodies agreed that the economic position of the Arab population, regarded as a whole, was in no way prejudiced by the influx of Jews and that, in fact, the Arabs benefited from the establishment of a Jewish National Home. There is certainly no incompatibility between the economic interests of the local Arab population and the establishment of a Jewish

State in Palestine, open to the influx of Jewish repatriates. Even the most ardent opponents of Jewish statehood have ceased to use the argument that Jewish mass immigration leads to impoverishment and dispossession of Palestine's present Arab inhabitants or prejudice to their eventual progeny. As far as the economic absorptive capacity of the country is concerned, both nations can live and develop peaceably and in full harmony.

Yet, in the Middle East—no less than in Europe—considerations of political or nationalistic "absorptive capacity" play a determining role. The Royal Commission in 1937 came to the conclusion that "the core of their (Arab) cause, it must be stressed, is political." The Commission pointed out that all politically articulate groups among the Palestinian Arabs refused to become an ethnic minority in a country ruled by a Jewish majority and that they would continue to do so even if it could be mathematically proved that they had nothing to fear and much to gain as to their future economic, religious, cultural and civic status. Fully endorsing the Commission's view, the Marquess of Dufferin and Ava told the House of Lords on behalf of the British Government that the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine was fundamentally "the result of conflicting ideals and not of conflicting interests;" he exposed "the fallacy... on which Jewish elements have based many of their arguments... imagining that this matter can be solved on economic lines. It is no good to tell the Arab that his birth-rate has gone up by so many thousands, or that he is able to obtain goods at a lower price."¹⁴ Five months later the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Malcolm MacDonald, also stressed that "the Arabs were not free to consider dispassionately the benefits which their country was getting from Jewish capital and activity. The material improvement was overlaid by a more serious consideration... They (the Arabs) were afraid that if Jewish immigration continued indefinitely this energetic, wealthy incoming people would dominate them numerically, economically, politically and in every way in the land of their birth."

On July 20, 1939, in the House of Commons, Lt. Col. Sir Arnold Wilson, presenting the Arab case, made no attempt to deny "the material benefit which has accrued to the inhabitants of Palestine" as a result of Jewish immigration. But," he added, "I lived long enough among Persians and Arabs to know that they are not exclusively concerned with material benefits. . . Nationalism is a growing force, with its good as well as bad sides. There is no possibility whatever of the Arabs accepting, as consolation for the loss of their homeland, a few more cinemas and a few more dentists, and two pairs of shoes where before they had one pair or none. There is no solution by that road here or elsewhere."¹⁵

By the end of the interwar period this fundamental political aspect of the Palestine problem had converted the Arab-Jewish controversy over the Holy Land into an apparently insoluble issue. Once the economic level was abandoned (and it has definitely been abandoned by the Arab spokesmen themselves, the alleged material harm to the Arabs being utilized in the discussion only as accidental and accessory argument), the Arab viewpoint became as unshakable as the Jewish. The Jews claim Palestine in order to escape their age-old minority status all over the world: the Royal Commission, for example, fully grasped the essence of Zionism in emphasizing that "escape from minority life" is the real motive of the Jewish regeneration movement. It is, therefore, ethically and politically impossible for Jews or anyone else lightly to dismiss another ethnic group's passionate refusal to become a minority. Malcolm MacDonald, speaking on June 16, 1939, at the thirty-sixth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, put the issue quite clearly and bluntly: "There had to be a minority in Palestine, if not of Jews, then of Arabs."¹⁶

It is true that the Arabs possess several independent national states and that there is no essential hardship in the fact that in territory constituting less than 1 per cent of the Arab inhabited area of the Middle East, an Arab population of 1,200,000—3 per cent of the total population of the Arab States—would have to live

as a minority in a non-Arab State. Almost every nation of the modern world, even the mightiest, has splinters living in someone else's state. This is the usual rather than the exceptional situation. Moreover, the Jewish majority is, in fact, firmly determined to guarantee their Arab co-citizens full political, cultural and religious equality and to treat them not as subjects but as equals in a common motherland. The State of Israel, since its inception, has been exemplary in relationship to its Arab minority; full provision has been made in its draft constitution for equal rights and cultural and religious freedom for Arab citizens of Israel.¹⁷

Nevertheless, Palestinian Arabs can quite justifiably claim that even the best protected and most prosperous minority is still a minority, and that they, therefore, are not willing to live as a minority in a Jewish-governed country. Alvin Johnson, President of the Institute of World Affairs, in a letter to the *New York Times* (October 10, 1947) bluntly put the crucial question: "Will the Arab minority within the Jewish State be content with Jewish law, Jewish educational provisions, Jewish administration of social services?" In his testimony before the Royal Commission, the Zionist leader, V. Jabotinsky, while categorically denying that becoming a minority would cause any personal hardship to individual Arabs, admitted: "If you suggest disappointment of the Palestine Arabs as a whole with the prospect of a country they call Palestine, which they think is one of their national states, becoming a Jewish State, I quite admit there is disappointment."¹⁸

We are thus confronted with a clearly outlined conflict between two ethically well-founded claims, the Jewish and the Arab. It was again the Royal Commission which said, as long ago as 1937, that the conflict which had arisen in Palestine between the Jews and Arabs was "not a conflict between right and wrong, but a conflict between right and right."

4.

The conclusion Arab spokesmen draw from their refusal to be-

come an ethnic minority, is that the United Nations resolution should be revised and the whole of Palestine be proclaimed a unitary Arab State.

Irrespective of the merits and feasibility of this Arab scheme, it offers no workable solution for the actual problem. It would merely supplant the problem of a powerful and intransigent Arab minority in a Jewish State by the problem of a powerful and intransigent Jewish minority in an Arab State—unless, of course, one admits the possibility of mass genocide.

Such a state would possess over 700,000 Jews, over one-third of the total population. The first step of a prospective Arab Government would be to stop any further Jewish immigration and thus convert Palestine Jewry into a permanent minority—one more Jewish minority splinter added to the numerous Jewish minority groups scattered over the world. The difference would consist only in that Jewish minorities in all other countries resulted from sporadic, involuntary migrations, without any thought of, or rightful claim to, the establishment of an independent national existence, while the hundreds of thousands of Jews who came to Palestine after the first World War did so in the hope of escaping the minority status which had been their people's lot for centuries in every part of the world. They came, also, on the strength of an international undertaking pledging Great Britain to help them in "re-constituting their national home" in Palestine. Speaking about the British White Paper of 1939, the then Archbishop of Canterbury, the highest moral authority of the Church of England, stated in the House of Lords that it would result in "reducing the Jews to the status of a permanent minority in a preponderantly Arab State. . . I venture to think," said the Archbishop, "that it was precisely from this permanent minority status that they (the Jews) had hoped to escape;" they hoped for "a sphere of their own, where they could. . . be masters of their own destiny and affairs," where "they had some autonomous control."¹⁹

Now that the State of Israel has functioned so dynamically and

effectively since May 14, 1948, it is inconceivable that the Jews of Palestine should reconcile themselves to minority status in an Arab State. For their part, Arab leaders have declared that they are not prepared to accept on equal footing any considerable Jewish minority within a Palestine Arab State. When asked by the Palestine Royal Commission in 1937 whether he thought that Palestine "can assimilate and digest" the 400,000 Jews who were at that time in the country, the Mufti of Jerusalem, the recognized spiritual and political leader of Arab nationalists, answered "No." To the next question whether "some of them would have to be removed by a process kindly or painful as the case may be," the Mufti answered: "We must leave all this to the future."²⁰

This ominous attitude towards an eventual Jewish minority still dominates the mentality of Arab leaders. In a statement made on September 29, 1947 to the United Nations General Assembly's Committee on the Palestine question, Jamal el Husseini, on behalf of the Palestine Arab delegation, promised that "the Arab State of Palestine will protect the legitimate rights and interests of all minorities."²¹ The meaning of the qualifying adjective "legitimate" was not specified. The report presented on November 19 to the above mentioned Committee by a subcommittee composed exclusively of representatives of Arab and/or Moslem states, made citizenship in the proposed unitary Arab State dependent upon the condition that "the applicant should be a legal resident of Palestine for a continuous period to be determined by the (Arab dominated) Constituent Assembly."²² The meaning of this provision was subsequently made clear by Mr. Emil Ghory, outstanding member of the Palestine Arab delegation to the United Nations. When asked what would become of a Jewish minority in an independent Arab State, Mr. Ghory declared that those who had been in Palestine or whose families had resided there, before 1918 would be given equal treatment with the Arabs, while others would be considered aliens.²³ Thus, over 630,000 Jews, 90 per cent of the Jewish community, would be simply disfranchised in an Arab Palestine.

On the other hand, even if Arab leaders should consent to guarantee the most far-reaching minority rights, their assurances could hardly be considered adequate. That the European treaties for protection of minorities failed completely during the interwar period, is a truism. There is certainly no reason to believe that unilateral guarantees by a Palestine Arab State would prove more effective. The situation of all ethnic and religious minorities in the Arab countries is known to be extremely precarious, and even their physical security has been increasingly threatened in the period since World War I. Last summer in Amsterdam at the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches, S. A. Morrison, a leading figure in Protestant missionary work in Egypt, said in trenchant words:

Orthodox Islamic doctrine has always assigned a position of permanent inferiority to the non-Moslem, be he Christian or Jew. Hopes had been entertained that with the adoption by Near East Governments of Western Constitutions and the introduction of democratic instruments of government, all forms of discrimination on religious grounds would be abolished, and equality of citizenship and of social and economic opportunity established for all, irrespective of their race or religion.

Such hopes have in the main been belied by the facts. Reaction to the "imperialistic policy" of the Western Powers since the close of World War I has led to the resuscitation of Islam as a focus of political and religious unity, and the prevailing tendency to identify nationalism and Arab culture with the Islamic faith has not only prompted measures for the enforcement of cultural homogeneity based on Islam, but has created a conception of citizenship, in which the Christian and the Jew appear to have no legitimate place.

The outstanding example of this trend is to be found in Egypt, the country I know best, where economic discrimination against the non-Moslem obtains both in Government service and in private trade, and where Christian children in the Government elementary schools are exposed under the system of compulsory education to regular Qur'anic teaching. Little wonder, then, that hundreds of Copts declare themselves Moslems every year, seldom if ever out of conviction, almost always

for economic or matrimonial reasons—though many of them seek later to return to their Christian faith. Egypt's political and cultural leadership in the Arab League sets the pace for other Near East countries and restrictive trends may be noted at the present time in Syria, Iraq and Transjordan.²⁴

It is highly unlikely that an Arab regime in Palestine would be more tolerant than the Governments of other Arab countries.

Considered as an isolated case and treated in local terms, the problem of Jews and Arabs in Palestine seems insoluble. But, regardless of whether or not the Jews like it, Palestine has become part and parcel of the entire Middle East complex, and, regardless of whether or not the Arabs like it, Palestine Jewry has become part and parcel of the Middle Eastern picture. The realization of this elementary truth must be the point of departure for any attempt to find a way out of the Arab-Jewish controversy. Any lasting solution will have to be worked out within the frame of the Middle East as an entity. It must be a solution in the spirit of peace and cooperation, helpful to the common interests of the Middle East.

The author submits that since no constructive and peaceable solution of the Palestine problem can be achieved by either a Jewish State with an Arab minority or an Arab State with a Jewish minority, and since no mass transfer of Palestine's 700,000 Jews to other countries is practicable, the only workable alternative remains an organized exchange of population between Palestine and the Arab States, involving the transfer to the independent Arab States, mainly to Iraq, of Palestine Arabs unwilling to live under a Jewish regime, and the transfer to Palestine of the Jewish communities in the Arab countries.

This scheme offers invaluable advantages to all the parties involved.

5.

It is obvious that the present Palestine Arab leaders will never agree to any plan of this kind. Quite naturally, they think in short-

range terms. They are, therefore, unable to consider without prejudice any broad, constructive scheme of Arab-Jewish collaboration in which Palestine and they themselves are only one of the components. They are, also, too deeply and passionately engaged in the almost thirty year old Arab-Jewish quarrel over Palestine to be sufficiently open-minded with respect to a plan which implies the surrender of their traditional intransigent policy of proclaiming Palestine a purely Arab land and refusing to compromise with Jewish claims. Every mention of eventual transfer of Palestine Arabs to other Arab countries arouses limitless indignation in them and seems to them a vicious attack upon the elementary rights, interests and dignity of the Palestine Arab population.²⁵

Actually, this indignation is hardly justified. There is nothing unusual in the idea of Arabs moving from one area to another. Sir John Hope Simpson, who was Vice President of the League of Nations Refugee Settlement Committee at Athens from 1926 to 1930 and who was then sent by the British Government to investigate possibilities of immigration, land settlement and development in Palestine, stated, in his very pro-Arab report, that the Palestinian fellah (Arab peasant) "is always migrating, even at the present time; he goes to any spot where he thinks he can find work; many have left the country altogether."²⁶ The easy mobility of the Arab population was pointed out also by W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore, British Secretary of State for the Colonies; in his testimony before the thirty-second (extraordinary) session of the Permanent Mandates Commission in July-August 1937, Mr. Ormsby-Gore recalled that "there had always been a certain amount of migration inside the Arab world; many people from Transjordan and even the Hauran had actually settled west of the Jordan in Palestine since the war."²⁷ The British Colonial Secretary agreed that "if it were a case of moving the Arabs long distances to a strange country, transfer would indeed be difficult. But these people had not hitherto regarded themselves as 'Palestinians,' but as part of Syria as a whole, as a part of the Arab world. They would be going... to a people

with the same language, the same civilization, the same religion, and therefore the problem of transfer geographically and practically was easier even than the interchanges of Greeks and Turks between Asia Minor and the Balkans... Not all the Arabs would wish to leave the Jewish State; some would realize that they would have opportunities in the Jewish State. But that some would want to leave on ground of sentiment, he equally had no doubt; and if homesteads were provided and land was prepared for their reception not too far from their existing homes, he was confident that many would make use of that opportunity... He believed that quite a number of Arabs, faced with the *fait accompli* of a Jewish State, would seek to leave that State for sentimental reasons rather than remain under a Jewish Government, and would seek to live—he was not sure that they would want to live under a mandatory Power—in an Arab atmosphere under an Arab Government with Arab ways of life... many Arabs in Palestine would prefer that solution, and still more Arabs would accept it as a *fait accompli* or some approach to a *fait accompli*.”²⁸

Submitting to this *fait accompli* would in no way affect the rights and interests of the prospective Arab transferees. In his “note of reservations” to the Report of the Woodhead Commission, Sir Alison Russel says: “It does not appear to me that to permit an Arab to sell his land for three or four times its value, and to go with the money to a different part of the Arab world where land is cheap, can be said to ‘prejudice’ his rights and position.”²⁹

Nor can it be said to be “humiliating” or derogatory to Arab national honor and dignity. The Royal Commission quoted the pattern of the Greek-Turkish transfer agreement—not an altogether appropriate example, since it came about under duress. There are more recent and appropriate patterns of population transfer which have been undertaken by sovereign states voluntarily and on their own initiative. The best example is the repatriation of Turkish populations from Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, which was carried on by the Kemalist Government after 1931.³⁰

These Turks have, as stated by the Turkish Minister for the Interior, Sukru Kaya Bey, "directly participated in the Turkish conquest of the last centuries; they have installed themselves in the conquered regions and lived there for centuries as masters." This "master" status does not exist any more. The Turks became minorities in states ruled by the local Christian populations, their former subjects.⁸¹

Some 172,000 Turks were repatriated from various countries during the period of 1935-1940 (interstate agreements were concluded by Turkey with Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in 1936-38). These Turks were resettled in the underpopulated districts of Turkish Thrace and Anatolia. Their resettlement is generally considered to have been an extremely successful undertaking. A former Assistant Professor of Social Science at the International College in Ismir, Donald Everest Webster, points out that the repatriates "have the vigor and ambition generally characteristic of migrants, so they are making a genuine contribution to the country. Since their villages are newly built and much of their farm equipment is equally new, many of the settlements are practically modern villages."⁸²

With regard to the transfer of Palestine Arabs, a significant editorial was published on July 3, 1943 in *Great Britain and the East*, usually considered an unofficial mouthpiece of the British Colonial Office. Referring to King Ibn Saud's anti-Zionist declaration made to an American correspondent and later published in a Saudi Arabian newspaper, the editorial pointed out that the natural effect of the growing unification of the Arab States "will be that an Arab moving from Syria to Saudi Arabia, or from Palestine to Iraq, will no longer be migrating from one country to another; he will merely be changing his position from one part of the same country to another part—a proceeding that is not usually capable of being magnified into a grievance... In his country he (King Ibn Saud) has an exceedingly sparse population and is making slow headway in his efforts to settle his followers on the land. In Palestine he could find as many ready-made Arab settlers as he has suitable

accommodation for; or, if Wahabi tenets prove an obstacle, those who would not go to Saudi Arabia could find a warm welcome elsewhere in the Peninsula because none of the Arab States has as many inhabitants as it really needs for the proper development of the country."

Thus, the influential British periodical clearly indicated that any scheme for transferring Arabs from Palestine would not be a local Palestine undertaking to be decided upon by the Palestine Arabs alone, but an enterprise of common interest to the Arab Middle East, on which the rulers of the independent Arab States are entitled to have their say. A similar view was forcefully expressed in 1931 by former First Lord of the British Admiralty Alfred Duff-Cooper, when advocating an Arab transfer from Palestine: "Talk not to the (Palestine) Arab Committee or to the Mufti, but to the important Arabs in the Hedjaz, Transjordan and Iraq; say to the Governments and Kings of these countries: 'This is what we propose to do.' They understand that language."³³

Palestine Arab leaders could hardly oppose the transfer plan if it were endorsed by independent Arab countries as a part of an all-Arab development scheme. They have always claimed that Palestine Arabs are part and parcel of the Arab world; they have repeatedly appealed to the rulers of the independent Arab States for support and guidance and obediently followed instructions coming from that source.

The ill-fated conference on Palestine called by Great Britain in the winter of 1938-1939 in St. James Palace was attended not only by Arab delegates from Palestine, but also by official representatives of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen and Transjordan. Palestine Arab leaders hailed this participation of the Arab States in the discussions concerning their political future, and thus freely conceded that these Arab States had as much say on the matter of Palestine as they themselves. With the formation of the Arab League in March, 1945, Palestine became a permanent and outstanding item on the League's agenda. In all deliberations of the United Nations

on Palestine the six Arab States which were or became members—Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen—have acted as recognized spokesmen for the cause of the Palestine Arabs. When partition of Palestine was decided by the United Nations, they announced their determination to fight the establishment of a Jewish State with all the means at their disposal, and this decision of theirs—and their subsequent military action—was gratefully accepted by the Palestine Arabs. Palestine has become a common Middle East cause in which the Arabs of Palestine are partners but by no means exclusive masters.

Partnership in war presumes partnership in peacemaking. After having for over a decade requested and gladly accepted cooperation, help and leadership from the independent Arab States, Palestinian Arabs cannot now suddenly claim a change of heart and demand to be regarded as a completely separate and sovereign body which alone is competent to make decisions in matters involving not only Palestine but the rest of the Near and Middle East.

6.

"The key to the 'Near Eastern Question' is land," says Albert Viton. "In Europe the land problem means hunger for land—absence of sufficient land to provide a decent living for all cultivators. In the Near East, however, the land problem is one of too much land and not enough cultivators. Less than nine million human beings are spread over its quarter of a million square miles which contain some of the potentially most fertile land in the world. The area which, if fully developed, could support 300 to 400 persons to the square mile, today has a population of 35 to the square mile."³⁴

The following two tables give a picture of the classification of land in the Arab Middle East according to utilization and density of rural population per square mile of cultivable land.³⁵

TABLE I

Classification of Middle East Land according to Utilization, 1939
(in square kilometers)

Country	Total Area	Cultivable Area	Cultivated Area	Irrigable Area	Irrigated Area
Iraq	543,000	92,000	13,000	51,000	7,000
Syria	202,000 ^a	61,000	16,000	12,000	2,500
Palestine	27,000	12,000 ^b	9,000	4,000	400
Transjordan	90,000	4,600 ^b	3,500	600	200
TOTAL	772,000	169,600	41,500	67,600	10,100

a) Including the Alexandretta District; no separate figures are available as to the classification of land in that district.

b) Although there are considerably higher estimates, a moderate figure has been inserted in the case of Palestine.

TABLE II

Density of Rural Population per sq. km. of Cultivable Land, 1939

Country	Total Population as of Dec. 31, 1939 in 1000	Rural Population	Total Area in 1000 sq. km.	Cultivable Area in 1000 sq. km.	Rural Population per sq. km., cultivable area
Iraq	3,700	2,100	453	92	23
Syria & Lebanon	3,700	2,500	197	59	42
Palestine	1,502	800	27	12	67
Egypt	16,680	13,700	1000	34	403

The area on which irrigated farming can be practised in the Arab Middle East (Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq) may thus be estimated at 67,600 square kilometers. Of this only 10,000 square kilometers are at present cultivated under irrigation, in many cases by primitive and wasteful methods. The average density of population per square kilometer of irrigable land should be about 200. If all the irrigable, but not yet irrigated, area of the four above mentioned countries (57,500 sq.km.) is considered, there is room for an additional population of 11.5 million. If, for the purposes of a conservative estimate, we assume that of the 57,500 square kilometers of Middle East irrigable but unirrigated land more than a third is worked under extensive cultivation and carries a population of 80

per square kilometer, the additional population figure might be computed at about ten million.

On the other hand, it must be taken into consideration that of the unirrigable but cultivable lands of the Middle East, a substantial part (some 125,000 sq. km.) is still uncultivated. Even with the lowest estimate and with a density figure of only 50 per square kilometer, the Middle East's unirrigable but cultivable land would provide room for an additional agricultural population of 16.25 million; together with the area of irrigation, the Middle East's capacity for additional peasant population may then be reckoned at approximately 16,000,000. W. C. Lowdermilk comes to the conclusion that modern and intensive methods of land cultivation applied throughout the Middle East might make it possible even for "twenty or thirty million people to live decent and prosperous lives where a few million now struggle for a bare existence."³⁸

The development of irrigation is the cornerstone of the regenerated Middle East. Its importance is illustrated not only by historical records but also by the fact that today two-thirds of the total value of crops in five Middle East countries (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Palestine) are derived from irrigated lands which represent only 9.6 per cent of the cultivable area, and 31.8 per cent of the actual cultivated area. Under Middle East climatic conditions, crops three times as large are produced under irrigation as on unirrigated land (1,800-2,000 kgs. of wheat per hectare, instead of 500-900 kgs.). Nevertheless, of the total irrigable area of the five Middle East countries mentioned above—124,000 sq. kms.—only a little more than one-third is at present under irrigation.

The situation in Iraq, undoubtedly the center of gravity of the Arab Middle East, is particularly grave. Two-thirds of the country's cultivable area still lies fallow: of a potential cultivable area of about 30,000,000 acres, only 9½ million acres are at present worked. Only about one-third of the irrigable area of 20,000,000 acres is now under irrigation, for the most part of the most primitive nature.

Irrigation possibilities have recently been shown to exist even in

what were formerly regarded as entirely unpromising areas. Following the success of the Iraq Petroleum Company's water drillings during the construction of its oil pipeline, the Iraqi Government launched a successful scheme for the sinking of artesian wells in various desert localities; in many places this may entirely revolutionize the life of the desert.

Intensive, irrigated agriculture alone can revitalize the Middle East. But intensive agriculture is impossible in sparsely populated areas. This brings us to another major problem of the Middle East today, for economic modernization and agricultural progress in Iraq, as well as in Syria and elsewhere, are distinctly hampered by scarcity of population. This was pointed out by Sir George Buchanan who during the first World War was President of the Directorate controlling the port of Basra and, later, President of the Committee of River Fleet and Marine Dockyard. Sir George energetically opposed ambitious irrigation schemes propagated by Sir William Willcocks³⁷ on the simple ground that it was useless to spend millions of pounds on irrigation if there were no people to farm the land when irrigated. He pointed out that in India and Egypt, where extensive irrigation works have been carried out, there has been a teeming population waiting to farm the land the moment water was available. The situation in Mesopotamia is quite different. "The population of Egypt is 1,000 to the square mile (1,045 per habitable square mile) and is increasing at a rate that promises to double the present figure within a century; the Indian Punjab has a population of 177 per square mile, and Bengal 540 per square mile, but in Mesopotamia there is a population of only 10 to the square mile."³⁸

Buchanan is not alone in this pessimistic estimate. Colonel R. G. Garrow, Officiating Director of Irrigation, in a memorandum presented to the D.Q.M.G., Baghdad, estimated that the existing population cultivated approximately 1,500,000 acres of land.³⁹ As late as 1931, the British Government in a Special Report by His Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Pro-

gress of Iraq (1920-31), stated that "the able-bodied male agricultural population of the country is less than five hundred thousand." W. C. Lowdermilk, who was present at the opening of the Kut Barrage, the first diversion dam built on the Tigris River, was told by Iraqi officials that there were not enough farmers in the country to make use of the water that could be diverted from this one dam.⁴⁰ Recently initiated irrigation schemes may bring another six to seven million acres under cultivation, in addition to about 5-3/5 million acres now being farmed, but "the people are not there to do the farming on a peasant-holding basis," states an authoritative article on plans to modernize agriculture in Iraq and Persia.⁴¹ This situation is just the opposite of that in Egypt where the population has increased by 25 per cent since the last war, while the cultivated area has increased only five per cent.⁴²

Iraq's population is increasing at an exceedingly slow pace. It was returned as 2,849,282 in the census of 1920 and was given as 2,857,077 by the census of 1942. Other estimates vary between 3,600,000 for 1936,⁴³ 3,500,000 for 1939,⁴⁴ 3,700,000 for 1940,⁴⁵ 5,000,000 for 1941,⁴⁶ and 4,500,000 for 1944.⁴⁷ All these contradictory figures are open to question. Any marked increase in the population could hardly have failed to be noticed, and all the available evidence indicates that the natural increase of Iraq's population is either nonexistent or infinitesimal. Dr. Ali Ghalib, Director of Preventive Medicine in Baghdad, acknowledged in 1944 that there is ground for the belief that Iraq's population has been very nearly stationary over the past twenty years; personally, he is "inclined to the view that there has been a certain increase in the population", but admits that the prevalent trend is only "slightly favorable to an increased population" and that the Iraqi authorities "do not exactly know what the trend is at the moment."⁴⁸ Another Arab authority, Hashim Jawad, who has since 1941 been the International Labor Office correspondent in Baghdad, reveals that "the average expectation of life in Iraq does not exceed 26 or 27 years . . . and the rate of increase in the population is extremely small . . . slightly

more than 1 per cent per annum."⁴⁹ The Iraqi Ministry for Social Affairs informed the British goodwill Trade Mission to the Middle East (April-May 1946) that "about one-third of all the children born died in their first year, and another quarter up to their fifth year."⁵⁰

There is no doubt that Iraq's present small population is an obstacle to the progress of the country. The British Government's Ten Years Report (1931) spoke of the "gravely insufficient agricultural population" which is a hindrance in the development of irrigated farming, and added: "Real agricultural development in Iraq will come through an increase of agricultural population." Thirteen years later, an Arab author acknowledged that "now Iraq is already short of agricultural labor, which is available only in adequate numbers and/or deficient in activity as a result of ill health."⁵¹ Hashim Jawad confirms that "many landlords . . . have been embarrassed by their inability to find farmers to cultivate their land" and that this "amounts to a gradual thinning down of the potential agricultural labor supply of the country."⁵²

There is no use in increasing Iraq's irrigated area without a corresponding increase in the number of its inhabitants: under present circumstances this would merely lead to redistribution of the numerically insufficient population.

The need for increased population as a pre-condition for progress in Iraq was insistently stressed as long ago as 1926 by Ja'far Pasha al Askari, then Prime Minister, in a paper prepared for the Royal Central Asian Society. Ja'far Pasha stated: "The size of the country is 150,000 sq. miles, which is about three times that of England and Wales, whilst the population is only three millions. We may start off by saying, therefore, that what Iraq wants above everything else is more population. This is a necessary condition of progress."

This urgent appeal for more population remained unanswered. Where was additional population to come from? In an article, *Iraq Today*, published in the *London Times* (October 27, 1938) H. T. Montague Bell clearly stated: "Iraq's paramount requirement is an increase of population . . . The settlement of the nomads on

the land may add to her wealth, but any substantial increase of population in the near future must come from outside."

The possibilities of an influx of population "from outside" are, however, extremely limited. For reasons of climate it is practically out of the question for people from Europe to engage in agriculture in Iraq, to say nothing of the social and political problems involved in such settlement. Putting forward his grandiose irrigation scheme, Willcocks had a vision of "thousands and tens of thousands of industrious laborers from Kurdistan and the Persian Hills flocking to the delta of the Tigris." However, the late Miss Gertrude Bell, one of the best informed and most penetrating students of the Arab Middle East, had no illusions on the subject and pointed out the probability of permanent unrest attendant upon the introduction of agricultural colonists who belonged to an alien and non-absorbable population.

These apprehensions are undoubtedly well founded. The Kurds in Iraq number some half a million souls and constitute about 16 per cent of the country's total population. The Kurd minority even today is too large and thorny a problem for the young state. Relations between the warlike Kurds and the Arabs are extremely strained. Kurd nationalists envision the creation of an independent state stretching from Alexandretta on the Mediterranean to the north coast of the Persian Gulf and including a population variously estimated at from seven to eleven million; many of them look to Soviet Russia for leadership. A mass influx of more Kurds would be too dangerous a venture for the ruling Arab majority and would certainly never be permitted.

After the first World War Edwin Montague, then Secretary of State for India, had in mind a colonization program for Mesopotamia which would provide an outlet for India's surplus population. In the early phase of the British occupation of Mesopotamia, a tendency towards the so-called "Indianization" of the country was very strong. Indian officials, currency and law were introduced. These attempts failed. The young Arab nationalists bitterly resented the

intrusion of alien elements and alien methods. One of the causes of the serious disturbance in 1920 was the "Indianization" system.

It is, therefore, only in Arab immigration that the Iraqi Government is interested. Replying to a question by a Moslem journalist as to why Iraq did not raise cotton on the large area of its land suitable for that purpose, King Feisal said in 1927: "... we do not have peasants willing to work the land. The Bedouins, to whom I have allotted land for cultivation, are capable of disappearing overnight, even in time of most pressing seasonal work, because a rumor had reached them that it was raining somewhere in the desert, one hundred—two hundred miles away. I would welcome with great pleasure an immigration of Mohammedan Arab fellahin from Syria and Palestine."⁵³

In 1938, the Director General of Public Health of Iraq, Dr. Sami Sharokat, told the Pan-Arab Congress of Medicine in Cairo that Iraq possessed immense area of cultivable land which were not being used because of lack of workers; and he invited the Government of Egypt to settle its unemployed in Iraq. Such a transfer of population, the speaker concluded, "would be to the mutual advantage of both countries." This invitation remained unheeded. In spite of Egypt's dangerously increasing agricultural overpopulation, there is not the slightest sign of a noticeable emigration movement from the country. Should the Egyptian Government decide to initiate such a movement, the most natural and promising colonization area would be the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, lying next door to Egypt and considered by the Government and the people to be indispensable to the Egyptian control of the Nile Valley. According to W. Wendel Cleland of the American University in Cairo, "the unreclaimed areas of the Sudan alone might take a population equal to Egypt's present number and still have a density of less than one-tenth that of Egypt."⁵⁴

Iraq cannot, therefore, look to Egypt for immigration. The most natural and, in fact, the only source of population for Iraq is Palestine. According to a well-informed author, the Iraqi Government,

shortly before World War II, sympathetically considered plans submitted by an American Jewish group for Palestine Arab agricultural immigration; negotiations over the materialization of such a project were interrupted by the outbreak of military operations.⁵⁶ There is no reason why they should not be resumed now. Palestinian Arabs would constitute a valuable asset to Iraq's economy. Iraq needs agricultural settlers: in 1942, 763,394 Arabs, 67 per cent of the Arab population of Western Palestine, lived in rural communities. The area of cultivated land in Palestinian villages for which they would be compensated under a transfer agreement, amounts to 6.4 million dunams. The average price paid by Jews for the rural land they bought in Palestine during 1944 amounted to over \$1000 per acre or about \$250 per dunam (including the value of buildings, orchards and other improvements).⁵⁶ These prices are, of course, highly inflated; but, even assuming that under a fair transfer agreement only one-third of the 1944 rates would be paid for Arab land, the overall compensation would amount to over half a billion dollars. Besides, 16,926,000 dunams of land classified by the Palestine Government as uncultivable were owned in 1943 by Arabs in Western Palestine;⁵⁷ this area would also have to be compensated for. Some Arab immigrants would, moreover, be in possession of considerable amounts of money of their own. The deposits in the Arab Bank (the larger of the two existing Arab banks in Palestine) increased from £370,000 in 1934 to £4,360,000 in 1944; besides, Arabs funds are undoubtedly deposited in non-Arab banks as well, and it is known that considerable sums of cash accumulated by Arabs are not deposited in banks but hoarded at home.⁵⁸

The figures cited above refer to the entire Arab community of Western Palestine. They are, however, indicative of the Arab economy within Israel.

Mass transfer of Palestine Arabs would decisively transform Iraq's economy. The vicious circle of land—irrigation—population, can be broken through its last link—population. But this can happen only if the Middle East is considered as an economic entity, if its

population resources are utilized for the common benefit, and if dynamic planning courageously disregards existing conflicts and animosities. The possibility of such a course was indicated by the excellent work of the Middle East Supply Center during the war years. At the Conference on Middle East Agriculture Development held in Cairo in February, 1944, Keith A. H. Murray, the Center's Director of Food, said: "The agricultural problems of the Middle East demand not merely common knowledge, but also common action. The three main rivers of the Middle East pay no attention to political boundaries; animal and plant diseases disregard territorial frontiers. This is true also of marketing problems; common marketing intelligence and information, even common monetary units are possible achievements."⁵⁹

This reasoning applies fully to the population problems of the Middle Eastern countries. Iraq's continued underpopulation which prevents full utilization of its land resources is obviously detrimental to the prosperity of the entire Middle East. Tension over Palestine jeopardizes the political stability of the Middle Eastern land complex. The Arab States themselves, while still waging a relentless struggle against a Jewish State in Palestine, have begun to realize the organic place of Palestine in any regional development plan. When, in February 1948, the United Nations Economic and Social Council suggested the creation of an economic commission to help develop the predominantly Arab Middle East, Dr. Charles Malik of Lebanon, President of the Council, stressed that Palestine must be considered an "integral part" of the Middle East, and Mahmoud Bey Fawzi of Egypt stated that an "indispensable prerequisite for the commission's success would be the maintenance of peace in the area."⁶⁰

7.

The transfer of Palestine Arabs to Iraq represents the main, but by no means the only aspect of the plan offered in this chapter. It

would have its counterpart in a similar movement of Jewish minorities from Arab-speaking countries, where their position is becoming increasingly difficult, into Palestine.

There are at present between 250 and 280 thousand Jews in the Arab Middle East (Iraq, Yemen and Aden, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon), and between 420 and 450 thousand in the Arabic-speaking countries of North Africa (Libya, Algeria, Tunis, French Morocco, Spanish Morocco and Tangier); besides, there are between 160 and 180 thousand Jews in non-Arab Moslem countries (Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan).

The historic position of the Jewish communities in these countries in one of inferiority; of brief interludes of peace and prosperity alternating with periods of oppression. In modern times, mainly during the present century, the Jews of the Moslem lands have been given equal status before the law, but, in actuality, there is increasing governmental discrimination against them and dangerously growing religious and national intolerance among their neighbors. They live in a state of political and economic insecurity. Their precarious status drives them to seek foreign support. When they do so, they are branded as disloyal. Anti-Jewish outbreaks (in April 1941 in Iraq, in November 1945 in Egypt and Libya, in December 1947 in Aden) though of relatively limited scope and infrequent occurrence, are a stern reminder of ever present danger. "Only in Poland and Germany," says Viton, "has the condition of the Jews been more deplorable than in these dark lands . . . The overwhelming majority of the Jews, especially those to whom western education has given a sense of human dignity and self-respect, are desperately eager to escape from the depressive atmosphere and are searching for a land where they can live as free men."⁶¹

The Jewish catastrophe in Europe has revived and intensified old fears. The attachment to Zion, deeply imbedded in religious tradition, is re-vitalized by the message of Israel. It is particularly strong among the poorer classes and the youth. The emigration of Oriental Jews to Palestine has been continuous. In fact, a larger proportion

of Oriental Jewry than of Jewish communities in the West, migrated to Palestine in the prewar period. Within the last few decades, Palestine has absorbed about one-half of Syrian Jewry and nearly 40 per cent of the Jews of the Yemen. During the war, immigration from Turkey assumed considerable proportions, and as soon as North Africa was liberated, immigration from that region was resumed. Jews from Iraq and Iran have trekked on foot to Palestine, notwithstanding governmental repression.

As a result of the growing anti-Zionist policy on the part of the Arab and Moslem states, the situation of the Jewish minorities in those countries is unbearable. They are considered and treated as hostages. Dr. Mohammed Hussein Heykal Pasha, chairman of the Egyptian delegation to the United Nations, told the Palestine Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on November 24, 1947 that the lives of 1,000,000 Jews in Moslem countries would be jeopardized by the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. A few hours later, Jamal el-Husseini, chairman of the delegation of the Palestine Arab Higher Committee, repeated much the same warning: "It must be remembered," he said, "that there are as many Jews in the Arab world as there are in Palestine whose positions, under such conditions, will become very precarious, even though the Arab states may do their best to save their skins. Governments, in general, have always been unable to prevent mob excitement and violence."⁶²

The Jewish minorities in Arabic-speaking countries, in particular in Iraq, Yemen and Syria, are thus faced with a very real threat of physical extermination. Their speedy evacuation is a matter of utmost urgency. But this operation cannot be effected without the consent and co-operation of the respective Arab Governments, which is, in turn, unlikely unless the transfer of Jews is made part of a general Arab-Jewish scheme of exchange of population. Within such a scheme, the movement of Jews out of the Arab countries would represent a numerically smaller, but fundamentally essential, counterpart to the movement of Arabs from Palestine.

8.

The idea of an organized transfer of Palestinian Arabs to an Arab State is of recent origin. It was first formulated by the Anglo-Jewish writer and politician, Israel Zangwill. Writing in the *League of Nations Journal* (February, 1919), Zangwill proposed that the (then) 600,000 Arabs of Palestine "should be gradually and amicably transplanted to the Arab Kingdom, which is to be reestablished next door, and with which the Jewish State would cordially co-operate." Zangwill insisted that "two national homes (a Jewish and an Arab) in a country smaller than ranches have been in South America, constitute a greater impracticability than an Arab exodus," and that "a well-ordered emigration to a pre-arranged home amid one's kinsmen, with full compensation for values left behind, a movement organized at either end, offers no terrors compared with the conflicts and race frictions it averts."⁶³

Zangwill's idea elicited little sympathy in the early years of the Palestine experiment: that period was characterized by unlimited confidence in the possibility of an Arab-Jewish understanding based on the economic benefits accruing to the Arabs from Jewish colonization. The first to revive the transfer concept—in a different form and limited scope—was, as has been pointed out, the Palestine Royal Commission. The Arabs dismissed the Commission's proposals without hesitation, and leading Jewish circles, regardless of party, also manifested marked coolness towards the idea. They made known their opposition to the "exercise of any degree of compulsion" which was hinted at by the Royal Commission.⁶⁴ V. Jabotinsky, President of the New Zionist Organization, which was generally considered as the most "extremist" Zionist body, categorically objected to the very idea of an Arab transfer.⁶⁵

This attitude on the part of the Jews changed very little during and after the war. Though not rejecting the possibility that individual Arabs "may not wish to remain in a Jewish State" and stat-

ing that "every facility will be given to them to transfer to one of the many and vast Arab countries," Dr. Weizmann, then President of the Jewish Agency and of the World Zionist Organization, only casually mentioned this eventuality in January, 1942.⁶⁶ David Ben-Gurion, Chairman of the Executive Board of the Jewish Agency, admitted that Syria and Iraq "may have an interest, economically as well as politically, in strengthening their position vis-a-vis their Turkish and Persian neighbors by transferring new Arab settlers to their country, and the only source of such settlers is Palestine." He, however, stressed that "this is a purely internal Arab problem, in which we [the Jews] may help if asked by the Arabs, but in which we neither can or ought to take any initiative. It is not a prerequisite condition for large-scale Jewish settlement."⁶⁷ A similar stand was taken by Mr. M. Shertok, then in charge of the political department of the Jewish Agency.⁶⁸

The New Zionists seemed divided on the question. The convention of the New Zionist Organization of America in February, 1942 declared that "should certain parts of the Arab population of Palestine not be willing to live in a Jewish State, opportunity should be given to them to have the choice of option for citizenship in an Arab state, and to transfer their domicile and wealth to that state; the transfer of those Arabs willing to be evacuated, shall be carried out in an organized manner, on the basis of agreement with the respective Arab states, with full compensation for the immovable property left behind by them."⁶⁹ The London New Zionist organ, *The Jewish Standard*, on the contrary, sharply criticized the British Labor Party's transfer scheme, declaring that "to raise this issue now cannot but stir up prejudice against Zionism, giving a welcome propaganda slogan to the Arab potentates and their business partners abroad."⁷⁰

Interestingly enough, it was non-Jewish scholars and politicians who first gave wholehearted support to the transfer idea.

It was in November 1941 that Sir Norman Angell, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, advocated moving Palestine Arabs into other

Arab territory. "A plan must be initiated to help in the development of other Arab territories so that Arabs in Palestine might immigrate to purely Arab lands where their establishment would be encouraged."⁷¹ Walter Clay Lowdermilk, formerly Assistant Chief of the Soil Conservation Service, United States Department of Agriculture, who made an extensive survey of the Near and Middle East in 1938-1939, also believes that Palestinian Arabs "could easily settle in the great alluvial plain of the Tigris and Euphrates Valley where there is land enough for large numbers of emigrants."⁷² Elie Culbertson included in his much discussed blueprint for a World Federation plan the transfer of "a large part of the Mohammedan and Christian population of Palestine to another territory in the Middle East where equivalent or better land and living conditions shall be provided."⁷³ John Gunther saw the only way out of the Arab-Jewish conflict on Palestine in a kind of exchange of populations: "The Arabs might conceivably go into Transjordan or Iraq, where there is plenty of room; Jews from Europe could come then to Palestine."⁷⁴

The statement of policy on "International Post-War Settlement" prepared by the Executive of the British Labor Party, in its discussion of Palestine advocated "a stable settlement for transfer of population": "Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out as the Jews move in. Let them be compensated handsomely for their land and let their settlement elsewhere be carefully organized and generously financed."⁷⁵ A year later, the British Common Wealth Party passed a similar resolution.⁷⁶

At the end of 1945, former President Herbert Hoover, himself an engineer and initiator of the monumental Boulder Dam, prepared a detailed memorandum on the solution of the Palestine problem by transfer of Palestinian Arabs to Iraq. Mr. Hoover suggested that the ancient Tigris-Euphrates system should be revived with international financial aid to Iraq and that this great land development should then be used for the resettlement of Arabs from Palestine. A newspaper summary of his plan follows:

"There is room for many more Arabs in such a development in Iraq than the total of Arabs in Palestine", stated Mr. Hoover. "The soil is more fertile. They would be among their own race, which is Arab-speaking and Mohammedan. The Arab population of Palestine would be the gainers from better lands in exchange for their present holdings. Iraq would be the gainer, for it badly needs an agricultural population.

"Today millions of people are being moved from one land to another. If the lands were organized and homes provided, this particular movement could be made the model migration of history. It would be a solution by engineering instead of by conflict."⁷⁷


As recently as 1947 the question of Arab transfer from Palestine was brought up in the British House of Commons by Mr. Anthony Eden, Foreign Minister in the Chamberlain and Churchill Cabinets and one of the first promoters of the Arab League. Pointing out "the inevitable difficulty which must arise from partition, whatever the final plan may be, because there must remain a large number of Arabs in the Jewish State and some Jews, at any rate, in the Arab State," Mr. Eden asked the present Foreign Secretary "whether he or the United Nations have given any consideration to a planned transfer of minorities." He reminded the House of the Royal Commission plan of 1937 and rightly stressed that "the difficulty of the Peel (Royal) Commission was that they were dealing only with Palestine and, therefore, they had the problem of whether there was room for the transfer of three hundred thousand Arabs to other lands in Palestine. I should have thought," said Mr. Eden, "that the question which now arises is whether, with the cooperation of the adjoining Arab states, room might not be found to absorb some part of the Arab minority which will be left in the Jewish State."⁷⁸

The outbreak of open Arab-Jewish war which followed the

United Nations resolution to partition Palestine and which was intensified after the proclamation, on May 14, 1948, of the State of Israel, has given a new and unexpected turn to the Arab problem in Palestine. Military successes of the Jewish armed forces during the period preceding the first truce worked out by Count Folke Bernadotte on behalf of the United Nations (June 11, 1948), led to the occupation of the overwhelming majority of Arab villages within the boundaries of Israel as defined by the partition resolution, as well as of the towns of Haifa, Tiberias, Safad and Beisan which had a considerable Arab population; during the same period the Jewish armed forces captured Jaffa and Acre, outside Israeli territory. When fighting was resumed on July 9, the Israeli Army succeeded in capturing 494 square miles of new territory, including Arab towns of Lydda, Ramleh, Jenin and Nazareth, before a new truce was imposed ten days later by the United Nations. On the whole, of the 219 Arab villages in Israeli territory, 201 were occupied by the Israel forces; outside Israel's boundaries 13 Arab towns and townlets and 112 villages were captured, 70 of them in the last ten days of fighting.

These military events led to a mass flight of Arab civilians from Jewish-occupied areas to the Arab-occupied portions of Palestine and to the neighboring Arab states.

Almost all Palestine's main urban centers were abandoned by their Arab residents. The first to move were the 6,000 Arabs of Tiberias who left in the direction of Nazareth and Transjordan.⁷⁹ Haifa followed next. By 1 p.m. on April 20, 6,000 Arabs were said to have left by sea, mainly to neighboring Acre, and it was estimated that 10,000 more left that same afternoon. The British Army had offered to find transportation for the departing Arabs.⁸⁰ On May 30, 1948, the *New York Times* reported that "6,000 of the original 40,000 Arabs were all that are left in Haifa, although many are coming back." The evacuation of Jaffa was even more complete. On May 4, the *New York Times* reported that all but 10,000 of the 70,000 Jaffa Arabs had left the city; by May 30, the number of



The upper figures in the rectangles represent estimates given by V. de St. Aubin of the Red Cross; the lower figures are taken from an Arab League Memorandum to the United Nations. The author assumes responsibility for neither set.

those remaining was reduced to 500. Thousands left by sea, while thousands of others fled inland, large numbers of them to become cave dwellers in the historic caves of Beit Jebrin, northwest of Hebron.⁸¹ Kenneth Bilby, the *Herald Tribune* correspondent, saw on the road from Jaffa "scores of trucks jammed with women, children and old men and piled skyward with household belongings; along the roadside donkeys and camels struggling under mountainous loads were driven toward Lydda, twelve miles east." Lydda had almost overnight become "the most populous Arab city of Palestine" as its population increased from 16,000 to 70,000.⁸² People with money headed for the Syrian and Lebanese borders, and some went as far as Egypt. Of the 6,400 Moslem and Christian Arabs in Safad, nearly 6,000 abandoned the town.⁸³ From Jerusalem where fierce fighting was raging, wealthy Arabs fled to nearby Arab countries, the poorer ones into the hills and villages.⁸⁴

No less extensive was the evacuation of the Arab village population. Early in May, thousands of Arabs were reported trekking from the Jewish-dominated Sharon coastal plain to the Arab-controlled hill region; many of them sold their flocks and poultry to the Jews and left their unharvested crops behind.⁸⁵ In Upper Galilee all Arab villages astride the Tiberias-Rosh Pina road were evacuated.⁸⁶ Mrs. Golda Meyerson of the Provisional Government of Israel told this author on May 20, 1948, that by then 130-140 villages had been abandoned by their Arab population. There was a notable exception in the case of the village of Abu Gosh, where the Arab peasants refused to quit and declared their readiness to live under the protection of the Jewish authorities.⁸⁷

Late in May, the total number of Arabs who had left Jewish-occupied areas of Palestine was estimated by Faris-el-Khoury, Syria's representative in the United Nations Security Council, at a quarter of a million.⁸⁸ Two months later, V. de St. Aubin, field representative of the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, computed that the Palestine war had created about 300,000 Arab refugees.⁸⁹ This figure has also been accepted by Arab spokesmen.

Elias Sasson of the Israeli Foreign Ministry also admitted that about 300,000 Arabs had left the territory of Israel.⁹⁰ This number does not, however, include those who fled from Jewish-occupied areas outside of Israel's boundaries. Thus, 70,000 Arabs left Jaffa; a London broadcast in Arabic reported on July 24, 1948, that 80,000 refugees from Ramleh and Lydda were registered in Transjordan (the town of Ramleh used to have 12,910 inhabitants, while the Ramleh district had 61,750); the population of Lydda increased from 20,000 to about 70,000 due to the influx of refugees. Another Arab source spoke of 65,000 Arab refugees in Transjordan.⁹¹ About 7,000 Arabs from Acre fled to the hills; numerous Arabs left Jenin (there used to be 4,150 Arabs in the town of Jenin and 51,880 in the whole Jenin district) and Nazareth (there previously were 6,290 Moslem and 9,250 Christian Arabs in the town of Nazareth and 21,850 Arabs in the whole Nazareth district).

In mid-October, 1948, Israeli military operations against Egyptian forces in the South were resumed and on October 21 the Israeli Army occupied Beersheba. On October 29, Israeli forces opened a counter-offensive against Arab forces in Northern Galilee, and by October 31 gained control of all Galilee, up to the borders of Syria and Lebanon. The Moslem Arab population of northern Galilee, numbering some 50,000 fled into the Lebanon, leaving only Christian Arabs—approximately 3,000. Simultaneously, there was a mass flight of Arabs towards Transjordan from the whole Arab area south of Jerusalem. It was prompted by the Arab belief in the imminence of Israeli operations to encircle Jerusalem from the north and the south and complete its occupation. Reports from Arab quarters also indicated a flight from Bethlehem and from the villages in the hills of Hebron. At the end of November, Frederic Beard, Cairo representative of the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization, estimated that 130,000 additional Arabs had been made refugees as a result of the Israeli offensive. Finally, the Negev campaign which started on December 22, and threw the Egyptians out of most of their positions, caused a new wave of flight among

the quarter of a million Arab refugees in Egyptian-held areas. A considerable group of refugees made their way almost all the way down to the Gulf of Aqaba above the Red Sea.

There is no precise data as to the total number of Arab refugees within and outside Palestine. The very nature of the situation makes it difficult to obtain exact figures. The refugees are constantly migrating from one camp to another, and overlapping of local counts is often unavoidable. Furthermore, statistical methods are usually highly unreliable in Oriental countries where the tendency to exaggerate is inveterate. Available estimates vary greatly. In August 1948, Arab refugees were estimated to total 330,000. In October, the Acting Mediator, Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, stated that they had increased to about 500,000, while Msgr. George Hakim, Greek Catholic Archbishop of Galilee, put the number at 600,000.⁹² The latter figure was used again in November by a British Brigadier, Lt. N. Clayton. In December Sir Rafael Cilento, Director of the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization, spoke of 750,000 needy refugees who had to be fed by his organization; he, however, admitted that some 100,000 of them "are not strictly refugees," but people "made indigent by warfare." As a matter of fact, the population of the Arab areas of Palestine has always included a considerable group of destitute people, and it is not at all unlikely that many of the latter registered as "refugees."

Speaking on November 22, 1948 before the United Nations Political Committee in Paris, Mr. Henry Cattani, of the Arab Higher Committee, declared that more than 750,000 Arabs had been driven through "Zionist terror and horror from their homeland and were now dependent on the mercies of others."⁹⁴ There is no evidence at all to substantiate this charge. The Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel, published on May 14, 1948 by the Jewish Provisional Government, assured "full social and political equality of all . . . citizens without distinction of race, creed or sex" and called upon "the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to return to the ways of peace and play their part in the development of the state, with full

and equal citizenship and due representation in all bodies and institutions, provisional or permanent."⁹⁵ Israeli sources contend that the Arab "flight psychosis fostered by Arab military leaders at Haifa last April had a political purpose: to prove that Jews and Arabs could not live peaceably in one state. . . They did not anticipate that the Arab flight would develop into a maddened, uncontrollable stampede. Yet this is exactly what their wild tales of 'Jewish butchery' brought about. The Haifa pattern was repeated at Jaffa, Tiberias, Safad, Ramleh, Lydda, New Jerusalem, and in over a hundred Arab villages."⁹⁶ Mr. Arthur Lourie, head of the Israeli United Nations Office, stressed that the evacuation of Arabs began at Tiberias as a "propaganda ruse" but that this backfired and that afterward the Arabs fled "in unreasoning panic" from Israeli troops.⁹⁷ The Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Shertok, declared that the Arabs "left in panic, aggravated by guilty conscience, in some cases stimulated by their British commanders."⁹⁸

This analysis is largely substantiated by British, as well as Arab, sources.

According to the London *Economist* of October 2, 1948, "by far the most potent" of the factors which brought about the mass flight of the Arabs from Haifa was "the announcement made over the radio by the Arab Higher Executive, urging all Arabs in Haifa to quit . . . it was clearly intimated that those Arabs who remained in Haifa and accepted Jewish protection would be regarded as renegades." Official Palestine Arab spokesmen have, in fact, announced that the mass self-evacuation of Palestine Arabs was undertaken on their own volition. At a meeting of the United Nations Security Council on April 23, 1948 Jamal Bey Hussein for the Arab Higher Committee said: "The Arabs would not submit to a truce . . . but they rather preferred to leave their homes in the town [Haifa] . . . and leave the town, which they did." Again, in an interview with the Beirut Arabic newspaper *Telegraph* for September 6, 1948, Emil Ghory, representative of the Arab Higher Committee at the meetings of the General Assembly of the United

Nations, stated: "The problem of the refugees is the direct result of the policy of resistance to partition and to establishment of the Israeli State. This policy was unanimously adopted by the Arab Government, and it is they who have to bear responsibility for the solution of the refugee problem."

All the evidence seems to point to the fact that the mass exodus of the Arab population was deliberately stimulated to serve the political ends of the Arab leadership. The Arab masses were subjected to a heavy barrage of "atrocities propaganda" predicting their wholesale extermination by the advancing Jewish forces. They were exhorted to flee for their lives, even though they were not directly threatened. This propaganda met with an unexpected measure of success. A contagious mass panic seized one Arab community after the other, and they began to flee in numbers far exceeding the original intentions of their leaders. In an article in the London *Daily Mail* of August 12, 1948, Glubb Pasha, the British commander of the Arab Legion, sadly acknowledged: "The Arab civil population panicked and fled ignominiously." A mass psychosis developed which resulted in the abandonment of Arab villages, frequently even before they were threatened by the progress of war.

As a result of this momentous and unexpected development, the Arab minority in Israel was reduced to insignificance. In November, 1948 only 60,000 Arabs, Moslem and Christian, remained in Israel and in the 320 Israeli-occupied Arab villages; this figure included some 15,000 Bedouins in the Negev area. On December 19, an official of the Israeli Ministry of Minorities revealed that many Arab refugees were infiltrating back to Israeli territory and that the number of Arabs had increased to 108,000—still no more than about one-quarter of the original Arab population.⁹⁹

Mr. Moshe Shertok, the Israeli Foreign Minister, hardly exaggerated when he described the Palestinian Arab exodus of 1948 as "one of those cataclysmic phenomena which, according to experience of other countries, change the course of history." Mrs. Anne O'Hare McCormick aptly summed up the impact of the Arab

exodus when she pointed out that "the fact that the development of the [Israeli] State is not complicated by the presence of a hostile minority is just a piece of unexpected good fortune."

10.

There is no firmly established data on the distribution of the Palestine Arab refugees in the neighboring Arab countries. Available figures are contradictory and constantly shifting.

On June 21, 1948 the Egyptian Justice Minister Mursi Badr declared in the Senate that 9,192 Palestinian refugees were in camps under Egyptian Government care.¹⁰¹ However, since the overwhelming majority of those Palestinians who went to Egypt were wealthy people, it can be safely assumed that the 9,192 in camps constituted an insignificant fraction of the total number of Arab refugees in that country. Arab sources put the number of refugees in Transjordan at 65,000 to 80,000 (almost 20 per cent of the country's total population). According to the April 24, 1948 edition of *Al Amal*, Maronite organ in Beirut, 23,000 Palestine Arabs entered Lebanon in the six month period ending April 15, 1948. It must, however, be taken into account that the influx of Arab refugees from Palestine started in the month of May when large-scale fighting led to Jewish occupation of Arab towns and villages. An Associated Press dispatch from Beirut on July 8, 1948 reported that the number of Palestine refugees in Lebanon had reached 150,000, almost 13 per cent of the country's population. In Syria, it was stated by Sir Alexander Cadogan in the United Nations Security Council, there were 70,000 Palestine Arabs, and 5,000 women and children were en route to Iraq.¹⁰²

Neighboring Arab countries are thus overloaded with Palestinian refugees, who impose a heavy burden on their precarious national economies. The conditions under which these refugees live are described as becoming increasingly unbearable. In a report presented to Count Bernadotte on July 23, 1948, St. Aubin of the Red

Cross states that "their present food and financial reserves either are exhausted or nearing exhaustion;" they are a strain on villages to which they were sent; many villages have been doubled in size. Housing conditions are bad and the danger of disease and epidemics is real. A few days later, King Abdullah sent a message to all Arab rulers describing the refugee problem as "dangerous" and asking for their immediate help.¹⁰³

The situation in Lebanon seemed even more serious. The Beirut newspaper, *Al-Hadith*, sharply criticized the Lebanese Government for admitting more refugees than it could handle and suggested that the other Arab states help care for the Arab DPs. *Al Hoda*, Arabic language daily appearing in Brooklyn, on June 16, 1948 published the impressions of Rev. Joseph Awad, rector of the Maronite Church of St. Joseph in Waterville, Maine, who had recently returned from a visit to Lebanon and bitterly complained that the "Palestinian is eating our bread while our brethren starve. Lebanon distributes food supplies to the Palestinians out of the public rations, but Arab Syria refuses to sell Lebanon wheat to feed the Palestine refugees, unless she is paid in hard currency, which the Lebanese treasury does not possess."

Aside from the burden of supporting tens of thousands of homeless people, the refugee problem has a special aspect in Lebanon: the influx of refugees, most of whom are Moslems, may in the long run upset the shaky balance between Christians and Moslems in Lebanon. Christian leaders have expressed alarm that this artificial increase of Moslems might wipe out the slender Christian majority in the country.

There can be little doubt that none of the Arab States is in a position to give permanent shelter—not to speak of permanent resettlement—to those who sought refuge there.

The refugees are even worse off in those parts of Palestine which have remained under Arab control. Overcrowding is unbearable. Food supplies are inadequate. Arab administration, always poor and for many years almost exclusively maintained by British offi-

cials and Jewish funds, has broken down completely. Transportation is disrupted. Fuel, tool and machine shortages are widespread. Medical and social services, always insufficient, have practically disappeared. Diseases are rampant. In addition to all this, relations between the local and the refugee Arabs are strained, and many clashes have been reported between them. There are many cases of attempted looting by refugees.¹⁰⁴ A London broadcast in Arabic said, on July 25, 1948, that prices in Nablus had soared to fantastic heights as a result of the increasing number of Arab refugees in the town, and directed attention to the possibility of epidemics. United Nations medical observers advised the inoculation of the entire Arab population in Palestine.

In a statement made on July 13, 1948 before the United Nations Security Council, Count Bernadotte insisted that "special attention ought to be given to ensuring the right to return to their homes of the substantial number of Arab refugees who fled from the Jewish-occupied areas because of war conditions."¹⁰⁵ One of the main conditions under which the Arab League States on July 18 gave their assent to the renewal of the truce in Palestine was the return of Arab refugees to their former homes.

In the meantime, however, a significant shift occurred in Israeli policy towards the Arabs who had left their residences in Israeli territory. In the first stages of the Palestine war, Jewish leaders made repeated appeals to their Arab neighbors to return to their homes and reclaim their property. But on June 20, 1948, Elias Sasson stated that the Government "had no alternative but to reverse its policy" after five Arab armies had invaded Israel territory. "We never drove the Arabs out," he said. "They fled as part of a plan to create world sympathy and to provide an excuse for an invasion of Palestine. Now they have served their purpose and have become a heavy burden, so the Arab states are telling them to return. They want to get rid of them, but we won't take them. If we did, we would have another 'liberation army' fighting in our midst."

The Jews, Mr. Sasson said, might decide to say to Arabs seeking to return: " 'You can come back to your homes as citizens of equal political and civil status, entitled to a full voice in our Government. First, however, you must sign a pledge of allegiance and loyalty to the State of Israel.' We shall be very careful of those we permit to come back," stressed Mr. Sasson. "In the future we don't want to be bothered by the local Arab troubles we have had in the past."¹⁰⁶

This policy, tentatively outlined by Mr. Sasson, was soon officially endorsed by the Israeli Government. Late in July, when Count Bernadotte during his visit to the Israeli Foreign Minister pressed for the return of Arab refugees "on humanitarian grounds," Mr. Shertok, while conceding that there was a humanitarian element involved, insisted that for military, political and economic reasons the Israeli Government is not in a position, as long as a state of war exists, to readmit any substantial number of Arabs who fled their homes; to do so would virtually be inviting a "fifth column." The Government would discuss the plight of Arab refugees only when the Arab States will be ready to conclude a peace treaty with Israel; then this question will come up for constructive solution as part of the general settlement, which must take into account "the long range interests of Israeli and Arab population."¹⁰⁷

A basic change took place, too, in the Israeli Government's attitude towards property abandoned by the Arab refugees. During the fighting and as a result of the mass flight, a great deal of Arab property fell into Jewish hands. Early in May, it was made clear by Jewish authorities that this property would be returned to the proper owners after the cessation of hostilities. A Jewish custodian of Arab property was chosen to be responsible for this. But later on, this property ceased to be considered inviolable. By November 12, some 450,000 dunams (112,000 acres) of land abandoned by Arabs fleeing Palestine, had been turned over to Jews for cultivation.¹⁰⁸ Under an agreement with the Government, the Jewish National Fund was granted priority in all purchases of unclaimed plots vacated by Arab refugees. Abandoned Arab dwellings have

also not remained empty. By the end of January, 1949, over 68,000 Jewish immigrants had been housed in the buildings evacuated by Arabs in Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, Safad and other urban and rural districts. On December 12, a far-reaching ordinance was published in the *Gazette Extraordinary*, vesting in an administrator appointed by the Government all property, movable and immovable, in Israel or in Israel-occupied areas, belonging to, controlled by, or occupied by "absentees."

On January 18, 1949, Anne O'Hare McCormick described in the *New York Times* how the Israeli Government was moving at top speed to repopulate the land left empty by the Arab exodus. "The shooting had hardly stopped in south Israel two weeks ago when bulldozers began clearing away a wrecked Arab village for the first of nine settlements. Seven were started last week in Galilee also on ground left behind by fleeing Arabs . . . The State of Israel is proceeding on the principle that possession is nine-tenths of the law. This means, obviously, that very few of the 750,000 refugees stranded in Arab Palestine and neighboring countries will ever return to their former abodes in Israeli territory."

It can now be considered as established that the Israeli Government is firmly determined not to permit the wholesale and unconditional return of former Arab residents and that the question of whether, to what extent and under what conditions they will eventually be allowed to come back, will be discussed as an organic part of the future Arab-Jewish peace settlement. This settlement will have to include the plight of the Jewish minorities in the Arab countries. Israeli Premier David Ben Gurion categorically stated that "the ultimate position of the 300,000-odd Arab refugees from Palestine would depend on the treatment meted out to Jewish populations in the Arab lands."¹⁰⁹ Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Shertok also emphatically stated that at the peace table "we shall certainly raise the question of the future of the Jewish communities in Arab lands . . . It is not as if the State of Israel will seek to protect Jewish minorities permanently in all foreign

countries. We can protect only Israeli citizens, but our relations with the neighboring Arab states will certainly be partially conditioned by their treatment of their Jewish communities."¹¹⁰

There are unmistakable indications to the effect that the Israeli Government is now earnestly considering an Arab-Jewish exchange of population as the most thorough and constructive means of solving the problem of an Arab minority in the Jewish State and of the Jewish minorities in Arab lands. Upon his return from a visit to Tel Aviv, Arthur Lourie, head of the Israeli United Nations Office, stated at Lake Success that Israeli Government circles were discussing "a possible exchange of minorities between Israel and the Arab area of Palestine and were considering also the possibility that Jews living in Arab countries might be transferred to Israel."¹¹¹

Isa Nakleh, representative of the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee, immediately denounced "irresponsible talk regarding the possibility of an exchange of minorities between Israel and the Arab states, including the Arab area of Palestine."¹¹² However, Thomas J. Hamilton, the *New York Times* correspondent at the United Nations, stressed that "such an exchange [of population] has long been under discussion by delegations here [at Lake Success], who believe that it offers the best hope for the establishment of friendly or at least correct relations between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries." He recalled that a similar exchange of minorities, executed by Greece and Turkey, "played an important part in establishing friendly relations between the two countries."¹¹³

In the light of the latest developments, exchange of minorities offers not only the most promising, but actually the only possible, solution of the Arab-Jewish deadlock. The question is no longer one of transferring a sedentary, deeply-rooted Arab population, of overcoming its natural inertia and unwillingness to move. We are faced with the hard reality of some 500,000 to 600,000 already displaced Palestinian Arabs. Their return to their former homes is barred by the Government of Israel for reasons of national security. Moreover, their return, even if unopposed, would probably present con-

siderable difficulties for most of the Arab refugees themselves, psychologically and politically, as well as economically. "Some of them have no homes to return to because their villages were leveled by themselves, by sabotage or by attacking forces," says Gene Currivan in the *New York Times* (July 25, 1948). Their economic reintegration, even their maintenance, would present at least as complex and difficult a problem as their resettlement in an Arab country. Fully realizing the magnitude of the task, Count Bernadotte, while pleading for the return of the Arab refugees, undertook "to enlist the aid of appropriate international organizations and agencies in the resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation [in Israel] of the returning refugees."¹¹³

It can hardly be doubted that this international effort would be much more constructive if directed toward transfer to, and resettlement in, an Arab country than toward a futile attempt at restoring the irreparably shattered Arab-Jewish balance in Palestine. "Neutral quarters" in Egypt state that among the Arab refugees themselves there is a marked reluctance to come back and that "most of them fear to return to Israeli-dominated areas."¹¹⁵ There is every reason to believe that the uprooted Palestinian Arabs would be responsive to plans for their resettlement in Iraq, with full compensation by the State of Israel for property left behind.

There should be even fewer difficulties in the case of the 90,000 nomadic "Bedouins, cultivators and stock owners who seek grazing further afield in dry seasons,"¹¹⁶ who live on the territory of Israel. They have no attachment to any specific area and would presumably migrate to any other Arab territory where large spaces for their camel and sheep herds are available. Their actual situation is desperate. When Palestine was a province of the Ottoman Empire, nomadic tribes were free to migrate from one part of the immense Arab territory to another; there was no scarcity in the choice of pastures when the old ones became exhausted. Now, numerous state frontiers have been erected, and there is no longer freedom of movement from Palestine to Syria, Iraq or Saudi Arabia.

This confinement has led only partially to transition to a sedentary, agricultural way of life. The overwhelming majority of Bedouins are simply starving and desperate.

As regards Jewish minorities in the Arab states, it may be assumed that very few among them would prefer to remain. In a letter addressed on January 15, 1946, through the British Foreign Office, to the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee on Palestine, the Jews of Iraq stated that "if a plebiscite is made by you among the Iraqi Jews, you will find that 100 per cent of them are anxious to emigrate from Iraq to Palestine, and none of them desire to stay in Iraq."¹¹⁷ Zakina Habib, president of the Jewish community of Tripoli, Libya, on May 13, 1946 told the *New York Times* correspondent that "because of economic distress and a feeling of insecurity, the Jewish community has asked that a large number of its members be admitted to Palestine or in the United States . . . Tripolitanian Jews would prefer Palestine because they are a Mediterranean people." Even more acute is the longing for Palestine among Yemenite Jews, while the emigration trend among the Jews of Egypt has been considerably strengthened in the last few years. The evacuation of Jewish communities from the Arab countries is likely to be almost wholesale.

The Jewish repatriates from Arab countries would represent a valuable asset to Palestine. The Yemenite Jews are hard-working, unpretentious people, mostly skilled craftsmen (silver and gold smiths, carpenters) and workers in iron foundries, cloth and soap factories. The Iraqi Jews were outstanding in organizing Iraq's international commercial relations and would bring with them extensive knowledge of world markets; they are also relatively wealthy, some of them even very rich. Under an agreement with the Iraqi Government, their wealth could serve as partial compensation for the property left behind by Palestine Arabs.

The working of the exchange scheme would present itself, in general lines, as follows:

An interstate treaty on exchange of population would have to be

concluded between the Governments of the Jewish State and of Iraq, providing for the transfer of Palestine Arabs to Iraq and of Iraqi Jews to Palestine. Additional agreements could be concluded with the Governments of other Arab states for the transfer of their respective Jewish minorities to Palestine, with or without provision for an eventual transfer of those Palestine Arabs who for some reason would prefer to be resettled in an Arab country other than Iraq. The treaties would provide for a compulsory, but not all-inclusive, ethnic sorting-out, based on the principle of a reversed option clause as formulated in the concluding chapter of this author's study, *European Population Transfers 1939-1945* (pp. 477-478). As a rule, every Arab in the Jewish State and every Jew in Iraq or any other Arab country would be subject to transfer; no specific option to this effect would be expected or necessary. Those who would not ask explicitly to be exempted from resettlement would have to leave. Should individual members of the affected minority group be for some imperative reason determined to stay in the country of their present residence, every one of them would have to exercise the right of option in the reverse direction and make a definite "statement of intentions", pledging full and unconditional allegiance to the state he decided to live in. In each individual case, the Government of the respective country would have the right to refuse the application if it considered the applicant disloyal or dangerous to the security of the state. Those who decided to stay and were permitted to do so would remain as individuals only, and would have to reconcile themselves to a status of civic equality, with the same rights and obligations as all other citizens, without any specific minority rights.

II.

Sir John Hope Simpson who possesses considerable experience in the field of interchange of population and who is rather critical

of this method as a general solution of minority population problems, has formulated the "conditions which might ensure success" of exchange of agricultural populations:¹¹⁸

There must on either side be willingness on the part of the States concerned to receive the immigrants in exchange for the minorities with which they wish to part. The numbers on either side must be approximately equal. There must be sufficient land on which to settle the immigrants, and land of the same type as that which they are leaving. There must be financial resources adequate for the expenses of settlement, and a competent staff to supervise and direct. If these conditions are present, it is possible that compulsory exchange may be the correct solution.

The conditions for an Arab-Jewish exchange of population seem to meet most of the above requirements fully and to correspond at least partly to the others.

There can hardly be any doubt as to the advantages which would accrue to the Iraqi Government from accepting Palestinian brothers in faith and race who would bring with them considerable means. Neither should there logically be any reluctance on the part of Arab Governments towards letting their Jewish minorities go. "Equality of numbers on either side" of the exchange is generally rare and of secondary importance; in this particular case it is of no importance whatsoever, since the prospective Palestine Arab transferees in Iraq are to be resettled not on land vacated by Jewish evacuees, but on new soil gained by irrigation and reclamation. The amount of land available for resettlement would be practically inexhaustible in Iraq and sufficient in Palestine, where millions of dunams would be left behind by the departing Arabs. Financial resources required for Arab resettlement in Iraq would be provided in the main by the compensation paid for the land vacated in Palestine. A competent staff for supervision and direction could certainly be found if the resettlement were organized with the cooperation of Jewish and international experts.

Like all other transfer schemes—and possibly to a higher degree than many of them—the project of an Arab-Jewish exchange of population is an arduous and trying proposition. No one should minimize the political, economic and above all psychological difficulties and hazards contingent on this course of action. But it is the only constructive, long-range solution. Other more orthodox solutions may appear “safer” and easier of attainment, but they are in reality no solutions at all. They lead nowhere. They will merely perpetuate and intensify old frictions. What is needed is a new, even revolutionary, approach. Such an approach would serve several purposes: it would eliminate the local Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine; it would free the new Jewish State of a minority problem; it would make possible a new and better life for hundreds of thousands of Arab peasants in surroundings to which they could easily adjust themselves; it would—finally—inaugurate an era of Arab-Jewish cooperation and increased prosperity in the entire Middle East.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III.

1. Eastern Palestine, Transjordan, which originally was part of the mandated territory of Palestine, was closed to Jews in September, 1922 and constituted as a separate Arab Kingdom in March, 1946
2. Elias Sasson, expert on Arab affairs in the Israeli Foreign Ministry, insists that Jewish investigation of the Arab population of Palestine “completely disproved the entirely unfounded” British estimates, and that “the Arab population was never more than 800,000.” (*New York Herald Tribune*, June 21, 1948)
3. Palestine Royal Commission, *Report Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament*, July, 1937, London
3. Palestine Royal Commission, *Report presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament*, July, 1937, London.
4. A more accurate computation by the so-called “Partition Commission” in 1938 put the respective numbers at 7,200 Jews in the Arab State and 294,700 Arabs (49 per cent of the population) in the Jewish State. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, Cmd. 5854, pp. 48-51
5. *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, July 20, 1937

6. *Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords*, July 20, 1937
7. Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Thirty-second (Extraordinary) Session*, Geneva, 1937, p. 26
8. Cmd 5634, January 4, 1938
9. Cmd 5854, p.235
10. *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, November 24, 1938
11. *Ibid.*, *House of Lords*, November 24, 1938
12. *Ibid.*, *House of Commons*, July 20, 1939
13. As early as January 28, 1938, when a Jewish State in partitioned Palestine as proposed by the Royal Commission was still under discussion, Nuri Pasha el-Said, then Iraq's Prime Minister, declared in the *Manchester Guardian* that should "anything untoward happen to a single Arab in the proposed Jewish State of Palestine, the lot of all Jews in Arabic-speaking countries, whether Egypt or the Yemen, would be very hard..."
14. *Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords*, December 8, 1938
15. *Ibid.*, *House of Commons*, May 23, 1939
16. Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Thirty-sixth Session*, Geneva, 1939, p.114
17. *New York Times*, December 10, 1948
18. Evidence Submitted to the Palestine Royal Commission by V. Jabotinsky. *House of Lords*, February 11, 1937, London, 1937, p.40
19. *Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords*, May 23, 1939
20. Palestine Royal Commission, *Minutes of Evidence. Testimony of the Jerusalem ex-Mufti, Haj Amin Effendi El-Husseini*, January 12, 1937. London, 1937, p.298
21. *New York Times*, September 30, 1947
22. *Ibid.*, November 20, 1947
23. *Ibid.*, January 1, 1948
24. S.A. Morrison, *The Condition and Task of the Church in the Near and Middle East* (Stenciled report issued at the Assembly)
25. See articles in the *Al-Difa'a* and *Falastin* of June 20, 1944, on the resolution of the British Labor Party favoring the Arab transfer from Palestine.
26. Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development, by Sir John Hope Simpson (Cmd 3686), London, 1930, pp.146-47
27. Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Thirty-second (Extraordinary) Session*, p. 198
28. *Ibid.*, pp.189, 173, 177
29. Cmd 5854, p. 257
30. Schechtman, Joseph B., *European Population Transfers, 1939-1945*, New York, 1946, pp.488-490
31. *Ankara*, November 17, 1934

32. Donald Everest Webster, *The Turkey of Ataturk*. Philadelphia, 1939, p. 274
33. *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, July 20, 1939
34. Albert Viton, *An American Empire in Asia?* New York, 1943, p.144
35. Alfred Bonne, *The Economic Development of the Middle East*, Jerusalem, 1943, p.50 ff
36. Walter Clay Lowdermilk, *Palestine—Land of Promise*, New York, 1943, p.69
37. Sir W. Willcocks, *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia*, London, 1911
38. Sir George Buchanan, *The Tragedy of Mesopotamia*, Edinburgh and London, 1938, p.247
39. *Correspondence Regarding Post-War Irrigation Policy in Mesopotamia*, Baghdad, 1919, p.9
40. Lowdermilk, *op.cit.*, p.178
41. D.H., "Food Production in Iraq and Persia. Plans to Modernize Agriculture in *The World Today*," November, 1947, p.488
42. Keith A.H. Murray (Director of Food, Middle East Supply Center), "The Common Wealth of the Middle East" in Middle East Supply Center, *The Proceedings of the Conference on Middle East Agricultural Development*, Cairo, 1944, p.197
43. Dr. Hans H. Boesch, "El-Iraq" in *Economic Geography*, Vol.15, No.4, 1939, p.342
44. Bonné, *op.cit.*, p. 8
45. *New International Yearbook for 1943*, p.332
46. Dr. Fritz Grobba, *Iraq*, Berlin, 1941, p.17
47. W.D. Garbutt (Managing Director, Latifyah Estates, Iraq), "Large-Scale Production in the Middle Euphrates Zone" in Middle East Supply Center, *op.cit.*, p.64
48. Dr. Ali Ghalib, *Malaria and Malaria in Iraq*, Jerusalem, 1944, pp.39,49
See also: Dr. Hashim Al Witry, *Health Service in Iraq*, Jerusalem, 1944
49. Hashim Jawad, *The Social Structure of Iraq*, Jerusalem, 1945, pp.17-18
50. Quoted in *The Jewish Standard*, January 31, 1947.
51. Dr. Ali Ghalib, *op.cit.*, p. 41
52. Hashim Jawad, *op.cit.*, p. 22
53. Quoted in: Eliahu Ben Horin, *The Middle East. Crossroads of History*, New York, 1943, p. 224
54. W. Wendel Cleland, "Population Plan for Egypt" in *Demographic Studies of Selected Areas of Rapid Growth*, New York, 1944, p.131
55. Eliahu Ben Horin. *op.cit.*, p. 224
56. Robert R. Nathan, Oscar Gass, Daniel Creamer, *Palestine: Problem and Promise*, Washington, D.C., 1946, p. 188
57. *Ibid.*, p. 190

78. Z. Abramovitz, "Wartime Development of Arab Economy in Palestine" in *The Palestine Year Book*, Vol I., Washington D.C., 1943. p.137
59. Middle East Supply Center, *op.cit.*, p. 199
60. *New York Herald Tribune* and *New York Times*, February 12, 1948
61. Viton, *op.cit.*, p. 164. See also: A. Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World*, London-New York-Toronto, 1947, pp. 36,39,104.
62. *New York Times*, November 25, 1947
63. Israel Zangwill, *The Voice of Jerusalem*, New York, 1921, pp. 108-109
64. Cmd 5854, p. 257
65. Herbert Sidebotham, *Great Britain in Palestine*, London, 1937, p. 240
66. Ch. Weizmann, "Palestine's Role in the Solution of the Jewish Problem" in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1942, p. 337
67. David Ben-Gurion, *Test of Fulfillment*, New York, 1943, p.9
68. *Hamashkif*, May 15, 1944
69. *Zionews*, *New York*, March 8, 1942
70. *Jewish Standard*, April 28, 1944
71. *Jewish Telegraphic Agency Bulletin*, November 17, 1941
72. Walter Clay Lowdermilk, *op.cit.*, p. 178
73. Elie Culbertson, *The World Federation Plan*, New York, 1943, p. 93
74. John Gunther, *Inside Asia*, New York and London, 1942, p. 589
75. British Labor Party, *The International Post-War Settlement*, p. 7. When the Labor Party came into power in 1945, the Labor Government completely disregarded this official party statement.
76. *Jewish Standard*, April 13, 1945.
77. *The Evening Star*, Washington, December 13, 1945.—The American Zionist Emergency Council formulated its position in regard to Herbert Hoover's scheme in a carefully worded statement. Stating—"for the record"—that the Zionist Organization "never advocated the transfer of Palestine's Arabs to Iraq or elsewhere", the Council said that "every man of good will...will welcome Mr. Hoover's plan as an expression of constructive statesmanship. When all the long accepted remedies seem to fail, it is time to consider new approaches. The Hoover plan certainly represents a new approach, formulated by an unprejudiced mind well trained in statesmanship, relief and rehabilitation. Should they (the Arabs) respond to the idea, we shall be happy to co-operate with the great powers and the Arabs in bringing about the materialization of the Hoover plan."

Khalil Totah, Executive Director of the Institute of Arab-American Affairs, in a letter to the *New York Times* (December 24, 1945), without questioning the practicability of Mr. Hoover's plan, categorically opposed it on "moral and religious" grounds. He insisted that "it is not a question of financing and of engineering; it is a human, moral and religious matter which cannot be viewed from mere technical consid-

ations. . . The crux of the matter is whether the Palestine Arabs wish to be transferred to Iraq or not. . . Even though the Arab countries are regarded as a unit, this is no excuse for packing a million Arabs from Palestine to Iraq in order to make room for further Zionist immigration."

78. *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, December 11, 1947
79. *New York Times*, April 20, 1948
80. *Haganah Speaks*, May 15, 1948
81. *New York Times*, May 4, 1948
82. *New York Herald Tribune*, May 4, 1948
83. *Haganah Speaks*, May 15, 1948
84. *New York Times*, May 4, 1948
85. *The Jewish Standard*, May 7, 1948
86. *Haganah Speaks*, May 15, 1948
87. *Ibid.*
88. *New York Times*, May 23, 1948
89. *Ibid.*, July 24, 1948
90. *New York Herald Tribune*, June 21, 1948
91. *New York Times*, July 28, 1948
92. *Ibid.*, December 11, 1948
93. *Ibid.*, November 24 and December 23, 1948
94. *Palestine Post*, November 23, 1948
95. *New York Herald Tribune*, April 20, 1948
96. *Haganah Speaks*, July 30, 1948
97. *New York Times*, July 23, 1948
98. *Ibid.*, August 3, 1948
99. *Jewish Agency Digest of Press and Events*, December 31, 1948
100. *New York Times*, August 2, 1948, and January 17, 1949
101. *Ibid.*, June 22, 1948
102. *New York Herald Tribune*, August 3, 1948
103. *New York Times*, July 24 and 28, 1948
104. *The New Palestine*, May 18, 1948
105. *Ibid.*, July 14, 1948
106. *New York Herald Tribune*, June 21, 1948
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